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50 



THE BATTLE OF 
THE MARNE 



BY 



GEORGE HERBERT PERRIS 

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF "THE DAILY CHRONICLE" 
WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES, 1914-18 



WITH TWELVE UTAPS 



JOHN W. LUGE & CO. 
BOSTON 

MCMXX 



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Gift 
Publisher 



OCT 30 1920 



nr 



PREFACE 

HE great war has entered into history. The 
■ restraints, direct and indirect, which it imposed 

■^ being gone with it, we return to sounder tests 
of what should be pubhc knowledge — uncomfortable 
truths may be told, secret places explored. At the 
same time, the first squall of controversy in France 
over the opening of the land campaign in the West 
has subsided ; this lull is the student's opportunity. 
No complete history of the events culminating in the 
victory of the Marne is yet possible, or soon to be 
expected. On the German side, evidence is scanty 
and of low value ; on that of the Allies, there is yet a 
preliminary work of sifting and measuring to undertake 
ere definitive judgments can be set down. Any nar- 
rative conceived in a scientific, not an apologetic or 
romantic, spirit may claim to further this end. 

The difficulty lies less in following the actual move- 
ments of that great encounter — the most important of 
which, and their part in the result, can now be traced 
pretty accurately — ^than in estimating the factors that 
produced and moulded it. Yet, if we are right in 



vi THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

holding the battle of the Marne to be essentially the 
completion of a chapter, the resultant of certain designs 
and certain misadventures, a vast strategical reversal 
and correction, such an estimate is necessary to the 
subject. How did the two chief antagonists envisage 
the process of modern warfare ? Why was the action 
which was to close the first phase of the war, and 
largely to shape its after-course, fought not near the 
northern or eastern frontiers, but between Paris and 
Verdun ? Why and how were the original plans of 
campaign modified to reach this result ? What con- 
ditions of victory existed on the Marne that had been 
lacking on the Sambre ? In a word, the key to the 
meaning of the battle must be sought in the character 
of the forces in play, their comparative numbers, 
organisation, and training, armament and equipment, 
leadership and inspiration. 

No sooner is such an inquiry opened than a number 
of derivative problems appear. Where exactly lay the 
German superiority of force at the outset, and why 
was it not maintained ? Was the first French con- 
centration justifiable ? If not, was it promptly and 
soundly changed ? Could the northern frontier have 
been defended ? Was Lanrezac responsible for Charleroi, 
and, if so, why not Castelnau for Morhange ? Was the 
German plan of envelopment exaggerated ? Could the 
British have done more at Mons, and were they slow 
and timorous when the hour arrived to turn about ? 
Was Paris ever in danger ? And, coming to the battle 



PREFACE vii 

itself, how was it decided ? What parts did Gallieni, 
Von Kluck, Sir John French, and Foch play ? Was 
Joffre really master of the field ? It may be too soon 
to answer fully such questions as these ; it is too 
late to evade them. 

Outside the mass of official and semi-official bulletins, 
dispatches, and explanations, much of it now best left 
to oblivion, a considerable literature has accumulated 
in France, including personal narratives by combatants 
of all arms, and critical essays from points of view the 
most diverse. With the rather cruel sincerity of the 
French intelligence, the whole military preparation of 
the Republic has been challenged ; and, in the con- 
sequent discussion, many important facts have come 
to Ught. Thus, we have the texts of the most decisive 
orders, and many details of the dispositions of troops. 
We have Marshal Von Billow's valuable diary of field 
movements, and the critical reflections of distinguished 
officers like Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, Generals Mallet erre, 
Berthaut, Verraux, Percin, Canonge, Bonnal, Palat, 
Cherfils, and Col, Feyler, Fragmentary statements by 
General Joffre himself, by Generals Foch, Lanrezac, 
and Maunoury, the Ministers of War, MM. Messimy and 
Millerand, by Generals von Freytag-Loringhoven, Von 
Kluck, and other German officers and men, give useful 
indications. We are also indebted to the more 
systematic works of MM. Hanotaux, Reinach, Engerand, 
and Babin ; and, with regard to the British Force, the 
volumes of Marshal French and Major-General Maurice 



viii THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

are important. These and other sources are cited 
in the pages of "Notes and References" at the end 
of the volume, in which some questions of detail, 
especially relating to the preparation of the battle, 
are discussed. 

Having been privileged to watch the war in France 
from beginning to end, and to live with the French 
armies (as Correspondent attached to General Head- 
quarters) for more than two years, the writer has also 
had exceptional opportunities of studying the terrain, 
and of discussing the drama as a whole and in detail 
with officers and men from the highest to the most 
humble. To name all those from whom he has re- 
ceived aid would be impossible ; to name any might 
seem to associate them with conclusions for which he 
is solely responsible ; but he may record his deep 
gratitude to the French Government, the Headquarters 
Staff, and the various Army Staffs, for the rare experi- 
ence of which this volume is unworthy fruit. 

February igso. 



German units are throughout numbered in Roman capitals ("the XX 
Corps "), Allied in ordinary Jigures (" the 20th Corps "). 

The S7nall figures in the text refer to ^^ Notes and References " at the end 
of the volume. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Preface . . • • • • • v 

CHAP. 

I. The Deluge ...... i 



II. A Tragedy of Errors— 

i. The German Plan of Campaign 
ii. The Forces in Play 
iii. The French War Doctrine 
iv. The Three French Offensives 
V. The Battle of Charleroi-Mons 



V. The Order of Battle — 
i. Gallieni's Initiative 
ii. General Offensive of the Alhes . 

Strength and Position of the Artnies 
iii. Features of the Battlefield 
iv. The Last Summons 



lo 

14 
20 
28 

34 



III. Joffre Starts Afresh— 

i. Ecce Homo ! . . . . .46 

ii. The Second New Plan . . . -54 

iii. Battle of the Gap of Charmes . . .61 

iv. Battles of Le Gateau, Guise, and Launois . 64 

V. End of the Long Retreat . . -71 

IV. The Great Dilemma, Paris-Verdun— 

i. The Government leaves the Capital . -76 

ii. Kluck plunges South-Eastward . . • 79 

iii. Joffre's Opportunity . . . .84 



92 

95 

97 

106 

no 



X THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

CHAP. 

VI. Battle of the Ourcq— 

i. A Premature Engagement 

ii. The British Manoeuvre . 
iii. A Race of Reinforcements 
iv. The Paris Taxi- Cabs 

VII. The "Effect of Suction"— 

i. French and d'Esp^rey strike North 
ii. Battle of the Marshes of St. Gond 

iii. Defence and Recapture of Mondemont 

iv. Foch's Centre broken 

V. Fable and Fact of a Bold Manoeuvre 

VIII. From Vitry to Verdun— 

i. The Battle of Vitry-le-Frangois 
ii. Sarrail holds the Meuse Salient 

IX. Victory .... 

X. The Defence of the East . 

XI. Summing-up .... 

Index ..... 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 

The German Objective (p. 239) ; The Opposed Forces (p. 240) ; De Bloch's 
Prophecy and French's Confession (p. 242) ; Criticisms and Defence of the 
French Staff (p. 244) ; The Surprise in the North (p. 247) ; The Abandon- 
ment of Lille (p. 252) ; M. Hanotaux and the B.E.F. (p. 252); The Fal 
of Maubeuge (p. 256) ; Paris and the German Plan (p. 259) ; Some Books 
on the Battle (p. 263) ; General Bonnal and the British Army (p. 265) ; 
Scenes at Farthest South (p. 266) ; The Myth of the 42nd Division 
(p. 268). 





"3 


. 


118 




. 126 


• 


129 


, 


135 


. 


142 


t 


148 




155 




160 




169 




175 




184 




197 




214 




271 



LIST OF MAPS 



Position of the Armies and Lines of Approach 

Frontispiece 

FACING PAGE 

Battle of Charleroi-Mons . . . ." 38 

. 118 

. 122 

• 136 

. 142 

. 146 

. 156 

. 172 

. 180 

. 206 

. 224 



The Ourcq Front, Afternoon, Sept. 6 
The British Turn-About 
Opening of Allied Offensive, Sept. 6 
The Marne Re-crossed, Sept. 9, a.m. 
Foch's Front, Sept. 6 and 7 . 

„ „ 8 AND 9 . 

Front of French 4TH Army . 
The Verdun Salient 
Battle of the Grand Couronn^ 
Crisis of the Battle of the Marne 



THE BATTLE OF THE 
MARNE 



CHAPTER I 
THE DELUGE 

AUGUST 25, 1914 : three weeks after Von 
Emmich opened the war before Liege ; five 
days after the French Army of Lorraine was 
trapped at Sarrebourg and Morhange ; two days after 
Namur fell, and Charleroi and Mons were abandoned. 
On this black day, the 25th, while Louvain was 
burning, the 80,000 men of the old British regular 
Army made an average of 20 miles under a brazen 
sun, pursued by the enormous mass of Von Kluck's 
marching wing. The ist Corps under Haig came into 
Landrecies at 10 p.m., and, after a stiff fight and two 
or three hours' sleep, trudged on to Guise ; while the 
2nd, Smith - Dorrien's, at Le Cateau and towards 
Cambrai, spent most of a showery night in preparing 
for the battle of the morrow, which was to save the 
western flank of the Allies. On the British right, the 
French 5th Army, Lanrezac's, surprised in the Char- 
leroi-Namur-Dinant triangle by the onset of Von 
Billow and the cleverly secreted approach of Von 
Hansen, had struck a wild blow, and then reeled 



2 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

back ; the two German commanders were now 
driving it over the Belgian frontier from Avesnes 
to Rocroi. The 4th Army, under de Langle de Gary, 
no less heavily punished between Paliseul and Neuf- 
chateau in the Belgian Ardennes, was just reaching the 
French Meuse between Sedan and Stenay, there to 
dispute the passages against the Duke of Wiirtemberg. 
Eastward again, Ruffey, beaten back on a wide crescent 
from Virton to Briey in the Woevre by the Imperial 
Crown Prince, was standing better against a relaxed 
pressure, from toward Montmedy, through Spincourt, 
to Etain. Thus, Sarrail, in taking over the command 
of the 3rd Army, was able to make ready, though with 
inadequate means, for the three-sided defence of 
Verdun. On the eastern border, Castelnau and 
Dubail, withdrawing hardly from ill-starred adventures 
in Lorraine and Alsace, were rallying the 2nd and ist 
Armies around the Nancy hills and on both sides of 
the Gap of Charmes. Mulhouse, twice captured, was 
finally abandoned by General Pau, with all save a corner 
of Alsace and the southern passes of the Vosges. 
" It is a cruel necessity," said the official communique 
of August 26, " which the Army of Alsace and its 
chief have submitted to with pain, and only at the last 
extremity," They had discovered that " the decisive 
attack " had to be met " in the north." At that 
moment, in fact, a hardly less " decisive " attack w^as 
being met in the heart of Lorraine. 

It was everywhere the same bitter story of defeat 
— defeat by surprise, by locally superior numbers, by 
superior armament, sometimes by superior general- 
ship ; and everywhere the retreat was accompanied 
and hampered by the flight of masses of peasantry 



THE DELUGE 3 

and townsfolk whose flaming homes lit upon the 
horizon behind a warning to hasten their feeble steps. 

Before we seek the Staffs in their shifting quarters, 
to explain this extraordinary situation, let us see what 
it meant for the commonalty of the armies, without 
whose strength and confidence the best plans must be 
as chaff in the wind. Over a million strong, they had 
left their homes, and gathered at their depots during 
these three weeks, to be whirled off to the frontiers 
and the first scarcely imaginable trial of modern 
conscript systems. It was a new thing in the world's 
history, this sudden tremendous clash of the whole 
manhood of highly developed nations, armed with 
the most murderous machinery science could devise, 
and supported by vast reserves of wealth. It had 
fallen swiftly upon them, the doom that many learned 
men had declared to be impossible in the twentieth 
century ; yet its essential nature was crude enough to 
be immediately understood, and the intelligence of 
France, though shocked, was not stunned. This 
million of peasants and workmen, merchants, manu- 
facturers, priests, artists, idlers, and the nation behind 
them, were unanimous as never before. They knew 
the issue was not of their making ; they knew equally 
that it could not be refused, but must be fought out, 
and that it would be a hard fight. The Napoleonic 
wars were to be eclipsed ; and there was now no 
Little Corporal to flash his genius Uke a searchlight 
across Europe. The enemy had no less advantage in 
prestige than in effectives, preparation, initiative. 

Few of the million guessed, as yet, that most of 
them were marked down for sacrifice. The general 
opinion was that it would be all over by Christmas, 



4 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

at latest. A four months' war seemed tragic enough 
in those first days. With the unwonted agreement, 
an unwonted gravity spread across the sunny lands 
from the Channel to the Alps where the crops were 
ripening. If international idealism lay shattered, 
national democracy rose well to the trial — never better. 
No recrimination (even the murderer of Jaur^s was 
set aside), no conspiracy, no guillotine, marked the 
great revival of the republican spirit. England would 
at least guard the coasts, and keep the seaways open. 
France went into the struggle without wavering or 
doubt. 

And so, " Aux armes, Citoyens ! " — ^for these, mark 
you, are, in very fact, citizen armies, independent, free- 
thinking, high-spirited fellows, no Emperor's " cannon- 
food." From the smallest hamlet to the boulevards 
of the great city, every pulse of life is feverishly con- 
centrated upon their gathering and departure. At the 
barracks the reservists, clad, armed, equipped, are 
ready to entrain. Crowds of women, whose red eyes 
belie their brave words, children at their skirts, 
surround the gates, and run forward with bunches 
of flowers and tricolor rosettes. The officers carry 
bouquets at their saddle-bows, the men cap their rifles 
with roses and ribbons. At the railway station, long 
lines of goods-vans, with a few passenger carriages ; 
more flowers and little flags ; allied colours in front of 
the engine ; a wag chalks up the direction : " Berlin, 
alley et retour." The horses and guns are aboard ; 
the men jostle in the open doorways, and exchange 
cries with the crowd. A stanza of the " Marseillaise " 
is broken by last adieux, shouts of " Vive la France ! " 
and the curtain falls upon the first memorable act. 



THE DELUGE 5 

Interminable journeys follow, by road and rail, 
toward the frontiers, then from town to village, and 
from farm to farm of countrysides more and more 
deserted and desolate. In the passes of the Vosges, 
the hills and fiats of Lorraine, the woods of the French 
Ardennes, the men accustom themselves uneasily to 
the oppressive heat of day and the chUl and damp of 
night ; to sore feet and chafed shoulders ; to spells 
of hunger due to late or lost convoys ; to the de- 
privation of accustomed comfort, and the thousand 
minor ills which in all times have been the ground- 
stuff of the showy tapestries of war. Superfluous 
graces of civilised life vanish before the irreconcilable 
need of economy in every effort. Officers begin to 
be honoured not for rank or show, but for the solid 
talents of leadership ; pals are chosen, not from 
effusion of heart, but for assurance of help in emer- 
gency. 

The mantles of the chasseurs are still blue, the 
breeches of the infantry red, the uniforms of the 
artillery and engineers nearly black ; but already 
bright colours tend to disappear, and every other tone 
to assimilate with the dust of the high roads. By 
day and night there is but one traffic throughout these 
northern and eastern departments — files of cavalry, 
batteries of field-guns, columns of heavy-laden men, 
convoys of Parisian autobuses and hooded carts, pass 
incessantly through the silent forests out into the open 
plains. The civilian population steadily diminishes, 
even in the larger towns ; the gendarmerie keep those 
who remain under suspicion of espionage. The 
frontier villagers welcome the marching troops hos- 
pitably, until local food supplies are exhausted, and 



6 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

until news comes in from the front of reverses and of 
foul cruelty to the peasants on the part of the enemy. 
Only a fortnight has gone by when the national con- 
fidence in a speedy victory receives this heavy blow. 
Bad news gathers and reverberates. It is a little 
difficult, after years of bloodshed, to recover the fresh 
sense of these first calamities. Men were then not yet 
broken to the pains, the abominable spectacles, of war. 
That their self-offering to the fatherland should win 
them an honoured grave might well be. But defeat 
at the outset, the shame of retreat almost before a 
blow could be struck, this was an incredible, monstrous, 
intolerable thing. 

The incredible, however, generalised itself over all 
the highways of Lorraine and Belgium. Take any 
typical scene on the march-routes of August 22 or the 
following days.^ The roads are black with columns 
of troops retreating west- and south-ward, more or 
less broken, linesmen, chasseurs, artillerymen, supply 
and special services, with their guns, munition wagons, 
Red Cross detachments, convoys of heavy-laden carts 
with wounded men sitting on top or clinging behind ; 
and, in the breaks, crowds of panic-stricken peasants, 
in farm wagons or on foot, old men, women, and children, 
with bedding, boxes, bird-cages, and other strange 
belongings. Dismay broods like a palpable cloud 
over these pitiful processions. There is an incessant 
jostling. Drivers flog their horses cruelly. Wounded 
men drop by the wayside and lie there untended, 
their haggard faces stained with mire and powder, 
blood oozing through their coats, trickling out into 
the litter of torn knapsacks and broken arms. The 
sun blazes inexorably, the air is poisoned with clouds 



THE DELUGE 7 

of dust, or drenching showers of rain produce another 
sort of misery ; and ever the long stream of failure 
and fear flows on, eddying here and there into acute 
confusion as some half-mad woman sets up a cry : 
" The Prussians ! " 

Night follows day : soldiers and country-folk, hungry 
and exhausted, fall into the corners of any sheltered 
place they can find — an empty barn, the nave of a 
village church — ^for an unsatisfying sleep, or, too sick 
to sleep, watch the fantastic shadov/s and fugitive 
lights dancing upon the walls, mocking their anguished 
thoughts of the morrow. The batteries and convoys 
have gone on through the darkness, men rolling from 
side to side with fatigue on their horses or gun- 
carriages, as though drunk. With daybreak the greater 
trek recommences. The enemy has not been idle : in 
the distance behind rolls the thunder of heavy guns ; 
pillars of smoke and flame rise from burning villages. 
And as, day after day, a new stage of retirement — 
increasingly controlled, it is true — is ordered, the 
question pierces deeper : What is to become of France ? 

Those who have lived at the centre as well as on 
the skirts of armed hosts become habituated to one en- 
veloping condition : the rank and file, and even most 
of the officers, know little or nothing of what is passing 
outside their own particular spheres. It is in the 
nature and necessity of military operations, especially 
at the beginning and in a phase of rapid move- 
ment, that it should be so. Perhaps it is also a ne- 
cessity of the psychology of endurance. Of these 
republican armies, only a small minority of the men 
were old soldiers ; most of them had all they could do 
to adapt themselves, day by day and hour by hour, 



8 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

to the new world of violence, squalor, and general 
unreason in which, they were now prisoned. They 
had to learn to bear fatigue and pain such as they had 
never known ; to overcome the spasm of fear that grips 
the stoutest heart in unaccustomed emergencies ; to 
thrust the bayonet not into a sandbag, but into soft, 
quivering flesh, and draw it forth again ; to obey men 
who were incompetent and stupid, as well as born 
leaders. The German heavy shells, aeroplanes, motor 
transport, the formidable entrenchments and fields 
of wire — ^gradually they recognised these and other 
elements of the invader's superiority. Weaklings 
cried : " We are betrayed. It is 1870 over again." 
What could the bravest reply ? Letters were few 
and far between. Newspapers were never so barren. 
What was Paris doing ? What were Russia and 
England doing ? The retreating columns marched 
with downcast eyes, wrapped in a moody silence. 

By what revolt of the spirit did these apparently 
broken men become, a fortnight later, the heroes of the 
Marne ? The answer must be that they were not 
broken, but were passing through the sort of experi- 
ence which, in a virile race, wakens the dull-minded 
to their utmost effort, blows away the last traces of 
laxity and false idealism, and, by setting above 
every other fear the fear of a ruined Fatherland, 
rallies the whole mass on the elementary ground of 
defence to the death. Voices, lying voices, had 
whispered that France was diseased, body and soul, 
that the Republic would surely die of its corruptions. 
We have since discovered the immeasurable strength 
of democratic communities. Then it was questioned 
by the few, unsuspected by the many. England and 



THE DELUGE 9 

America, even more than France, had outgrown any 
sort of liking for war. To be driven back to that 
gross test was a profound surprise. For the quick, 
proud French mind to find itself suddenly in face of 
defeat and the threat of conquest was a second and 
severer shock. The long retreat gave it time to per- 
ceive that this calamity arose largely from its own 
errors, and to re-group its forces in a truer conception 
of the character of modern warfare. Even Joffre 
may not have clearly realised this need ; great instincts 
count in the crisis of leadership equally with powerful 
reasoning. Amid the tramp-tramp of the weary, 
dust-blinded columns, by the night bivouacs, under 
the rain of shrapnel and the crash of high explosive, 
men of the most diverse condition and character, 
shedding old vanities and new alarms, came down 
step by cruel step to the fundamental honesty, unity, 
and resolution of our nature. The mirage of an easy 
victory vanished ; in its place a finer idea rose and 
rose till the armies saw nothing else : France must 
live ! I may die, or be doomed to a travesty of life ; 
at any price, France must be saved. 

So the steel was tempered for the supreme trial. 



CHAPTER II 
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

I. The German Plan of Campaign 

ERRORS," " vanities " ? These words must 
be justified, however gently, however briefly. 
To regard the battle of the Marne without 
reference to the grievous beginnings that led to and 
shaped it would be to belittle and falsify a subject 
peculiarly demanding care for true perspective. The 
battle may be classed as negatively decisive in that it 
arrested the invasion long enough to enable the Allies 
to gain an equaUty of forces, and so to prevent a final 
German victory ; it was only positively decisive in 
the larger sense that it re-created on a sounder base 
the military spirit and power of France, which alone 
among the Western Allies seriously counted in that 
emergency, and, by giving the army a new direction, 
the nation a new inspiration, made it possible for them 
to sustain the long struggle that was to follow. Perilous 
illusions, military as well as pacifist, were buried 
beside the Marne. A fashion of thought, a whole 
school of teaching was quietly sunk in its waters. 
The French mind rose to its full stature as the nature 
of the surprise into which it had fallen broke upon it. 

This surprise was threefold. In the first place, 
the German plan of campaign was misconceived. 



THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ii 

That plan was grandiose in its simplicity. It rested 
upon a sound sense of the separation of the Allies : 
their geographical dispersion, which gave the aggressor 
the advantages famous in the career of Frederick the 
Great, as in that of Napoleon ; the diversity of char- 
acter, power, and interest within the Entente, which 
was, indeed, hardly more than an improvisation, 
without any sort of common organ, so far ; its lack of 
unity not only in command but in military theory and 
practice generally. The first of these data indicated 
to the German Command the Frederician succession 
of swift offensives ; the second narrowed the choice 
for the first effort, and suggested an after-work of 
political intrigue ; the third had fortified Prussian 
pride and discipline with a daring strategy and an 
armament superior, in most respects, to an3rthing the 
rest of the world had conceived to be possible. Which 
of the three great States, then, should be first struck 
down ? The wildest Pan-Germanist could not reply 
" England," in face of her overwhelming sea-power. 
So the British Empire, with the North Sea and Channel 
coasts, were, for the moment, ignored. Its internal 
problems, its peaceful, almost neutral, temper, its 
slow-mindedness in European affairs, were more 
regarded than the trivial military force which alone 
England could at once offer its friends. For speed 
was to be of the essence of the plan. Remained 
France and Russia ; and here political as well as 
military calculations entered. The inchoate Empire 
of the East would, it was thought, be the slower in 
getting to its feet. Would a new Moscow expedition 
break its will for self-defence ? The author of the 
" Willy-Nicky " letters imagined a better way. France 



12 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

would stand by her ally. The " RepubUc of the 
Rochettes and Steinheils," however, was not naturally 
impregnable ; when it was finished, would not " dear 
Nicky " be glad to return to the Drei-Kaiserbund, the 
old Bismarckian order, and to join in a friendly re- 
arrangement of the world ? So the conclusion, with 
all the neatness of a professorial thesis : Russia was 
to be held up — ^actively, on the south, by the Austro- 
Hungarian armies, passively on the north, by a screen 
of German troops — ^while France, as the principal 
enemy, was swiftly crushed. Thus far, there should 
have been no surprise. 

It was otherwise with the plan of campaign itself, 
and there are details that will remain in question till 
all the archives are opened. Yet this now appears 
the only plan on which Germany could hope to bring 
an aggressive war to a successful issue. A repetition 
of the triumph of 1870 would not be enough, for, if 
France resisted as long this time, everything would 
be put in doubt. The blow must be still more swift 
and overwhelming. To be overwhelming, it must at 
once reach not portions, but the chief mass, of the 
French armies. But nowhere in the world had 
military art, working upon a favourable terrain, set 
up so formidable a series of obstacles to grand-scale 
manoeuvre as along the line of the Meuse and Moselle 
Heights and the Vosges. A piercing of this line at 
the centre, between the fortified systems of Verdun- 
Toul on the north and Epinal-Belfort on the south, 
might be an important contributory operation ; in 
itself it could not give a speedy decision. A mere 
diversion by Belgium, in aid of a main attack in 
Lorraine, would not materially alter this calculation. 



THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 13 

The full effects of surprise, most important of all 
factors in a short struggle, could only be expected 
where the adversary was least prepared, which was 
certainly across the north. These offensive con- 
siderations would be confirmed by a defensive con- 
sideration : German Lorraine, also, was so fortified 
and garrisoned as to be beyond serious fear of in- 
vasion. In neither direction could Alsace provide 
favourable conditions for a great offensive. 

The political objects of the war being granted, these 
arguments would lead to the strategical conclusion : 
the strongest possible force will be so deployed, on a 
vast arc stretching from southern Lorraine to Flanders, 
that its superiority may at once be brought fully into 
play. The method was a variant drawn from 
the teaching of Clausewitz and Schlieffen. The 
" march on Paris " occupied in the plan no such 
place as it long held in the popular imagination. The 
analogy of closing pincers has been used to describe 
the simultaneous onset of seven German armies ranged 
in a crescent from the Vosges to Brussels ; but it is 
uncertain whether the southern wing was originally 
intended to participate immediately in the destructive 
stroke, or whether this purpose followed upon the 
collapse of the first French offensives. The latter 
supposition is the more probable ; and we may, 
therefore, rather picture a titanic bolas ending in five 
loaded cords, of which the two outer ones are the 
most heavily weighted. These two outer masses were 
{a) Kluck's and Billow's Armies on the west ; {b) the 
Crown Prince of Bavaria's and Heeringen's on the 
east. Approximately equal, they had very different 
functions, the road of the one being open, of the other 



14 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

closed ; the one, therefore, being essentially offensive, 
the other provisionally defensive. Between these 
two masses, there were three lesser forces under 
Hansen, the Duke of Wiirtemberg, and the Imperial 
Crown Prince. While the eastern armies held the 
French forces as originally concentrated, the western 
mass, by an immense envelopment, was to converge, 
and the three inner bodies were to strike direct, 
toward the north-centre of France — perhaps toward 
the upper Seine, but there could hardly be a precise 
objective till the invasion developed ^ — destro3^ng any 
resistance in their path. The eastern thrust which 
actually followed appears, on this hypothesis, as an 
auxiliary operation rather than part of a double 
envelopment : we shall see that, delivered at the 
moment when the Allies in the west were being 
driven in between Le Cateau and Givet, it failed 
against a successful defence of the only open road of 
the eastern frontier, the Gap of Charmes, and that 
it again failed a fortnight later. The other German 
armies went triumphantly forward. In every part 
of the field is evident the intention to conceal, even 
to hold back, the movements of approach, and so to 
articulate and synchronise them that, when the hour 
of the decisive general action had arrived, there should 
be delivered a single, sudden, knock-out blow. 

II. The Forces in Play 

In every part the German war-machine was de- 
signed and fitted to deliver such a blow. Its effective 
force was the second great element of surprise for the 
Entente. 



THE FORCES IN PLAY 15 

It is now clear that, taking the field as a whole, 
France was not overwhelmed by superior numbers. 
True, as a French official report says, " the military 
effort of Germany at the outset of the war sur- 
passed all anticipations " ; but the element of sur- 
prise lay not in numbers, but in fighting quality 
and organisation. Of the whole mass mobilised in 
August 19 14, one quarter was sent to the East. The 
remainder provided, in the last week of August, for 
employment against Belgium and France, an effective 
force of about 80 infantry divisions — 45 active, 27 
reserve, mixed Ersatz brigades presently grouped in 
6 divisions, and 4 Landwehr divisions in course of 
formation,^ with about 8 divisions of cavalry, — about 
a million and a half of men, for the most part young, 
highly trained and disciplined, including 115,000 
re-t ngaged non-commissioned officers (double the 
strength of the French company cadres). Of the 
prodigious mass of this west-European force, about 
a half was directed through Belgium, and — essential 
fact — nearly a third passed to the west of the 
Meuse. 

The French, on the other hand, admirably served 
by their railways,* put at once into the field 86 
divisions (47 active, 25 reserve, 12 Territorial, and 
2 Moroccan), of which 66 were at the front, with 7 
divisions of cavalry, on the eve of the critical battles 
of the Sambre and the Gap of Charmes, in the third 
week of August. Before the battle of the Marne, all 
French active troops had been withdrawn from the 
Italian frontier, only a few Territorials being left 
there. An exact numerical comparision cannot yet 
be made. It seems certain, however, that, including 



1 6 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

five British and six Belgian divisions, in the whole 
field the Allies were not outnumbered. There was 
no great difference in cavalry. 

But there was a vital difference in the infantry 
organisation, as to which the French Command had 
been completely deceived. Not only had it failed to 
foresee the creation of brigades of Ersatz troops (to 
say nothing of the Landwehr divisions which appeared 
in September) : it had never contemplated the use of 
reserve formations as troops oi shock. In the 
French Army, the reserve battalions, regiments, and 
divisions were so many poor relations — inadequate in 
younger officers and non-coms, insufficiently armed 
(especially in artillery), insufiiciently trained and 
disciplined, and, accordingly, destined only for lesser 
tasks. When, as occurred almost at once under 
pressure of the successful example of the enemy, 
reserve divisions and groups of divisions had to be 
thrown into the front line, the homogeneity of the 
armies and the confidence of their chiefs suffered. 
Meanwhile, realising a plan initiated in 1913, the 
German Staff had created 16 army corps of reserves, 
of which 13 were used on the Western front, where 
they proved as solid as the regulars, and were given 
tasks as responsible in all parts of the field. The main 
mass of attack, therefore, consisted not of 22, but 34, 
army corps — a difference larger than the strength 
of the two armies of Kluck and Biilow to which the 
great enveloping movement was entrusted.^ With- 
out this supplementary force — ^the result not of 
numbers available, but of superior training and 
organisation — ^the invasion could hardly have been 
attempted, or would assuredly have failed. On the 



THE FORCES IN PLAY 17 

other hand, as we shall see, had it been anticipated, 
the French plan of campaign must have been pro- 
foundly modified. 

The balance in armament was not less uneven. The 
French 3-inch field-gun from the first justified the 
highest expectations of its rapidity and accuracy of 
fire. But in pieces of heavier weight and longer 
range the inferiority was flagrant. While Frenchmen 
had been counting their "75" against heavier but 
less handy German guns, while they were throwing 
all the gravamen of the problem of national defence 
on three-years' service, the enemy was developing a 
set of instruments which immensely reinforced his 
man-power. Instead of resting content with light 
guns, he set himself to make heavier types more 
mobile. The peace estabUshment of a German active 
corps included 160, a French only 120, guns. It was, 
however, in weight, rather than numbers, that the 
difference lay. Every German corps had 16 heavy 
5" 9-inch mortars. The French had no heavy artillery 
save a few batteries of Rimailho 6'i-inch rapid-fire 
pieces, and a few fortress cannon. In addition to 642 
six-piece batteries of horse and field artillery (3'1-inch 
field-gun and 4"i-inch light howitzer), the German 
armies had, in aU, before the mobilisation, 400 four-piece 
batteries of 5*9-inch howitzers and 8'2-inch mortars. 
The German artillery alone at the outset had aviators 
to correct their fire, " Thus," says General Malleterre, 
speaking from experience in the long retreat ^ — " thus 
is explained the terrible surprise that our troops 
suffered when they found themselves overwhelmed at 
the first contact by avalanches of projectiles, fired 
from invisible positions that our artillery could not 



1 8 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

reach. For there was this of unexpected in the German 
attack, that, before the infantry assault, the deploy- 
ment of units was preceded by showers of shells of all 
calibres, storms of iron and fire arresting and upsetting 
our shaken lines." 

In air services, in petrol transport, and in the art 
of field defences, also, the French were outmatched. 
Aviation was essentially their sport and science ; but 
the army had shown little interest in it, and had made 
only a beginning in its two main functions — ^general 
reconnaissance and the ranging of artillery fire.' 
Thus ill-prepared for a modern large-scale offensive, 
France had not acquired the material or the tactic 
of a strategical defence. The light and rapid " 75 " 
had been thought of almost exclusively as an arm of 
attack, in which weight and range were now become 
the master properties. Its remarkable qualities for 
defence began to appear in the unfortunate actions 
presently to be traced, and were only fully understood 
many months later, when " barrage " fire had been 
elaborated. The mitrailleuse was essentially a French 
invention ; but its greatest value — in defence — was 
not yet appreciated. The numerical provision of 
machine-guns was the same as that of the German 
Army (though differently organised). It was owing 
to a more considerable difference of tactical ideas 
that a legend grew up of an actual German superiority 
in this arm. In the French Army, all defensive 
methods were prejudiced ; in the German, they were 
not. The deep trenches that might have saved 
much of Belgium and northern France were 
scouted, until it was too late, as incompatible with 
the energy and pride of a great army. The lessons 



THE FORCES IN PLAY 19 

from recent wars drawn, among others, by the 
Russian State Councillor, Jean de Bloch, fifteen years 
before,® went for nothing. "It is easy to be * wise 
after the event,' " writes Field-Marshal French ; " but 
I cannot help wondering why none of us realised what 
the most modern rifle, the machine-gun, motor traction, 
the aeroplane, and wireless telegraphy would bring 
about. It seems so simple when judged by actual 
results. ... I feel sure that, had we realised the true 
effect of modern appliances of war in August 1914, 
there would have been no retreat from Mans." ^ 

While the German armies were born and bred in the 
old offensive spirit, their masters had seen the diffi- 
culties created by the development of modern gunfire. 
With a tireless and pitiless concentration of will, 
the men had been organised, trained, and in every 
essential way provided, to carry out an aggressive 
plan of campaign. Yet their generals did not despise 
scientific field-works, even in the days of their first 
intoxication, as witness any French story of the battle 
of Morhange, or this characteristic note on the fighting 
in the region of Neufchateau and Palliseul : " The 
enemy, whom our aeroplanes and cavalry had not been 
able to discover, had a powerful defensive organisa- 
tion : fields of wire entanglement on the ground ; 
wide, deep holes concealing pikes and sword blades ; 
lines of wire 2 yards high, barbed with nails and hooks. 
There were also, unfortunately, in certain of our corps, 
insufficiencies of instruction and execution, imprudences 
committed under fire, over-bold deployments leading 
to precipitate retreats, a lack of co-ordination between 
the infantry and the artillery. The enemy profited 
by our inexperience of the sort of defence he had 



20 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

organised." i° For the German soldiers at the outset 
of the war, this was only a passing necessity. The 
principle of the instant strategical offensive well ex- 
pressed the spirit of an authoritarian Government 
bent on aggression, of its constituency, at once 
jealous and servile, and its war-machine, sustained 
by a feverishly developed industrialism. None of these 
conditions obtained under the Third Republic. Of 
the weaknesses of the French Army in tactical science, 
one result is sufficiently tragic proof ; in the first 
month of the war, 33 army corps and divisional 
generals were removed from their commands .^^ 

III. The French War Doctrine 

It was not the fault, but the glory, of France that 
she lived upon a higher level, to worthier ends, than 
her old enemy. But if we find reason to suspect that, 
the nation having accepted the burden of taxation 
and armed service, its arms and preparation were not 
the best of their kind, that a superstitious fidelity to 
conservative sentiments and ideas was allowed to 
obscure the hard facts of the European situation and 
the changing nature of modern warfare, the fact 
that certain critics have plunged rashly into the 
intricacies of a most difficult problem, or the risk 
of being corrected when more abundant information 
appears, must not prevent us from facing a con- 
clusion that is important for our subject. We do not 
espouse any partisan thesis, or question any individual 
reputation ; we can do no more here than open a line 
of inquiry, and no less than recall that the men whose 
responsibility is in cause had suddenly to challenge 



THE FRENCH WAR DOCTRINE 21 

fate on evidence at many points slighter than now 
lies before any studious layman. 

In every detail, Germany had the benefit of the 
initiative. The French Staff could not be sure in 
advance of British and Belgian aid or of Italian 
neutrality, and it was bound to envisage the possibility 
of attack by the Jura, as well as by Belgium. It 
could not be sure that any smaller strength would 
secure the Lorraine frontier ; and it was possibly right 
in regarding a defeat on the east as more dangerous 
than a defeat in the north. The distrust of fortifica- 
tion, whether of masonry and steel, or of field-works, 
may have become exaggerated by a too lively sense 
of the power of the newer artillery ; but it had a certain 
basis in the fear of immobilising and paralysing the 
armies. To discover a happy mean between a 
dangerous obstinacy in defending a frontier, and a 
dangerous readiness to abandon precious territory and 
its people in order to preserve freedom of movement, 
was perhaps beyond any brain of that time. Never- 
theless, when aU allowances have been made, it must 
be said (i) that the importance of gaining time by 
defensive action was never realised, and this chiefly 
because of dogmatic prepossessions ; (2) that the 
actual concentration expressed a complete misjudg- 
ment of the line of greatest danger ; and (3) that these 
two faults were aggravated by the kind of offensive 
upon which all hopes were placed. The misapprehen- 
sion of the German system of reserves, referred to 
above, and therefore of the total effective strength of 
the enemy, had led the French Staff to conclude that 
there was nothing to fear west of the Meuse, and at the 
same time had confirmed a temperamental beUef in 



22 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

the possibility of crippling the attack by a rapid and 
unrestrained offensive. The whole conception was 
erroneous. 

For Belgium, there was no other hope than a pro- 
visional defensive. In any war with Germany, the 
principal object for France, it now seems evident, must 
be to stave off the coup brusque till Russia was fully 
ready, and England could bring more aid. But the 
traditional dogma was in possession ; any doubt was 
damned as a dangerous heresy. The chief lesson of 
1870 was now thought to be the folly of passivity. 
Looking back upon events, many French soldiers 
recognise, with General Malleterre, that the French 
strategy should have been " a waiting disposition 
behind a powerfully-organised Meuse front, with a 
mass of manoeuvre ready to be directed against the 
principal attack." " But," adds this writer, " our 
minds had been trained in these latter years to the 
offensive d, outrance." ^'^ They had been trained in part 
upon German discussions, the deceptive character of 
which, and the very different facts behind, were not 
realised. At its best, for instance in Foch's lectures 
at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre (1895-1901), there 
was in this teaching somewhat too much of emotion, 
too little of cold analysis. The faith in sheer energy 
and will is placed too high, the calculation of means to 
ends too slightly insisted upon. It is true, it is, indeed, 
a truism, that " the battle must not be purely de- 
fensive," that " every defensive battle must be ter- 
minated by an offensive action, or it will lead to no 
result." Foch himself, before he had risen to the 
supreme direction of the Allied armies, had learned 
to recognise that, with millions of men in play, no 



THE FRENCH WAR DOCTRINE 23 

effort of will can suddenly give a decision, that the 
defensive may have to continue for months, even for 
years, a new war-machine may have to be built up, 
ere a victorious reaction becomes possible. 

In the General Staff instructions of October 28, 
1913, the doctrine had received its extremest ex- 
pression. The milder instructions of 1895 were con- 
demned as based upon the " most dangerous " idea 
that a commander might prefer defence on a favour- 
able, to attack on an unfavourable, ground. " In 
order to avoid all misunderstanding on so important a 
point of doctrine, the new instructions admit only a 
single justification for the defensive in combat, that 
is, the necessity of economising troops on certain points 
in order to devote more forces to attacks ; so under- 
stood, the defensive is, properly speaking, no more 
than an auxiliary of the offensive." " The offensive 
alone leads to positive results " ; this is the sole 
permissible rule governing the conduct of operations. 
Attacks must be pressed to the extremity without 
arriere-pensee or fear of heavy losses : " every other 
conception must be rejected as contrary to the very 
nature of war" (art. 5). "A Commander-in-Chief 
will never leave to his adversary the priority of action 
on the pretext of waiting for more precise information ; 
he will, from the beginning of the war, stamp it with 
such a character of violence and determination that 
the enemy, struck in his morale and paralysed in 
action, will perhaps fird himself compelled to remain 
on the defensive " (art. 6). "All the decisions of the 
command must be inspired by the will to seize and 
keep the initiative " ; and they must be pursued 
" even if the information collected up to then on the 



24 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

forces and dispositions of the enemy be obscure and 
incomplete." The plan should, indeed, be supple, 
so that changes can be made according to new informa- 
tion ; but " success in war depends more on persever- 
ance and tenacity than on ability in the conception 
of the manoeuvre " (art. 15). " The French Army," 
added the Commission which elaborated these rules 
" returning to its traditions, now admits in the conduct 
of operations no law other than that of the offensive." 

Fortunately, no code can do more than hamper the 
natural elasticity of the French mind. But the direction 
of the armies from top to bottom, and even the 
traditional aim of keeping in hand a mass of manoeuvre, 
which had figured strongly in the teaching of Foch 
and other military writers of ten or fifteen years 
before, were affected by the current prescriptions 
of the Staff. We cannot here attempt to trace the 
growth of the perversion. The spirit of the French 
command on the eve of the war is, however, sufficiently 
evidenced in its actual dispositions ; and we know 
that it threw its only mass of manoeuvre (the 4th Army) 
into the Belgian Ardennes in the third week of August, 
and had to fight the battle of the Marne without any 
general reserve. In brief, along with every arm and 
method of defence, the service of information, the 
preparation of battle, and the art of manoeuvre — 
which is irreconcilable with a dogma of universal and 
unconditional attack — were depreciated and pre- 
judiced.i^ In the strength and weakness of this 
creed, France entered the war. 

The results in the lesser commands were serious 
enough. Speaking of the advance into the Ardennes, 
M. Hanotaux, in general an apologist of the old school, 



THE FRENCH WAR DOCTRINE 25 

says that it was conducted " in an extremely optimistic 
mood," that " mad bayonet charges were launched 
at a mile distance from the enemy without artillery 
preparation/' and that, " doubtless, the spirit of the 
offensive, ill-regulated and ill-restrained, among officers 
as well as men, was one of the causes of our reverse." 
Officers and men took only too literaUy the rules on 
which they had been trained. Strengthened by the 
general belief in a short war, and by an exaggerated idea 
of the importance of first results, a like infatuation 
governed the strategy and the tactics of the French 
armies. A succession of surprises marks the light 
regard for information of the enemy's means and 
movements, as a series of instant reverses measures 
the scorn for well-pondered manoeuvre. Was France 
required by her Eastern ally to attack at once ? The 
attack need not have surpassed the proportions of 
holding actions punctuating a stout defence. Was 
Belgium closed to the French armies by the old treaty 
of neutrality ? That did not justify a plan of cam- 
paign which left the north uncovered to a German 
aggression. For all that followed from disunity of 
the Allied commands, England and Belgium share the 
responsibility. Had they, as well as Russia, been long 
in alliance, and Italy's neutrality assured in advance, 
all might have gone otherwise ; probably, indeed, there 
would have been no war. These circumstances do 
not afford excuse for a radically unsound conception 
of the danger and the reply. 

A German attack through Belgium had been much 
and long discussed. If few would have said before the 
event, as the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary 
pleaded immediately afterward, that it was " a question 



26 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

of life and death for the Empire," " a step absolutely 
required," it was at least more than probable ; and 
we have Marshal Joffre's word for it that the con- 
tingency was contemplated by the French Staff.^* 
But two doubts remained, even in vigilant minds. 
Would the invasion by the north be large or small, and 
would it be more or less extensive, proceeding only 
by Belgian Luxembourg and the Meuse valley, or also 
by a more daring sweep across the Flanders plain into 
the valley of the Gise ? Moltke had advocated a 
march to the North Sea coast, and a descent by the 
Channel ports, through the trouee of the Gise, upon 
Paris, turning not merely the principal line, but the 
whole system, of the French fortresses, Bernhardi 
had toyed with the idea of an even more extensive 
movement, violating Dutch territory, but seemed 
at last to favour the more limited project, " the army 
of the right wing marching by the line Treves-Stenay, 
crossing Luxembourg and southern Belgium." In 
fact, neither of these ways was taken. The invasion 
pursued a middle route, Holland being avoided, the 
descent upon the coast deferred, and armies thrown 
across both the Flanders plain and the difficult country 
of the Belgian Ardennes. 

Notwithstanding the advertisement of the Kaiser's 
chief Ministers in their famous pleas in justification, 
on the first day of the war, the French Staff do not 
seem to have anticipated anything more in the north 
than an attack by Luxembourg and the Ardennes, 
or to have altered their dispositions to meet it until 
the middle of August. We do not yet fully know 
what are the reasons for the arrest of the German 
offensive after the effective reduction of Liege, until 



THE FRENCH WAR DOCTRINE 27 

August 19. Instead of six days, with, perhaps, three 
more for re-concentration, the German right wing took 
sixteen days in crossing Belgium. As this week of 
Belgium's vicarious sacrifice saved France, it cannot 
be supposed to have been a vokmtary delay made 
simply for the purpose of deceiving the Allies. It 
had that effect, however. Thwarted at Liege, the 
German command did everything it could to conceal 
the true nature of the blow it was about to deliver — 
by terrorising the population and occupying the mind 
of the world with its atrocities, by the ubiquitous 
activity of its cavalry screen, by avoiding Western 
Flanders and the coast, and by holding up the advance 
of its first three armies behind the line of the Gette 
and the Meuse till everything was ready. The Allies 
altogether failed to pierce the veil of mystery covering 
the final concentration. They were deceived (i) as 
to the main direction of the coming onslaught, (2) as 
to its speed, (3) as to its power in men and armament . 
General Sordet's cavalry got little information during 
their Belgian wanderings ; the few French aviators 
still less. No doubt, the Allies hoped for a longer 
Belgian resistance, especially at Liege and Namur, 
as the enemy expected a shorter. The French Staff 
clung blindly to its belief that it need expect, at most, 
only an attack by the Meuse valley and the Ardennes .^^ 
The first French plan of campaign, then, envisaged 
solely the eastern and north-eastern frontier. The 
original concentration placed the two strongest armies, 
the ist and 2nd (Dubail and Castelnau — each five 
corps) between Belfort and Toul ; the 3rd and 5th 
(Ruffey and Lanrezac — three and five corps respec- 
tively) from Verdun to Givet, where the Meuse enters 



2 8 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

Belgium ; the 4th (de Langle de Gary — ^three corps) 
supporting the right, at its rear, between the Argonne 
and the Meuse. Of 25 reserve divisions, three were 
kept in the Alps till Italy declared her neutrality, three 
garrisoned Verdun, and one Epinal. The remainder 
were grouped, one group being sent to the region of 
Hirson, one to the Woevre, and one before Nancy. 
There was also a Territorial group (d'Amade) about 
Lille. These dispositions are defended as being supple 
and lending themselves to a redirection when the 
enemy's intentions were revealed.^^ We shall see that, 
within a fortnight, they had to be fundamentally 
changed, Lanrezac being sent into the angle of the 
Sambre and Meuse, de Langle bringing the sole reserve 
army in on his right, and Ruffey marching north into 
the Ai-dennes — a north-westerly movement involving 
awkward lateral displacements, the crossing of columns, 
and oblique marches. Some of the following failure 
and confusion resulted from the dislocating effect of a 
conversion so vast. 

IV. The Three French Offensives 

Instead of an initial defensive over most of the 
front, with or without some carefully chosen and 
strongly provided manoeuvre of offence — ^as the major 
conditions of the problem would seem to suggest — ^the 
French campaign opened with a general offensive, 
which for convenience we must divide into three parts, 
three adventures, all abortive, into Southern Alsace, 
German Lorraine, and the Belgian Ardennes. The 
first two of these were predetermined, even before 
General Joffre was designed for the chief command ; 



THE THREE FRENCH OFFENSIVES 29 

the second and third were dehberately launched after 
the invasion of Belgium was, or should have been, 
understood. A fourth attack, across the Sambre, was 
designed, but could not be attempted. 

The first movement into Alsace was hardly more 
than a raid, politically inspired, and its success might 
have excited suspicions. Advancing from Belfort, the 
1st Army under Dubail took Altkirch on August 7, and 
Mulhouse the following day. Paris rejoiced ; General 
Joffre hailed Dubail's men as " first labourers in the 
great work of la revanche ." It was the last flicker of 
the old Gallic cocksureness. On August 9, the Ger- 
mans recovered Mulhouse. Next day, an Army of 
Alsace, consisting of the 7th Corps, the 44th Division, 
four reserve divisions, five Alpine battalions, and a 
cavalry division, was organised under General Pau. It 
gained most of the Vosges passes and the northern 
buttress of the range, the Donon (August 14). On the 
19th, the enemy was defeated at Dornach, losing 3000 
prisoners and 24 cannon ; and on the following morning 
Mulhouse was retaken — only to be abandoned a 
second time on the 25th, with all but the southern 
passes. The Army of Alsace was then dissolved to 
free Pau's troops for more urgent service, the defence 
of Nancy and of Paris. 

The Lorraine offensive was a more serious affair, and 
it was embarked upon after the gravity of the northern 
menace had been recognised.^^ The main body of the 
Eastern forces was engaged — nine active corps of the 
2nd and ist Armies, with nine reserve and three cavalry 
divisions — considerably more than 400,000 men, under 
some of the most distinguished French generals, in- 
cluding de Castlenau, unsurpassed in repute and 



30 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

experience even by the Generalissimo himself ; Dubail, 
a younger man, full of energy and quick intelligence ; 
Foch, under whose iron will the famous 20th Corps of 
Nancy did much to limit the general misfortune ; Pau, 
who had just missed the chief command ; and de 
Maud'huy, a sturdy leader of men. As soon as the 
Vosges passes were secured, after ten days' hard 
fighting, on August 14, a concerted advance began, 
Castelnau moving eastward over the frontier into the 
valley of the Seille and the Gap of Morhange, a narrow 
corridor flanked by marshes and forests, rising to for- 
midable cliffs ; while Dubail, on his right, turned north- 
eastward into the hardly less difficult country of the 
Sarre valley. The French appear to have had a marked 
superiority of numbers, perhaps as large as 100,000 
men ; but they were drawn on till they fell into a 
powerful system, established since the mobilisation, of 
shrewdly hidden defences, with a large provision of 
heavy artillery, from Morville, through Morhange, 
Bensdorf, and Fenetrange, to Phalsburg — the Bavarian 
Army at the centre, a detachment from the Metz 
garrison against the French left, the army of Von 
Heeringen against the right. The French command 
can hardly have been ignorant of these defences, 
but must have supposed they would fall to an impetuous 
assault. Dubail held his own successfully throughout 
August 19 and 20 at Sarrebourg and along the Marne- 
Rhine Canal, though his men were much exhausted. 
Castelnau was immediately checked, before the natural 
fortress of Morhange, on August 20. His centre — ^the 
famous 20th Corps and a southern corps, the 15th — 
attacked at 5 a.m. ; at 6.30 the latter was in flight, 
and the former, its impetuosity crushed by numbers 



THE THREE FRENCH OFFENSIVES 31 

and artillery lire, was ordered to desist. The German 
commanders had concentrated then- forces under 
cover of field- works and heavy batteries. Under the 
shock of this surprise, at 4 p.m., Castelnau ordered the 
general retreat. Dubail had to follow suit. 

Happily, the German infantry were in no condition 
for an effective pursuit, and the French retirement was 
not seriously impeded. The following German advance 
being directed southward, with the evident intention 
of forcing the Gap of Charmes, and so taking all the 
French northern armies in reverse, the defence of 
Nancy was left to Foch, Castelnau's centre and right 
were swung round south-westward behind the Meurthe, 
while Dubail abandoned the Donon, and withdrew to 
a line which, from near Rozelieures to Badonviller and 
the northern Vosges, made a right-angle with the line 
of the 2nd Army, the junction covering the mouth of the 
threatened trouee. In turn, as we shall see (Chap. III. 
sec. iii.), the German armies here suffered defeat, only 
five days after their victory. But such failures and 
losses do not " cancel out," for France had begun at 
a disadvantage. Ground was lost that might have 
been held with smaller forces ; forces were wasted that 
were urgently needed in the chief field of battle. Evi- 
dently it was hoped to draw back parts of the northern 
armies of invasion, to interfere with their communi- 
cations, and to set up an alarm for Metz and Strasbourg. 
These aims were not to any sensible extent accomplished. 

Daspite the improbability of gaining a rapid success 
in a wild forest region, the French Staff seems to have 
long cherished the idea of an offensive into the Belgian 
Ai'dennes in case of a German invasion of Belgium, 
the intention being to break the turning movement by 



32 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

a surprise blow at its flank. By August 19, the French 
were in a measure prepared for action between Verdun 
and the Belgian Meuse. Ruffey's 3rd Army (including 
a shortlived " Army of Lorraine " of six reserve 
divisions under Maunoury), and Langle de Gary's 
4th Army, brought northwards into line after three or 
four days' delay, counted together six active corps 
and reserve groups making them nearly equal in num- 
bers to the eleven corps of the Imperial Crown Prince 
and the Duke of Wiirtemberg. But, behind the 
latter, all unknown till it debouched on the Meuse, lay 
hidden adroitly in Belgian Luxembourg another 
army, the three corps of the Saxon War Minister, 
Von Hausen. Farther west, the disparity of force 
was greater, Lanrezac and Sir John French having only 
about seven corps (with some help from the Belgians 
and a few Territorial units) against eleven corps 
left to Billow and Kluck after two corps had been 
detailed to mask the Belgian Army in Antwerp. 
Neither the Ardennes nor the Sambre armies could be 
further strengthened because of the engagements in 
Lorraine and Alsace. 

A tactical offensive into the Ardennes, a glorified 
reconnaissance and raid, strictly limited and con- 
trolled, might perhaps be justified. The advance 
ordered on the evening of the defeat of Morhange, 
and executed on the two following days, engaging 
the only general reserve at the outset in a thickly- 
wooded and most difficult country, was too large 
for a diversion, and not large enough for the end 
declared : it failed completely and immediately — ^in a 
single day, August 22 — ^with heavy losses, especially 
in officers .^^ Here, again, there was an approximate 



THE THREE FRENCH OFFENSIVES 33 

equality of numbers ; again, the French were lured 
on to unfavourable ground, and, before strong en- 
trenchments, crushed with a superiority of fire. 
Separated and surprised — ^the left south-west of 
Palliseul, the centre in the forests of Herbeumont and 
Luchy, the Colonial Corps before Neufchateau and 
Rossignol, where it fought hterally to the death 
against two German corps strongly entrenched, the 
2nd Corps near Virton — ^the body of the 4th Army was 
saved only by a prompt retreat ; and the 3rd Army 
had to follow this movement. True, the German IV 
Army also was much exhausted ; and an important 
part of the enemy's plan missed fire. It had been 
soon discovered that the Meuse from Givet to Namur 
was but hghtly held ; and the dispatch thither of the 
Saxon Army, to cut in between the French 4th and 5th 
Armies, was a shrewd stroke. Hausen was late in 
reaching the critical point, about Dinant, and, by 
slowness and timidity, missed the chance of doing 
serious mischief. 

Meanwhile, between the fields of the two French 
adventures into German Lorraine and Belgian Luxem- 
bourg, the enemy had been allowed without serious 
resistance to occupy the Briey region, and so to carry 
over from France to Germany an iron- and coal-field 
of the utmost value. " Briey has saved our life," 
the ironmasters of the Rhineland declared later on, 
with some exaggeration. Had it been modernised, 
the small fortress of Longwy, situated above the 
River Chiers three miles from the Luxembourg frontier, 
might have been an important element in a defence of 
this region. In fact, its works were out of date, and 
were held at the mobiUsation by only two battalions 
3 



34 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

of infantry and a battery ^.nd a half of light guns. 
The Germans summoned Colonel Darche and his 
handful of men to surrender on August lo ; but the 
place was not invested till the 20th, the day on which 
the 3rd Army was ordered to advance toward Virton 
and Arlon, and to disengage Longwy. Next day, 
Ruffey was north and east of the place, apparently 
without suspecting that he had the Crown Prince's 
force besieging it at his mercy. On the 22nd, it was 
too late ; the 3rd and 4th Armies were in retreat ; 
Longwy was left to its fate.^^ 

V. The Battle of Charleroi-Mons 

The completest surprise naturally fell on the west 
wing of the Allies ; and, had not the small British 
force been of the hardiest stuff, an irreparable disaster 
might have occurred. Here, with the heaviest pre- 
ponderance of the enemy, there had been least pre- 
paration for any hostilities before the crisis was 
reached. On or about August 10, we war corre- 
spondents received an official map of the " Present 
Zone of the Armies," which was shown to end, on the 
north, at Orchies — 16 miles S.E. of Lille, and 56 miles 
inland from Dunkirk. The western half of the northern 
frontier was practically uncovered. Lille had ceased 
to be a fortress in 1913, though continuing to be a 
garrison town ; from Maubeuge to the sea, there was 
no artificial obstacle, and no considerable body of 
troops.^" The position to be taken by the British 
Expeditionary Force — on the French left near Maubeuge 
— was only decided, at a Franco-British Conference 
in London, on August 10. ^^ On August 12, the British 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 35 

Press Bureau announced it as " evident " that " the 
mass of German troops Ue between Liege and Luxem- 
bourg." Three days later, a Saxon advance guard tried, 
without success, to force the Meuse at Dinant. Thus 
warned, the French command began to make the new 
disposition of its forces which has been ahuded to. 

Lanrezac had always anticipated the northern attack, 
and had made representations on the subject without 
effect. 2- At last, on August 16, General Joffre, from 
his headquarters at Vitry-le-Frangois, in southern 
Champagne, agreed to his request that he should move 
the 5th Army north-westward into the angle of the 
Sambre and Meuse. At the same time, however, its 
composition was radically upset, the nth Corps and 
two reserve divisions being sent to the 4th Army, 
while the i8th Corps and the Algerian divisions were 
received in compensation. On August 16, the British 
Commander-in-Chief, after seeing President Poincare 
and the Ministers in Paris, visited the Generalissimo 
at Vitry ; and it was arranged that the Expeditionary 
Force, which was then gathering south of Maubeuge, 
should move north to the Sambre, and thence to the 
region of Mons, On the same day. General d'Amade 
was instructed to proceed from Lyons to Arras, there 
to gather together three Territorial divisions of the 
north which, reinforced by another on the 21st and 
by two reserve divisions on the 25th, ultimately 
became part of the Army of the Somme. Had there 
been, on the French side, any proper appreciation of 
the value of field-works, it might, perhaps, not have been 
too late to defend the line of the Sambre and Meuse. 
It was four or five days too late to attempt a Franco- 
British offensive beyond the Sambre. 



36 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

To do justice to the Allied commanders, it must 
be kept clearly in mind that they had (albeit largely 
by their own fault) but the vaguest notion of what 
was impending. Would the mass of the enemy come 
by the east or the west of the Meuse, by the Ardennes 
or by Flanders, and in what strength ? Still sceptical 
as to a wide enveloping movement, Joffre was re- 
luctant to adventure too far north with his unready 
left wing ; but it seemed to him that, in either case, 
the intended offensive of the French central armies 
(the 3rd and 4th) across the Ardennes and Luxembourg 
frontier might be supported by an attack by Lanrezac 
and the British upon the flank of the German western 
armies — ^the right flank, if they passed by the Ardennes 
only ; the left, if they attempted to cross the Flanders 
plain toward the Channel. Thus, it was provisionally 
arranged with the British Commander that, when the 
concentration of the Expeditionary Force was complete, 
which would not be before the evening of August 21, it 
should advance north of the Sambre in the general 
direction of Nivelles (20 miles north-east of Mons, 
and half-way between Charleroi and Brussels). If the 
common movement were directed due north, the British 
would advance on the left of the 5th Ai'my ; if to the 
north-east or east, they would be in echelon on its 
left -rear. General Joffre recognised that the plan 
was only provisional, it being impossible to define the 
projected manoeuvre more precisely till all was ready 
on August 21, or till the enemy revealed his intentions. 

It was only on the 20th that two corps of the French 
5th Army reached the south bank of the Sambre — one 
day before Biilow came up on the north, with his VII 
Corps on his right (west), the X Reserve and X Active 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 37 

Corps as centre, the Guard Active Corps on his 
left, and the VII Reserve (before Namur) and Guard 
Reserve Corps in support. In this posture, on the 
evening of August 20, Lanrezac received General 
Joffre's order to strike across the Sambre, Namur 
was then garrisoned by the Belgian 4th Division, 
to which was added, on the 22nd, part of the 
French 8th Brigade under General Mangin. Lanrezac 
had not even been able to get all his strength aligned on 
the Sambre when the shock came.^'^ On the 21st, his 
five corps were grouped as follows : The ist Corps 
(Franchet d'Esperey) was facing east toward the 
Meuse north of Dinant, pending the arrival, on the 
evening of the 22nd, of the Bouttegourd Reserve 
Division ; the loth Corps (Defforges), with the 37th 
(African) Division, on the heights of Fosse and Arsimont, 
faced the Sambre crossings at Tamines and Auvelais ; 
the 3rd Corps (Sauret) stood before Charleroi, with 
the 38th (African) Division in reserve ; the i8th Corps 
(de Mas-Latrie) was behind the left, south of Thuin. 
Of General Valabregue's group of reserve divisions, one 
was yet to come into line on the right and one on the 
left. 

Could Lanrezac have accomplished anything by 
pressing forward into the unknown with tired troops ? 
The question might be debatable had the AlUes had 
only Billow to deal with ; but, as we shall see, this was 
by no means the case. Meanwhile, the British made 
a day's march beyond the Sambre. On the 22nd 
they continued the French line west-north-westward, 
still without an enemy before them, and entrenched 
themselves, the 5th Cavalry Brigade occupying the 
right, the ist Corps (Haig) from Binche to Mons, and 



38 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

the 2nd Corps (Smith-Dorrien) along the canal to Conde- 
on-Scheldt. West and south-west of this point, there 
was nothing but the aforesaid groups of French 
Territorials. The I German Army not yet having 
revealed itself, the general idea of the French 
command, to attack across the Sambre with its centre, 
and then, if successful, to swing round the Allied left 
in a north-easterly direction against what was supposed 
to be the German right flank, still seemed feasible. 
But, in fact, Kluck's Army lay beyond Billow's to the 
north-west, on the line Brussels- Valenciennes ; it is 
quite possible, therefore, that a preliminary success by 
Lanrezac would have aggravated the later defeat. 

However that may be, the programme was at once 
stultified by the unexpected speed and force of the 
German approach. The bombardment of the nine 
forts of Namur had begun on August 20. Billow's 
Army reached the Sambre on the following day, and 
held the passages at night. Lanrezac 's orders had 
become plainly impossible, and he did not attempt to 
fulfil them. Early on the afternoon of the 21st, while 
Kluck approached on one hand and Hausen on the 
other. Billow's X Corps and Guard Corps attacked 
the 3rd and loth Corps forming the apex of the French 
triangle. These, not having entrenched themselves, 
and having, against Lam^ezac's express orders, ad- 
vanced to the crossings between Charleroi and Namur, 
there fell upon strong defences flanked by machine-guns, 
and were driven back and separated. Despite repeated 
counter-attacks, the town of Chatelet was lost. On 
the 22nd, these two French corps, with a little help 
from the i8th, had again to bear the full weight of 
the enemy. Their artillery preparation was inade- 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 39 

quate, and charges of a reckless bravery did not 
improve their situation. ^^ Most desperate fighting took 
place in and around Charleroi. The town was re- 
peatedly lost and won back by the French during 
the day and the following morning ; in course of these 
assaults, the Turcos inflicted heavy losses on the 
Prussian Guard. While the loth Corps, cruelly 
punished at Tamines and Arsimont, fell back on Mettet, 
the 3rd found itself threatened with envelopment 
on the west by Billow's X Reserve and VII Corps, 
debouching from Chatelet and Charleroi. 

That evening, the 22nd, Lanrezac thought there was 
still a chance of recovery. " The enemy does not yet 
show any numerical superiority," he wrote, " and the 
5th Army, though shaken, is intact." The ist Corps was 
at length free, having been relieved in the river angle 
south of Namur by the 51st Reserve Division ; the 
i8th Corps had arrived and was in full action on the 
left about Thuin ; farther west, other reserves were 
coming up, and the British Army had not been seriously 
engaged. The French commander therefore asked his 
British confrere to strike north-eastward at Billow's 
flank. The Field-Marshal found this request " quite 
impracticable " and scarcely comprehensible. He 
had conceived, rightly or wrongly, a very unfavourable 
idea of Lanrezac 's qualities ; and the sight of infantry 
and artillery columns of the 5th Army in retreat south- 
ward that morning, before the two British corps had 
reached their positions on either side of Mons, had 
been a painful surprise. He was already in advance 
of the shaken hue of the 5th Army ; and news was 
arriving which indicated a grave threat of envelop- 
ment by the north-west. French had come out from 



40 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

England with clear warning that, owing to the im- 
possibility of rapid or considerable reinforcement, he 
must husband his forces, and that he would " in no 
case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied 
General." He now, therefore, repUed to Lanrezac that 
all he could promise was to hold the Conde Canal 
position for twenty-four hours ; thereafter, retreat 
might be necessary. 

On the morning of the 23rd, Bouttegourd and 
D'Esperey opened an attack on the left flank of the 
Prussian Guard, while the British were receiving the 
first serious shock of the enemy. The French centre, 
however, was in a very bad way. During the afternoon 
the 3rd Corps gave ground, retreating in some disorder 
to Walcourt ; the i8th was also driven back. About 
the same time, four surprises fell crushingly upon the 
French command. The first was the fall of Namur, 
which had been looked to as pivot of the French right. 
Although the VII Reserve Corps did not enter the town 
till 8 p.m., its resistance was virtually broken in the 
morning. Most of the forts had been crushed by the 
German 11- and 16-inch howitzers ; it was with great 
difficulty that 12,000 men, a half of the garrison, 
escaped, ultimately to join the Belgian Army at Ant- 
werp. Secondly, the Saxon Army, hitherto hidden in 
the Ardennes and practically unknown to the French 
Command, suddenly made an appearance on Lanrezac 's 
right flank. On the 23rd, the XII Corps captured 
Dinant, forced the passages of the Meuse there and at 
Hastiere, drove in the Bouttegourd Division (51st 
Reserve), and reached Onhaye. The ist Corps, thus 
threatened in its rear, had to break its well-designed 
attack on the Prussian Guard, and face about eastward. 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 41 

It successfully attacked the Saxons at Onhaye, and 
prevented them from getting more than one division 
across the river that night, so that the retreat of the 
French Army from the Sambre toward Beaumont and 
Philippeville, ordered by Lanrezac on his own re- 
sponsibihty at 9 p.m., was not impeded. Thirdly, 
news arrived of the failure of the French offensive 
in the Ardennes. 

The fom'th surprise lay in the discovery that the 
British Army had before it not one or two corps, as was 
supposed until the afternoon of August 23, but three 
or four active corps and two cavalry divisions of Kluck's 
force, a part of which was already engaged in an 
attempt to envelop the extreme left of the Allies. 
Only at 5 p.m. — ^both the intelligence and the liaison 
services seem to have failed — did the British com- 
mander, who had been holding pretty well since noon 
against attacks that did not yet reveal the enemy's full 
strength, learn from Joffre that this force was twice 
as large as had been reported in the morning, that his 
west flank was in danger, and that " the two French 
reserve divisions and the 5th French Army on my right 
v/ere retiring." About midnight the fall of Namur and 
the defeat of the French 3rd and 4th Armies were also 
known. In face of this ' most unexpected " news, a 
15-miles withdrawal to the line Maubeuge-Jenlain was 
planned ; and it began at dawn on the 24th, fighting 
having continued through the previous night. 

Some French writers have audaciously sought to 
throw a part, at least, of the responsibiUty for the 
French defeat on the Sambre upon the small British 
Expeditionary Force. An historian so authorised as 
M. Gabriel Hanotaux, in particular, has stated that it 



42 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

was in line, instead of the 20th, as had been arranged, 
only on the 23rd, when the battle on the Sambre was 
compromised and the turning movement north-east- 
ward from Mons which had been projected could no 
longer save the situation ; and that Sir John French, 
instead of destrojnng Kluck's corps one by one as they 
arrived, "retreated after three hours' contact with 
the enemy," hours before Lanrezac ordered the general 
retreat of the 5th Army.^^ It is the barest justice to 
the first British continental Army, its commander, 
officers, and men, professional soldiers of the highest 
quality few of whom now survive, to say that these 
statements, made, no doubt, in good faith, are in- 
accurate, and the deductions from them untenable. 
It was not, and could not have been, arranged between 
the Allied commands that French's two corps should 
be in line west and east of Mons, ready for offensive 
action, on August 20, when Lanrezac 's fore -guards 
were onl}^ just reaching the Sambre. General Joffre 
knew from Sir John, at their meeting on August 16, 
that the British force could not be ready tiU the 21st ; 
and it was then arranged that it should advance that 
day from the Sambre to the Mons Canal (13 miles 
farther north). This was done. Biilow had then 
already seized the initiative. If the British could 
have arrived sooner, and the projected north-easterly 
advance had been attempted. Billow's right flank 
might have been troubled ; but the way would have 
been left clear for Kluck's enveloping movement, 
with disastrous consequences for the whole left of the 
Allies. It is not true that the British retreat preceded 
the French, or that it occurred after " three hours' 
contact with the enemy." Lanrezac 's order for the 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 43 

general retreat was given only at 9 p.m. ; but his corps 
had been falling back all afternoon. Kluck's attack 
began at 11 a.m. on the 23rd, and became severe about 
3 p.m. An hour later, Billow's right struck in between 
Lanrezac's 3rd and i8th Corps, compelling them to 
a retreat that left a dangerous gap between the British 
and French Armies. From this time the British were 
isolated and continuously engaged. " When the news 
of the retirement of the French and the heavy German 
threatening on my front reached me," says the British 
commander (in his dispatch of September 7, 1914), 

I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane recon- 
naissance ; and, as a result of this, I determined to 
effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at day- 
break on the 24th. A certain amount of fighting 
continued along the whole line throughout the night ; 
and, at daybreak on the 24th, the 2nd Division made 
a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche," 
to enable the 2nd Corps to withdraw. The disengage- 
ment was only procured with difficulty and consider- 
able loss. Had it been further delayed, the two corps 
would have been surrounded and wiped out. They 
were saved by courage and skill, and by the mistakes 
of Kluck, who failed to get some of his forces up in 
time, and spent others in an enveloping movement 
when a direct attack was called for. 

Such, in brief, is the deplorable story of the break- 
down of the first French plan of campaign. By 
August 25, the local panics of the preceding days were 
arrested ; but from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps 
the Allied armies were beaten back, and their chief 
mass was in full retreat. King Albert had shepherded 
his sorely stricken regiments into the entrenched 



44 A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

camp of Antwerp, where, and in West Flanders, they 
were to drag upon the invader for nearly two months 
to come. For the rest, Belgium was conquered, much 
of it ravaged. The forces to which it had looked for 
aid were disappearing southward, outnumbered, 
outweighed in material of war, and severely shaken. 
But the heroic Belgians never thought of 5delding. 
On August 25, they made a valuable diversion, striking 
out from Antwerp, and forcing the small German 
watching force to retire to near Brussels. This and 
the landing of 2000 British Marines at Ostend sobered 
the enemy, and caused the detention of two corps 
(the III and IX Reserve) before the Scheldt fortress. 
The shortHved victories of Rennenkampf and 
Samsonov at Gumbinnen and in the Masurian Lake 
region, threatening a greater invasion of East Prussia, 
also affected slightly the distribution of German troops, 
though it probably stimulated the urgency of the 
Western invasion. The French eastern armies were 
to keep inviolate the pivot of Verdun, the crescent 
of the Nancy hills, and the line of Epinal-Behort. 
The tiny garrison of Longwy resisted tUl August 26, 
that of Montmedy till the 30th. Maubeuge held out 
from August 25 to September 7,^^ and might be ex- 
pected to hold longer. The front of the retreating 
armies was never broken ; but at what a price was 
their cohesion purchased — ^the abandonment of a 
wide, rich tract of the national territory, with much of 
its hapless population. 

Enough has been said to show that the reverses of 
the beginning of the war which led to the long retreat 
were due not only to the brutal strength of the German 
invasion, but to bad information, bad judgment, bad 



THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI-MONS 45 

organisation, an ill-conceived strategy and reckless 
tactics, on the side of the Allies. The impact on the 
north and north-west (including now the Crown 
Prince's Army) of some 28 army corps — considerably 
over a million men — provided with heavy artillery, 
machine-guns, transport, and material on a prodigious 
scale, had never been dreamed of, and proved irre- 
sistible. 

We shall now have the happier task of following 
the marvellous rally of will and genius by which these 
errors were redeemed. 



CHAPTER III 
JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

I. EccE Homo ! 

FRANCE, land of swift action and swifter wit, 
was the last one would expect to take kindly to 
the new warfare. She looked then, as her elders 
had always looked, for a Man. And she found one ; 
but he was far from being of the traditional type. 

Joseph Cesaire Joffre was at this time sixty-two 
years old, a burly figure, with large head upheld, grey 
hair, thick moustache and brows, clear blue eyes, 
and a kindly, reflective manner. His great-grand- 
father, a political refugee from Spain, named Gouffre, 
had settled in Rivesaltes, on the French side of the 
eastern Pyrenees, where his grandfather remained as 
a trader, and his father lived as a simple workman till 
his marriage, which brought him into easier circum- 
stances. One of eleven children, Joffre proved an 
industrious pupil at Perpignon, entered the Ecole 
Polytechnique in 1869, advanced slowly, by general 
intelligence rather than any special capacity, entered 
the Engineers after the War of 1870, and during the 
'eighties commenced a long colonial career. His 
report on the Timbuctoo Expedition of 1893-4, where 
he first won distinction, is the longest of his very few 

printed writings. It shows a prudent, methodical, 

46 



ECCE HOMO! 47 

lucid, and energetic mind, with particular aptitude for 
engineering and administration. After an interval in 
Paris as secretary of the Inventions Commission, the 
then Colonel Joffre went out to direct the establish- 
ment of defence works in Madagascar. In 1900, 
promoted general, he commanded an artiUery brigade, 
in 1905 an infantry division. After other experience 
at the Ministry of War and in local commands, he 
became a member of the Higher War Council in 1910, 
and in July 191 1 Vice-President of that body, and thus 
Commander-in-Chief designate. 

This heavy responsibility feU to him almost by 
accident. It was the time of the Agadir crisis ; France 
and Germany were upon the verge of war. M. Caillaux 
was Prime Minister, M. Messimy Minister of War, 
General Michel Vice-President of the Council, a position, 
at the end of a long period of peace, of little power, 
especially as the Council had only a formal exist- 
ence. The Government recognised its weakness, but 
feared to establish a Grand Staff which might obtain 
a dangerous authority. Moreover, General Michel was 
not "well seen " by the majority of his colleagues. Mes- 
simy thought him lacking in spirit and ability.^' There 
were also differences of opinion ; Michel thought the 
reserves should be organised to be thrown into line 
directly upon the outbreak of hostilities, and he be- 
lieved in the probability of an invasion by way of 
Belgium. Generals Pau and Gallieni were the first 
favourites for the succession. Both, however, would 
attain the age limit at the end of 1912. Gallieni de- 
clined on the further ground that his experience had 
been almost wholly colonial, and that he would not be 
welcomed by the metropolitan army. Michel's ideas 



48 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

having been formally rejected at a meeting of the 
Higher War Council on July 19, 1911, the post was 
offered to Pau, a universally esteemed officer. The 
Ministry had decided to strengthen the post of Vice- 
President of the Council by adding to it the functions 
of Chief-of-Staff ; but when Pau demanded the right 
to nominate all superior officers, Messimy hesitated, 
and turned to Joffre, the member of the Council having 
the longest period — over five years — of service before 
him. 

Joffre was little known outside army circles ; and 
he had none of the quahties that most easily bring 
popularity. Southerners would recognise his rich 
accent, but little else in this sUent, though genial, 
figure. His profound steadiness, a balance of mind 
that was to carry him through the worst of storms, a 
cool reflectiveness almost suggesting insensibility, were 
qualities strange in a French mihtary leader. He 
was understood to be a faithful Republican ; but, 
unlike some high officers, he had never trafficked with 
party, sect, or clique, and he showed his impartiality 
in retiring the freethinker Sarrail and the Cathohc de 
Langle de Cary, as in supporting Sir John French and 
in advancing Foch. When I looked at him, I was 
reminded of Campbell-Bannerman ; there was the same 
pawkiness, the same unspoiled simplicity, the same 
courage and bonhomie. Before the phrase was coined 
or the fact accomplished, he prefigured to his country- 
men the " union sacree " which was the first condition 
of success ; and to the end his soUd character was an 
important factor in the larger concert of the Allies. 

While there appears in Joffre a magnanimity above 
the average of great commanders, it is, perhaps, not yet 



ECCE HOMO! 49 

possible to say that, through this crisis, his sense of 
justice was equal to every strain. There are friends of 
General Galheni who would question it. The case of 
General Lanrezac is less personal, and more to our 
purpose. An officer of decided views and temper, who 
had been professor at St. Cyr in 1880, and had risen to 
be director of studies in the Staff College, he became a 
member of the War Council only six months before the 
outbreak of war, when the opinions formerly repre- 
sented by General Michel, and partially and more softly 
by Castlenau, were definitely discredited.^^ Always 
sceptical of the orthodox doctrine of the general offen- 
sive, Lanrezac was convinced by information obtained 
at the beginning of the campaign that the great danger 
had to be met in the north, and that the armies should 
be shifted immediately to meet it. We have seen that 
Joffre would not accept this view till the third week in 
August, and still pursued an offensive plan which now 
appears to have been foredoomed to failure. Never- 
theless, Lanrezac was punished for the defeat on the 
Sambre, by being removed from the command of the 
5th Army ; and, to the end of the war, the General- 
issimo persisted in attributing the frontier repulses to 
subordinate blundering. Joffre's action in the height 
of the crisis, his wholesale purge of the army commands, 
may be justified ; it is too late to shelter the Staff of 
those days from their major share in the responsibility. 
It must remain to his biographers to explain more 
precisely the extraordinary contrast between the errors 
we have indicated and the recovery we have now to 
trace. This much may here be said : Joffre was 
hardly the man, in days of peace, to grapple with a 
difficult parliament, or to conceive a new military 
4 



50 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

doctrine. He was not, like his neighbour of the 
South, Foch, an intellectual, a bold speculator, a 
specialist in strategy, but an organiser, a general 
manager. The first French plan of campaign, for 
which he had such share of responsibility as attaches 
to three years in charge of the military machine, was 
the expression of a firmly established teaching, which 
only a few pioneers in his own world had consciously 
outgrown. It did not reflect his own temperament ; 
but he could not have successfully challenged it, in 
the time at his disposal, against prejudices so inveterate, 
even if he had had the mind to do so. It was the 
first time all the services concerned in war preparations, 
including the War Council, the General Staff, the 
Staff Committee, the Higher War School, had come 
under a single control ; and, even had there been no 
arrears, no financial difficulties, a greater permanence 
of Ministries, the task would have called for all one 
man's powers of labour and judgment. Joffre was 
surrounded during that period by men more positive, 
in certain directions, than himself, more ambitious, 
men whose abilities could no more be defied than their 
influence. " He had more character than personahty," 
says one of his eulogists, who compares him with 
Turenne, citing Bossuet on that great soldier : "He 
was used to fighting without anger, winning without 
ambition, and triumphing without vanity." ^^ It was 
as though Nature, seeing the approach of a supreme 
calamity, had prepared against it, out of the spirit of 
the age — ^an age by no means Napoleonic — an adequate 
counter-surprise. 

The slow growth and cumulation of his career are 
characteristic. It is all steady, scrupulous industry. 



ECCE HOMO! 51 

It smacks of an increasingly civilian world. There is 
no exterior romance in the figure of Joffre, nothing 
mediaeval, nothing meretricious. He is a glorified 
bourgeois, with the sane vigour and solidity of his race, 
and none of its more showy qualities. There is extant 
a lecture which he delivered in 1913 to the old scholars 
of the Ecole Polytechnique. He presented the Balkan 
wars for consideration as a case in which two factors 
were sharply opposed — ^numbers, and preparation. 
Setting aside high strategy and abstract teaching, he 
preached the virtue of all-round preparation — ^in the 
moral and intellectual factors, first of which a sane 
patriotism and a worthy command, as well as in the 
material factors of numbers, armament, supplies, and 
so on. " To he ready in our days," he says, " carries 
a meaning it would have been difficult for those who 
formerly prepared and conducted war to grasp. . . . 
To be ready to-day, all the resources of the country, 
all the intelligence of its children, all their moral 
energy, must be directed in advance toward a single 
aim — victory. Everything must have been organised, 
everything foreseen. Once hostilities are commenced, 
no improvisation vdll be of any use. What lacks then 
will lack definitivel}^ And the least omission may 
cause a disaster." 

That he and his Staff were caught both unprepared 
and ill-prepared gives an impish touch of satire to this 
passage. That it is, nevertheless, the authentic voice 
of Joffre is confirmed by one of his rare personal 
declarations in the course of the war. This statement 
was made in February 1915 — when many of the com- 
manders referred to had been removed, and the officer- 
ship of the French Army considerably rejuvenated — 



52 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

to an old friend ^^ who asked him whether Charleroi 
was lost under pressure of overwhelming numbers. 
" That is absolutely wrong/' repHed Joffre. " We 
ought to have won the battle of Charleroi ; we ought to 
have won ten times out of eleven. We lost it through 
our own faults. Faults of command. Before the 
war broke out, I had aheady noted that, among our 
generals, many were worn out. Some had appeared 
to me to be incapable, not good enough for their work. 
Some inspired me with doubt, others with disquietude. 
I had made up my mind to rejuvenate our chief com- 
mands ; and I should have done so in spite of all the 
commentaries and against any malevolence. But the 
war came too soon. And, besides, there were other 
generals in whom I had faith, andj.who have not re- 
sponded to my hopes. The man of war reveals himself 
more in war than in studies, and the quickest inteUi- 
gence and the most complete knowledge are of Uttle 
avail if they are unaccompanied by quahties of action. 
The responsibilities of war are such that, even in the 
men of merit, their best faculties may be paralysed. 
That is what happened to some of my chiefs. Their 
worth turned out to be below the mark, I had to 
remedy these defects. Some of these generals were 
my best comrades. But, if I love my friends much, I 
love France more. I reUeved them of their posts. 
I did this in the same way as I ought to be treated 
myself, if it be thought I am not good enough. I did 
not do this to punish them, but simply as a measure 
of public safety. I did it with a heavy heart." 

Such were the character and record of the man upon 
whom, at the darkest moment in modern history, fell 
the burden of the destinies of liberal Europe ; who was 



ECCE HOMO! 53 

called upon to prove, against his own words, that a 
great leader must and can improvise something es- 
sential of what has not been prepared ; who, between 
August 23 and 25, 1914, in a maze of preoccupations, 
had to provide the Western Allies with a second new 
plan of campaign. Some day his officers will tell the 
story of how he did it, of the outer scene at his shifting 
headquarters during those alarming hours, as the 
Emperor's Marshals portrayed their chief pacing like 
a caged tiger by candlelight in a Polish hut, or gazing 
gloomily from the Kremlin battlements upon the 
flames that were turning his ambition to ashes. Joffre 
will not help us to such pictures ; and in this, too, he 
shows himself to be representative of the modern 
process, which is anything but picturesque. If he 
had none of the romance of the stark adventurer about 
him, he had a cool head and a stout heart ; and we 
may imagine that, out of the depths of a secretive 
nature, there surged up spontaneously in this crisis 
all that was worthiest in it, the stored strength of a 
Spartan life, the will of a deep patriotism, the lessons 
of a long, varied, pondered experience. So far from 
dire peril paralysing his faculties, it was now that 
they first shone to the full. Calm, confident, clear, 
prompt, he set himself to correct the most glaring 
errors, and to create the conditions of an equal struggle. 
We know from his published Army Orders what re- 
sulted. Castlenau, Pau, Foch were far away on the 
east, or at the centre. There were other advisers ; 
but, in the main, this was Joffre 's own plan. 

Before we state it, and trace its later modification, 
it will be well to recall the main features of the problem 
to be solved. 



54 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 



II. The Second New Plan 

The first fact which had to be reckoned with was 
that the main weight of the enemy was bearing down 
across the north and north-east, and was, for the 
moment, irresistible. Retreat, at the outset, was 
not, then, within the plan, but a condition of it. There 
was no choice ; contact with the invader must be 
broken if any liberty of action was to be won back. 
Defeat and confusion had been suffered at so many 
points, the force of the German offensive was so 
markedly superior, that an unprepared arrest on the 
Belgian frontier would have risked the armies being 
divided, enveloped, and destroyed piecemeal. 

If the first stage of the retreat was enforced, its 
extension was in some measure willed and constantly 
controlled. For all the decisions taken, Joffre must 
have the chief credit, as he had the whole responsi- 
bility. The abandonment of large tracts of national 
territory to a ruthless enemy cannot be an easy choice, 
especially when the inhabitants are unwarned, and 
the mind of the nation is wholly unprepared (the 
defeats on the Sambre and the Meuse were not known 
for several days to the civil public, and then only very 
vaguely). A less cool mind might have fallen into 
temporising expedients. Maubeuge was to hold out 
for a fortnight more ; the 4th Army had checked the 
enemy, and Ruffey had repulsed several attacks ; 
Longwy had not yet capitulated. But the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was not deceived. He had no sooner 
learned the weight of Kluck's fl3;ing wing than he 
realised that the only hope now lay in a rapid retire- 



THE SECOND NEW PLAN 55 

ment. The fact that the British force, holding the 
west flank, depended upon coast communications for 
its munitions, supplies, and reinforcements, was an 
element to be counted. In every respect, unreadiness 
in the north dominated the situation. 

Evidently the retreat must be stayed, and the 
reaction begun, at the earliest possible moment. 
Not only were large communities and territories 
being abandoned : the chief German line of attack 
seemed to be aimed direct at the capital, which was 
in a peculiar degree the centre of the national life. 
This consideration, which no Commander-in-Chief 
could have forgotten, was emphasised in a letter 
addressed at 5 a.m. on August 25 by the Minister of 
War, M. Messimy, to General Joffre. It contained 
a specific order from the Government — probably the 
only ministerial interference with the operations in 
this period — thus phrased : "If victory does not 
crown a success of our armies, and if the armies are 
compelled to retreat, an army of at least three active 
corps must be directed to the entrenched camp of 
Paris to assure its protection." In an accompanying 
letter, the Minister added : "It goes without saying 
that the Une of retreat should be quite other, and 
should cover the centre and the south of France. We 
are resolved to struggle to the last and without 
mercy," ^^ No doubt, these measures would, to 
Joffre, seem to "go without saying." The retreat, 
so long as necessary, must be directed toward the 
centre of the country, and at the same time the capital 
must be protected. 

There was another necessity of no less importance. 
The retreat must be covered on the east. After the 



56 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

reverse of Morhange-Sarrebourg, this was a continual 
source of anxiety. On August 25, the German Armies 
of Lorraine, now reinforced, were hammering at the 
circle of hills called the Grand Couronne of Nancy, 
and were upon the Moselle before the Gap of Charmes. 
Belfort and Epinal were safe, and Verdun was not 
yet directly threatened. Very little consideration 
of the rectangular battle front — the main masses 
ranged along the north, while a line of positions 
naturally and artificially strong favoured the French 
on the east — would lead to the further conclusion : 
to stand fast along the east, as cover for the retreat 
from the north. Castelnau and Dubail, therefore, 
were asked to hold their critical positions at any cost. 
At the same time, Mulhouse and the northern Vosges 
passes were abandoned ; Belfort, Epinal, and even 
Verdun were deprived of ever}/ superfluous man, in 
order to meet the main flood of invasion. The evacua- 
tion of Verdun and Nancy was envisaged as a possi- 
bility. The line Toul-Epinal-Belfort could not be 
lost without disaster. 

Such were the three chief conditions affecting the 
extent of the strategic retreat. Conditions are, 
however, to be made, not only suffered ; and General 
Joffre had no sooner got the retreat in hand than he 
set himself to the constitution of a new mass of 
manoeuvre by means of which, when a favourable 
conjuncture of circumstances should be obtained, the 
movement could be reversed. The simultaneous 
disengagement and parallel withdrawal of four armies, 
with various minor forces, over a field 120 miles wide 
and of a hke depth, was an operation unprecedented 
in the history of war. The pains and difficulties 



THE SECOND NEW PLAN 57 

of such a retreat, the danger of dislocation and de- 
moralisation, are evident. Its great compensation 
was to bring the defence nearer to its reserves and 
bases of supply, while constantly stretching the 
enemy's line, and so weakening his striking force. 
This could not, of course, be pure gain : the French 
and British Armies lost heavily on the road south by 
the capture of laggards, sick, wounded, and groups 
gone astray, as well as in killed and men taken in 
action. The Germans lost more heavily in several, 
perhaps in most, of the important engagements, and 
they were much exhausted when the crucial moment 
came. On the other hand, the Allies were constantly 
picking up reinforcements ; while the enemy had to 
leave behind an army of occupation in Belgium, and 
large numbers of men to reduce Maubeuge, to garrison 
towns Uke Lille, Valenciennes, Amiens, St. Quentin, 
Cambrai, Laon, Rethel, Rheims, to terrorise scores of 
smaller places, and to provide guards and transport 
for ever-lengthening lines of communication. 

Upon these chief elements Joffre constructed his 
new plan of campaign. It was first mooted, a few 
hours after the issue of the order for the general 
retreat, in the tactical " Note for All the Armies " of 
August 24, and in the strategical " General In- 
struction " of August 25. General Headquarters 
were then housed in the old College, in the small 
country town of Vitry-le-Francois. Here, far behind 
the French centre, undisturbed by the tunnoil of the 
front and the capital, the Commander-in-Chief, aided 
by such men as General Belin (a great organiser, 
particularly of railway services), General Berthelot 
and Colonel Pont, grappled with the dire problem 



58 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

and, in the shadow of defeat, imperturbably drafted 
the design of the ultimate victory. 

The tactical note gathered such of the more 
urgent lessons of the preceding actions as were capable 
of immediate application : the importance of close 
co-operation of infantry and artillery in attack ; of 
artillery preparation of the assault, destruction of 
enemy machine-guns, immediate entrenchment of a 
position won, organisation for prolonged resistance, as 
contrasted with " the enthusiastic offensive " ; ex- 
tended formation in assault ; the German method of 
cavalry patrols immediately supported by infantry, and 
the need of care not to exhaust the horses. " When 
a position has been won, the troops should organise it 
immediately, entrench themselves, and bring up 
artillery to prevent any new attack by the enemy. 
The infantry seem to ignore the necessity of or- 
ganising for a prolonged combat. Throwing forth- 
with into line numerous and dense units, they expose 
them immediately to the fire of the enemy, which 
decimates them, stops short their offensive, and often 
leaves them at the mercy of a counter-attack." The 
Generalissimo offered his lieutenants no rhetorical 
comfort, but the purge of simple truth. He knew, 
and insisted on their understanding, that the shrewdest 
of strategy was useless if faults such as these were 
to remain uncorrected. 

The " General Instruction No. 2," issued to the 
Army Commanders at lo p.m. on August 25, con- 
sisted of twelve articles, which — omitting for the 
moment the detailed dispositions — contain the fol- 
lowing orders : 

" I. The projected offensive manoeuvre being impossible 



THE SECOND NEW PLAN 59 

of execution, the ulterior operations will he regulated with 
a view to the reconstit^ition on our left, by the junction 
of the 4th and ^th Armies, the British Army, and new 
forces drawn from the region of the east, of a mass capable 
of resuming the offensive, while the other armies contain 
for the necessary time the efforts of the enemy. 

"2. In its retirement, each of the ;^rd, 4th, and $th 
Armies will take account of the movements of the neigh- 
bouring armies, with which it must keep in touch. The 
movement will be covered by rearguards left in favourable 
irregularities of the ground, so as to utilise all the obstacles 
to stop, or at least delay, the march of the enemy by short 
and violent counter-attacks, of which the artillery will 
contribute the chief element. 

"6. In advance of Amiens, a new group of forces, 
constituted by elements brought up by railway {yth Corps, 
four divisions of reserve, and perhaps another active 
army-corps), will be gathered from August 27 to September 
2. It will be ready to pass to the offensive in the general 
direction St. Pol- Arras, or Arras-Bapaume. 

"8. The ^th Army will have the main body of its 
forces in the region of Vermand-St. Quentin-Moy, in 
order to debouch in the general direction of Bohain, 
its right holding the line La Fere-Laon-Craonne-St. 
Erme. 

"11. All the positions indicated must be organised 
with the greatest care, so as to make it possible to offer 
the maximum of resistance to the enemy. 

" 12. The 1st and 2nd Armies will continue to hold 
the enemy forces which are opposed to them." 

Articles 3, 4, and 5 specified the lines of retreat and 
zones of action of each of the Western forces. Articles 
7, 9, and 10, like articles 6 and 8 quoted above, indicate 
the positions from which the projected offensive move- 
ment was to be made. The whole disposition may be 
summarised as follows : — On the extreme left, from 



6o JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

the coast to near Amiens, the northern Territorial 
Divisions were to hold the Une of the Somme, with the 
Cavalry Corps in advance, and the 6ist and 62nd 
Reserve Divisions in support. Next eastward, either 
north or south of the Somme, was to come the new, 
or 6th Army, which was to strike north or north-east, 
on one side or the other of Arras, according to cir- 
cumstances. Beside it, the British Army, from behind 
the Somme between Bray and Ham, would advance to 
the north or north-east. The 5th Army (article 8 
above) had an exceedingly strong position and role. 
With the Oise valley before it, and the St. Gobain 
and Laon hills behind, it was to attack due northward 
between St. Quentin and Guise. The 4th Army was 
to reach across Champagne from Craonne to the 
Argonne either by the Aisne valley or by Rheims ; 
while the 3rd hung around Verdun, touching the Ar- 
gonne either at Grandpre or Ste. Menehould. 

The great military interest of these arrangements 
must not detain us. Their publication reveals the fact, 
long unknown save to a few, that Joffre not merely 
hoped for, but definitely planned, a resumption of the 
offensive from a line midway between the Sambre 
and the Marne, that is, from the natural barrier of the 
Somme and the St. Gobain-Laon hills, We shall see 
that an effort was made to carry out these dispositions, 
and that it failed. The failure was lamentable, inas- 
much as it doomed another large tract of country to 
the penalties of invasion. But, because the dis- 
positions ordered on August 25 were only provisional 
details, not essentials, of the new plan, the military 
result was in no way compromised. While deaUng 
with local emergencies or opportunities, Joffre en_ 



BATTLE OF THE GAP OF CHARMES 6i 

visaged steadily the whole national situation. The 
essentials of the " General Instruction " of August 25 
were four in number : (a) a defensive stand by the 
armies of Alsace and Lorraine, and a provisional 
defensive by the two armies next westward, the 3rd 
and 4th ; [b) a strictly controlled continuation of the 
northern retreat while reorganisation took place and 
forces were transferred from the east to the north-west ; 
(c) an ultimate offensive initiated by the western and 
central armies, of which one additional, to be called 
the 9th, under General Foch, about to be interjected 
between the 4th and 5th, is not yet mentioned ; {d) 
the constitution of a new left wing, to meet the extra- 
ordinary strength of the German right, and to attempt 
a counter-envelopment. The Amiens-Laon line fell 
out of the plan ; the plan itself remained, and it is 
fully true to say that in it lies the germ of the battle 
of the Marne. 

IIL Battle of the Gap of Charmes 

Everything was conditional upon the defence of the 
eastern frontier, now at its most critical phase. ^^ 

On the morning of August 24, Luneville having been 
occupied on the previous day, the hosts of Prince 
Ruprecht and General Heeringen were reported to be 
advancing rapidly toward the entry of the Gap of 
Charmes by converging roads — ^the former, on the 
north, passing before the Nancy hills, southward ; the 
latter, coming westward from around the Donon, by 
Baccarat. We have seen (p. 31) that, on the other 
hand, the 2nd and ist French armies, in preparation for 
a decisive action, were ranged in the shape of a right- 



62 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

angle — that of Castelnau (based on Toul) from the 
foothills north-eastward of Nancy, southward, to 
Rozelieures and Borville ; that of Dubail (based on 
Epinal) from the northern end of the Vosges, westward, 
to the same point. How far these positions, with the 
prospect of being able to close in upon the flanks of 
the enemy, arose from necessary directions of the 
retreat, and how far from strategical design, whether 
of one or both of the army commanders, or of the 
Commander-in-Chief, does not here concern us ; suffice 
it to say that the two generals won equal honour, and 
that the Grand Quartier effectively supervised this and 
subsequent developments of the situation. The op- 
posed forces were now about equal in strength — ^nine 
corps on either side. 

A space had been left at the point of the angle, 
north of the Forest of Charmes, west of Rozelieures ; 
and this may have tempted the Germans forward. 
The i6th Corps of the French 2nd Army, the 8th and 
13th of the 1st, with three divisions of cavalry under 
General Conneau masking them, were ready to fill this 
space, and, as soon as Luneville had been lost, pro- 
ceeded to do so, artillery being massed particularly on 
Borville plateau. On the afternoon of August 24, the 
pincers began to close, Dubail holding the imperilled 
angle and Heeringen's left, while Castelnau beat upon 
the enemy's northern flank. On the morning of the 
25th, the Germans took RozeUeures ; at 2 p.m. they 
abandoned it ; at 3 p.m., Castelnau issued the order : 
"En avant, partout, a fond!" Foch's 20th Corps, 
aiming at the main line of enemy communications, the 
Arracourt-Luneville road, took Remereville and Erbe- 
villier, east of Nancy, and struck hard, farther south, 



BATTLE OF THE GAP OF CHARMES 63 

at Maixe, Crevic, Plain val, and Hudviller, toward 
Luneville, which was at the same time threatened on 
the south-west by the 15th Corps, reaching the Meurthe 
and Mortagne at Lamath and Blainville. By night, 
the enemy was conscious of his danger, and escaped 
constriction by a general withdrawal. On the 26th, 
further hard fighting confirmed the French victory. 
Positions were occupied at the foot of the Grand 
Couronne, on the north, and near St. Die on the south, 
which were to save the situation a fortnight later. 
The Gap of Charmes was definitely closed. The 
German armies had suffered their first great defeat in 
the war ; and, although little known to the outer world, 
it did much for the moral of the French ranks. On 
August 27, General Joffre issued an order praising this 
" example of tenacity and courage," and expressing his 
confidence that the other armies would " have it at 
heart to follow it." 

Towards the north end of the Franco-German 
frontier, another check was administered at the same 
time to the Crown Prince's Army, near Etain, half-way 
between Verdun and Metz, General Maunou^y, with 
an ephemeral " Army of Lorraine," consisting of three 
reserve divisions, formed part of the 3rd Army of 
General Ruffey, but was given by the G.Q.G. the 
special task of watching for any threat on the side of 
Metz. He could do little, therefore, to help Ruffey 
in the battle of Virton.^^ On August 24, however, a 
German postal van was captured with orders showing 
that the Crown Prince intended to attack in the belief 
that the French had engaged all their troops. Generals 
Ruffey, Paul Durand, Grossetti, and Maunoury held a 
hurried conference ; and, the G.Q.G. having given 



64 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

permission, on the following day Maunoury struck 
out suddenly at the Crown Prince's left, which was 
thrown back in disorder. 

This victory might have been followed up. But 
General Joffre did not mistake the real centre of 
gravity of the situation, and would not change the 
basis of his new plan. He now considered the eastern 
front sufficiently secure to justify a transfer of cer- 
tain units to meet the emergency in the western field. 
Thither, our attention may return. 

IV. Battles of Le Cateau, Guise, and 
Launois 

During the night of August 25 — ^while Smith- 
Dorrien's men were defending themselves at Solesmes 
and Haig's at Landrecies — General Maunoury re- 
ceived the order to disengage his divisions, and to 
hurry across country to Montdidier with his Staff, 
there to complete the formation and undertake the 
command of the new 6th Army. This distinguished 
soldier was sixty-seven years of age. Wounded in 
the war of 1870, he had taken a leading part in the 
development of the French artillery, directed the 
Ecole de Guerre, and restored a strict discipline in the 
garrison of the capital as Governor of Paris. Two of 
his phrases will help to characterise this gallant 
officer. The first was that in which, in the moment of 
victory, he spoke of himself as having for forty-four 
years directed all his energies toward " la revanche de 
1870." The other was addressed to a group of fellow- 
ofhcers who were discussing certain German brutalities. 
He could not understand such things, he said, and 



LE CATEAU, GUISE, AND LAUNOIS 65 

added : " When we are in their country, we will give 
them a terrible lesson in humaneness." ^^ 

The Army of the Somme consisted at the outset of 
the 7th Corps, taken from Alsace {minus its 13th 
Division, left in Lorraine ; plus the 63rd Reserve 
Division and a Moroccan Brigade from the Chalons 
camp) ; the 55th and 56th Divisions of Reserve, taken 
from the Verdun-Toul region ; the 6ist and 62nd 
Divisions of Reserve, detached from the Paris garrison 
to Arras, under General d'Amade, and brought back 
from Arras to Amiens. It was constituted in the most 
unfavourable circumstances ; and the idea of a flank 
attack from the Arras- Amiens region, in support of an 
offensive from the old line of secondary fortresses La 
Fere-Laon-Rheims, was no sooner conceived than it 
had to be abandoned. Maunoury was compelled to 
send his divisions off piecemeal from railhead to the 
battlefield. The chief body of them had had such 
rest as a long journey in goods-vans permits ; 
d'Amade's reservists had been routed in the north, 
and had lost heavily. If Kluck had not been absorbed 
in the effort to destroy Sir John French's little band 
of heroes, Maunoury's task could never have been 
fulfilled. 

The debt was quickly repaid. The moment had 
come when the British must be relieved, or exter- 
minated. Between Le Cateau and Cambrai, on August 
26, the three infantry divisions and two cavalry 
brigades of the 2,nd Corps, although worn by long 
marches, checked the onrush of seven German divisions 
and three mounted divisions, including some of the 
best Prussian troops, supported by at least a hundred 
batteries. Again trusting to his guns while he planned 
5 



66 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

a double envelopment, Kluck allowed his enemy to 
escape. While this first experience of massed artillery 
fire revealed the fine quality of our " Old Contempt- 
ibles," it is a debated question whether General Smith- 
Dorrien's temerity was justified. He had been 
expressly ordered to continue the retreat, and General 
Allenby had warned him of the risk he ran. A sharp 
blow upon the German right flank by Sordet's cavalry 
and some of d'Amade's battalions relieved the perilous 
situation. But the British losses were heavy after 
as well as during the battle. At night, during the dis- 
engagement, the ist Gordons marched into the camp 
of a German division, and were taken prisoner almost 
to a man. The following is the judgment of the British 
Commander-in-Chief upon this affair : " The magnifi- 
cent fight put up by these glorious troops saved dis- 
aster, but the actual result was a total loss of at least 
14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, numbers of 
machine-guns as well as quantities of ammunition, 
war material and baggage, whilst the enemy gained 
time to close up his infantry columns marching down 
from the north-east. . . . The hope of making a 
stand behind the Somme or the Oise, or any other 
favourable position north of the Marne, had now to be 
abandoned, owing to the shattered condition of the 
army, and the far-reaching effect of our losses at the 
battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even throughout 
the subsequent battle of the Marne, and during the 
early operations on the Aisne. It was not possible 
to replace our lost guns and machine-guns until nearly 
the end of September." ^^ 

At this time Bilow was pursuing Sir Douglas Haig 
along the Guise road. On the 27th, the 2nd Munster 



LE CATEAU, GUISE, AND LAUNOIS 67 

Fusiliers were cut off, and killed or captured, except a 
handful saved by the 15th Hussars. On the 28th, 
the weary remnant of an army which had marched 
go miles in four days, fighting continually, tramped 
down the Oise valley, from La Fere to Noyon. That 
evening, Cough's cavalry, at the south of the Somme 
near Ham, and Chetwode's a Uttle farther east, in 
covering the retreat, had to bear two severe attacks, 
which they effectually broke. On August 26, Sir John 
French had met Generals Joffre and Lanrezac at St. 
Quentin, and had again found the attitude of the latter 
officer unsatisfactory. On August 29, at i p.m., 
General Joffre visited the British Commander at the 
latter's headquarters in the Chateau of Compiegne. 
" I strongly represented my position," Sir John re- 
ported to Lord Kitchener, " to the French Commander- 
in-Chief, who was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, 
as he has always been." The Field-Marshal was 
persuaded from this time on that " our stand should 
be made on some line between the Marne and the 
Seine." 

The needed relief had already been arranged when 
the conference took place, by a movement which we 
may summarise as an inclination of the 6th and 5th 
French Armies toward each other across the British 
rear. Sordet's three cavalry divisions had already 
passed from the right to the left of the British Army, 
D'Amade's Divisions had done something to check 
Von Kluck's advance by the Bapaume-Amiens and 
Peronne - Roye highroads. Nevertheless, Von der 
Marwitz's cavalry was on the Somme on August 28. 
That day Lanrezac's Army, which had retired from 
the line Avesnes-Chimay west -south-westward, took 



68 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

positions south of the Oise between La F^re and Guise. 
On the following day, August 29, while Joffre had gone 
from Lanrezac's headquarters at Laon to consult Sir 
John French at Compiegne, Maunoury and Lanrezac 
struck two hard blows, the one eastward from the 
Santerre plateau toward Peronne, the other north- 
west from the Oise toward St. Quentin, against the 
two flanks ot Kluck. 

In the former - ction, between the villages of 
Villers Bretonneaux and Proyart, 15,000 French 
chasseurs and troops of the line arrested a larger 
German force for a day and a night, then falling back 
toward Roye. Lanrezac was more successful in the 
simultaneous battle of Guise (extending to Ribemont 
on the west, and eastward to Vervins), although its 
original aim was not carried out. This was to wheel 
about, and to strike westward. The delicate man- 
oeuvre might have ended disastrously, for Biilow 
was closer than was thought, but for a rapid return to 
the old front. The left of the 5th Army (i8th and 
3rd Corps) crossed the Oise toward St. Quentin in the 
morning of the 29th, but was stopped in view of the 
arrest of the right (ist and loth Corps) by heavy 
German attacks. The 3rd Corps was then transferred 
to the right ; and, to the east of Guise, a serious repulse 
was inflicted on the German X Corps and the Guard. 

This seems to have been the strongest of several 
factors which now produced a deep disturbance of 
the German plans. On August 28, according to 
Billow's war-diary,^^ the High Comimand, probably 
under the impression of Le Cateau, had ordered the 
I Army to continue south-westward to the Seine 
below Paris, and the II Army to make straight for 



LE CATEAU, GUISE, AND LAUNOIS 69 

the capital. Guise altered the whole prospect. Biilow 
had had to ask aid from Kluck (who, till August 27 
subject to Billow, was then given an independence of 
command which continued till September 10). Kluck, 
evidently the more forceful personality, and opposed 
to an immediate descent on Paris, then proceeded 
south-east to the Oise about Compiegne. The new 
direction was at once accepted by General Head- 
quarters — a momentous change which will be dis- 
cussed presently. Other important results were 
attained by these actions. The British Force was 
freed, and retired to the north bank of the Aisne, 
between Compiegne and Soissons, there to reorganise. 
At the same time, the neighbouring French armies, 
albeit outnumbered, were so ranged as to close the 
breach thus left against Kluck and Biilow. Field- 
Marshal French, not having received reinforcements, 
had rejected Joffre's request to " stand and fight," 
and refused to budge when it was repeated by 
President Poincare and Lord Kitchener.^' 

Dislocation became apparent on both sides at this 
juncture. Kluck's liaison with Biilow was not very 
good, or the movements just described would not have 
been possible. A considerable gap had also developed 
between Hansen and Biilow. True, there was a 
corresponding void between the French 5th and 4th 
Armies, a distance of 25 miles held only by a few 
flying columns. But behind this breach, a few miles 
to the south (between Soissons and Chateau Porcien), 
the new so-called 9th Army had begun to form on 
August 27, under General Foch, fresh from his faUure 
and success in Lorraine. 

It is difficult now not to regard this appointment 



70 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

in the light of later fame.-^^ But the commander of 
the 2oth Corps was already distinguished. It is 
noteworthy that Ferdinand Foch was born within 
4 miles and four months of Joffre — at Tarbes in the 
Upper Pyrenees, on October 2, 1851. Of a solid and 
comfortable middle-class family, he is said to have 
called the Generalissimo's attention, when he was 
offered the army command, to the fact that he had a 
brother who was a Jesuit priest. Joffre swept the 
hinted objection aside. Foch, who had served as sub- 
altern in the 1870 war, had risen to be brigadier-general 
when he was made director of the Ecole de Guerre. 
Later, he commanded successively the 13th Division, 
the 8th Corps, and the 20th, of Nancy. 

The new force he was now called upon to lead — 
consisting of the 42nd Division of the 6th Corps, taken 
from the 3rd Army, the 9th and nth Corps, taken from 
the 4th Army, the ist Moroccan Division, and two 
reserve divisions from the 4th Army — was not yet 
ready to enter into action. Joffre 's purpose in creating 
and placing it was not only to strengthen his centre, 
but to preserve the offensive force of the 5th Army. 
The German Staff probably did not know of the 
existence of Foch's " detachment." It did know 
that, farther east, its central armies, those of Duke 
Albrecht of Wiirtemberg and the Prussian Crown 
Prince, were not doing as well as had been expected. 
On August 28, de Langle, having obtained the 
Generahssimo's leave to suspend the retreat of the 4th 
Army for a day, and a day only,^^ drove the German 
IV Army back across the Meuse between Sedan and 
Stenay with his right, while, with his left, he struck 
at the Saxons between Signy-l'Abbaye and Novion- 



END OF THE LONG RETREAT 71 

Porcien (sometimes called the battle of Launois), 
where, in particular, the ist Moroccan Division dealt 
faithfully with the I Saxon (XII German) Corps. 
The 3rd French Army was also deliberate in its retire- 
ment toward and around the northern limits of the 
entrenched camp of Verdun, and, on the 29th, near 
Dun-sur-Meuse, almost completely destroyed one of 
the Crown Prince's regiments which tried to cross the 
river. 

V. End of the Long Retreat 

The position along the French front on this day was, 
therefore, more favourable than it had been. In 
Lorraine, there was a slackening of the German attacks, 
pending the arrival of fresh forces ; and Castelnau, 
his weakened army fully rallied, was more confident 
of the issue. In the west, one new army had come, 
and another was coming, into line. At the right-centre 
and left-centre, the enemy had suffered checks which 
must have disturbed his arrogance, and caused hesita- 
tion and divided counsels that were presently to 
contribute to his undoing. They were checks only, 
however. A superiority of power remained ; and 
Kluck's right wing, doing forced marches of 25 to 30 
miles a day, although the Allies broke most of the 
bridges behind them, was a very serious menace. 
Foch was not ready for a decisive engagement ; and 
the Commander-in-Chief never wavered in his view 
that the general reaction must commence from the 
left. 

So the offensive must be postponed, the subsidiary 
scheme of August 25 cancelled, the retreat prolonged. 
General Joffre had left Lanrezac, at noon on the 



72 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

29th, with the knowledge that an offensive toward 
St. Quentin was impossible, and during the afternoon 
had listened to the representations of the British 
commander, who was accompanied by his three corps 
commanders and General Allenby. In his report of 
the interview, French says : " A general retirement 
on the line of the Marne was ordered, to which the 
French forces in the more eastern theatre of war were 
directed to conform," adding : " Whilst closely 
adhering to his strategic conception, to draw the 
enemy on at all points until a favourable situation 
was created from which to assume the offensive, General 
Joffre found it necessary to modify from day to day 
the methods by which he sought to attain this object, 
owing to the development of the enemy's plans and 
changes of the general situation." It was a hard 
decision to retreat to the Marne, so abandoning the 
second great defence line established after the war of 
1870, including the forts of La Fere, Laon, and 
Rheims. This new objective emphasised the dangerous 
unevenness of the front, for, on the 29th, de Langle's 
Army was 40 miles north of the Marne (beyond Rethel), 
Lanrezac was 50 miles to the north (near Guise), 
Maunoury and the British were about 30 miles to the 
north (between Clermont and Compiegne). It was a 
bold decision. But there was something still more 
heroic to foUow. 

Retreat and pursuit now attained their maximum 
speed, the greatest pressure being always on the west. 
The city and important railway centre of Amiens was 
evacuated by d'Amade, and occupied by Kluck's 
extreme right, on August 30 (the British base had 
already been moved to St. Nazaire) On that memor- 



END OF THE LONG RETREAT 73 

able Sunday, all the roads converging towards Paris 
were crowded with fugitives, whose panic-haste was 
only too well justified by the barbarities that marked 
the progress of the invasion. On the 31st, while the 
5th Army was still north of Laon, Kluck was driving 
across the rearguards of Maunoury and of the British 
(restored to the general line, after a day's rest) in the 
Clermont-Compiegne region. The curvature of the 
Allied line, and the threat of envelopment on the 
left, or division of the left from the centre, were 
acute. As we shall see, however, the enemy had 
fallen into a more perilous predicament. Paris had 
begun to be a major factor in the situation. The 
railways running southward from the capital were 
overwhelmed with multitudes of flying civilians ; so 
that the detrainment of some of the reinforcements 
from the east had to be made at a point more distant 
than had been intended.^" 

The British Commander-in-Chief, conscious of the 
weakness of his means, but sensible also of what might 
happen to the great city, now expressed his readiness 
to take part in a general battle before Paris, provided 
that his flanks could be covered.*^ But neither of 
Joffre's two new armies, the 6th and 9th, was ready 
for a decisive test. Kluck was hard upon the heels of 
d'Amade, Maunoury, and the Bri+ish ; and even on the 
Marne they might not be able to make a stand. Weigh- 
ing up the possibilities from hour to hour, the General- 
issimo concluded that he was not yet justified in risking 
everjrthing. On September i, from his headquarters, 
which were moved on that day from Vitry to a quiet 
chateau at Bar-sur-Aube, orders were issued to extend 
the retreat by another 30 miles to the south banks of 



74 JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH 

the Aube and the Seine. " Despite the tactical 
successes obtained by the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Armies on 
the Meuse and at Guise," he wrote, " the enveloping 
movement of the left of the 5th Army, insufficiently 
arrested by the British troops and the 6th Army, 
obliges the whole of our formation to pivot upon its 
right. As soon as the 5th Army has escaped the 
enveloping manoeuvre against its left, the mass of the 
3rd, 4th, and 5th Armies will resume the offensive." 
This order marks the moment at which Verdun became 
a pivot for the remaining portion of the western 
retreat. " We shall reach this line," the Generalissimo 
added (September 2), " only if we are constrained. We 
shall attack, before reaching it, if we can realise a 
disposition permitting the co-operation of the whole 
of the forces." 

The " General Instruction No. 4 " of September i 
indicated, as the turning-point, the line Bray-sur- 
Seine - Nogent-sur-Seine - Arcis - sur-Aube - Camp - de- 
Mailly-Bar-le-Duc. By the supplementary note of the 
following day, this line of arrest was pushed back a 
little farther stiU, from Pont-sur-Yonne (south-east of 
Fontainebleau), through Brienne-le-Chateau, to Join- 
ville, 25 miles south of Bar-le-Duc. These positions 
were never reached ; but the orders are of great 
interest, anticipating, as they did, the possibility of a 
movement that might well have involved the aban- 
donment of Verdun and the creation of a new pivot 
at Toul-Nancy. Joffre's public words are so few and 
sententious that the " General Order No. 11 " may be 
given in fuU : 

" Part of our armies are falling back to re-establish 
their front, recomplete their effectives, and prepare, 



END OF THE LONG RETREAT 75 

with every chance of success, for the general offensive 
that I shall order to be resumed in a few days. The 
safety of the country depends upon the success of this 
offensive, which, in accord with the pressure of our 
Russian Allies, must break the German armies, that 
we have already seriously damaged at several points. 
Every man must be made aware of this situation, 
and strain all his energies for the final victory. The 
most minute precautions, as well as the most draconian 
measures, will be taken that the retirement be effected 
in complete order, so as to avoid useless fatigue. 
Fugitives, if found, will be pursued and executed. 
Army commanders will give orders to the depots so 
that these shall send promptly to the corps the full 
number of men necessary to compensate for losses 
sustained and to be foreseen in the next few days. 

" The effectives must be as complete as possible, 
the cadres reconstituted by promotion, and the moral 
of all up to the level of the new tasks for the coming 
resumption of the forward movement which will give 
us the definitive success. 

" At General Headquarters, September 2, 1914. 
The General Commanding-in-Chief, 

" JOFFRE " 



CHAPTER IV 
THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

I. The Government leaves the Capital 

RETREAT to the Somme was much, to the Marne 
so much more as was to be appreciated only in 
the after-years of the war. Retreat to the 
Seine, besides endangering the venerable fortress and 
pivotal place of Verdun, left in peril of capture, perhaps 
of destruction, Paris, the richest and most beautiful 
city of Continental Europe, the seat of a strongly 
centralised system of government and many industries, 
the home of two milUons of people, the converging 
point of the chief national roads and railways. That 
Government and people accepted such a risk speaks 
eloquently for the mind that imposed it upon them. 

The passionate strain of those few days will ever 
rest in the memories of those who experienced it. 
News, vague and unexplained, of the northern invasion 
had fallen upon us with avalanche swiftness. Paris 
was almost universally regarded as its immediate 
objective. On August 27, the Viviani Ministry was 
reconstructed as an enlarged Government of National 
Defence, with M. Millerand in M. Messimy's place at 
the Ministry of War, M. Delcass6 at the Quai d'Orsay, 
M. Briand at the Ministry of Justice, and the Socialist 

M. Sembat at the PubUc Works. The same evening 

76 



THE GOVERNMENT LEAVES THE CAPITAL ^^ 

M. Millerand visited the Grand Quartier General at 
Vitry-le-Francois. " On the staircase," he afterwards 
wrote, " I shook hands with General Maunoury, who 
was leaving for the north to take command of his new 
army. The Staff officers were working in tranquillity, 
silence, and order. The brains of the army functioned 
freely. General Joffre kept me long in conference. 
I never found him more calm, more master of himself, 
more sure of the future. I left him full of respect, 
admiration, and confidence." "^ On the same day, 
General Gallieni was appointed military governor of 
Paris. Amongst the people of the capital, at least, 
this step excited keener interest, since it bore directly 
upon the question that was beginning to be asked on 
all hands — must we leave, or stay ? Gallieni, who, 
long years before, had been Joffre's chief in the military 
organisation of the colony of Madagascar, was, like 
him, of the type of soldier-administrator. But his 
temperament spoke of his Corsican origin ; and he had 
asked for, and Joffre had refused him, an army com- 
mand — circumstances to be remembered when we see 
him in action. A man of impeccable honesty, emphatic 
wiU, and few words, he immediately won the confidence 
of his men and the population at large, and in the height 
of the crisis presented a worthy, if somewhat stiff, 
personification of the new spirit which France began 
to exhibit before her armies had scored any victory. 

On August 29, the French official bulletin (communi- 
cated to an anxiously waiting crowd of journaUsts in a 
stable-Hke building beside the Ministry of War, there- 
after to be scanned greedily as the piece de resistance 
of the world's press) contained a partial revelation of 
the whereabouts of the enemy : " The situation from 



78 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS- VERDUN 

the Somme to the Vosges remains as yesterday." At 
the same time, the new Government, in a manifesto 
to the nation, declared that " our duty is tragic, 
but simple : to repel the invader, to hold out to 
the end, to remain masters of our destinies." This 
phrase " jusqu'au bout," repeated by Gallieni a few 
days later — ^with its homologues, " jusqu'auboutist," 
" jusqu' auboutisme " — was to become for years after- 
wards a catchword of the general resolve to fight 
to a victorious finish. 

Refugees and wounded soldiers were now streaming 
into the city from the north, and families from the 
holiday resorts of the west and south. More than 
30,000 fugitives from Belgium and the north of France 
reached the Nord Station on the 29th. A consider- 
able current had begun to flow outwards, and during 
the next few days the railways were overwhelmed ; 
but there was at no time real panic among the people 
of the great city. On Sunday the 30th, the first of a 
series of aeroplane raids provided a novel boulevard 
entertainment ; the president of the City Council, 
M. Mithouard, advised residents to send their women 
and children into the country ; and an edict was issued 
forbidding the papers to publish more than one edition 
daily. Railways, posts, and telegraphs were working 
subject to many hours' delay. The city hospitals were 
being cleared. Thousands of civilians were helping 
the garrison to dig trenches, and clear fields of fire. 
The Bois and neighbouring lands were turned into 
a vast cattle and sheep farm ; and large quantities of 
wheat were stored against the possibility of a siege. 

On the night of the 31st, I received privately the 
alarming news — only made public on September 3 — 



KLUCK PLUNGES SOUTH-EASTWARD 79 

that the Government had that afternoon decided to 
abandon the capital. The staffs and papers of the 
Ministries were already being removed ; Ministers 
themselves, with the President of the Republic, and 
the Ambassadors, except those of Spain and the United 
States, started for Bordeaux during the night of 
September 2. Many of the treasures of the Louvre 
and other museums and galleries were carried away 
at the same time. M. Poincare and all the Ministers 
signed a lengthy manifesto declaring that they were 
departing " on the demand of the military authority," 
in order to keep in touch with the whole country, after 
assuring the defence of the city " by all means in their 
power." A quarter of the inhabitants of Paris had 
by now left, or were endeavouring to leave, the city. 
The remainder, very anxious — ^for the red-handed 
enemy was only a day's march away — but still out- 
wardly calm, preferred to any eloquence of political 
personages the terse promise of General Gallieni : 
" I have received the mandate to defend Paris against 
the invader. This mandate I shall fulfil to the end." 
Certainly, the Government was in duty bound to see 
that it did not fall into the hands of Von Kluck. The 
utmost that can be said for the popular sentiment of 
the day is that, having prepared for departure, the 
chief magistrates of the Republic might perhaps have 
remained a few hours longer, when they would have 
discovered that there was no need to move after all. 

II. Kluck plunges South-Eastward 

The German Staff had, in fact, no immediate in- 
tention of attacking Paris ; and Kluck, passing beyond 



8o THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

gunrange of the outer forts of the entrenched camp, 
was racing south-east toward Meaux and Chateau- 
Thierry after the British and the French 5th Armies. 
This unexpected change of direction was only dis- 
covered on the afternoon of September 2, and 
confirmed during the next twenty-four hours by suc- 
cessive cavahy and aviation reports brought in to the 
headquarters of the British Army, Maunoury's Army, 
and the Paris garrison. It had, in fact, begun two days 
before, though it could not then be considered decisive. 
No sooner had he occupied Amiens, and crossed the 
Somme and Avre, than Kluck began to alter his course 
from south-west to south-east, while Maunoury and 
the British continued due south (the former two days 
behind the latter). Thus, while conducting foreguard 
actions with the British, Kluck increasingly left aside 
Maunoury, and came into contact with the 5th Army. 
Under Joffre's orders, Maunoury continued his direct 
march on Paris, his last units not leaving Clermont till 
early on the morning of September 2, whereas the Expe- 
ditionary Force had crossed the Aisne on August 30, 
and traversed Senhs, Cr^py, and Villers-Cotterets on 
the following day, to pass the Mame at and near Meaux. 
It is true that detachments of the German extreme 
right got as far afield as Creil, on the evening of Sep- 
tember 2, and Chantilly on the following morning, but 
they were no more than a flank guard. Senlis, on 
September 2, was the last place occupied in any force, 
the last scene of fighting, and of assassination, pillage, 
and incendiarism, on the main road to Paris, 23 miles 
away. Immediately in front lay the forests of 
Ermenonville and Chantilly, an uncomfortable country 
for what had become a mere wing-tip of the invasion. 



KLUCK PLUNGES SOUTH-EASTWARD 8i 

While Maunoury's exhausted troops were thus left 
liberty, behind these woods, to re-form and rest across 
the north-eastern suburbs of Paris (from Dammartin to 
the Marne), Kluck's main body was making south- 
eastward after the British at a hot pace, at the same 
time closing up on its left with other forces coming due 
south from Soissons through Villers-Cotterets. Crepy- 
en-Valois was occupied by the Germans on September 
I, 120,000 troops passing through toward Nanteuil-le- 
Haudouin and Betz, which were reached on September 
3. By the time Gallieni got wind of the new direction, 
in fact, nearly the whole of Kluck's Army and Billow's 
right wing were nearing Meaux and Chateau-Thierry 
(27 and 54 miles east of Paris). On September 3, 
the British blew up the Marne bridges behind them, 
and altered their hne of retreat to south-west, reaching 
quietude and reinforcements on the Seine on Septem- 
ber 4. Kluck pursued his south-eastward course, and, 
having crossed the Marne, Petit Morin, and Grand 
Morin, established himself, on September 5, with his 
Staff, in the house of a Dr. Alleaume in the Uttle 
country town of Coulommiers. " This is the last 
stage," he is reported as saying ; " the day after to- 
morrow, we shall leave Coulommiers to enter Paris." -^ 
That programme could not be carried out. Three 
days later, the boaster had fled, and Sir John French 
was ensconced in Coulommiers Town Hall. 

Before we go on to trace the advantage the Allied 
commanders took of this situation, we may pause to 
consider two questions which have been, and may yet 
be, keenly discussed : (i) How came Kluck, reputedly 
one of the best of living German officers, to perform 
this evolution across Maunoury's front, and so to 
6 



82 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

reach a position that was to prove fatal to the whole 
enterprise ? (2) Was the German Staff right in decid- 
ing to postpone the attack upon Paris ? 

It was natural that the problem should at first be 
posed in this double form, because, when information 
is scanty, it is easier to criticise an individual com- 
mander than a Grand Staff, and because the fate of a 
capital is more generally interesting than a strat- 
egical hypothesis. The most usual reply to the two 
questions was that, while the commander had made an 
evident blunder, the Command had only followed the 
orthodox military rule that no lesser objective should 
be allowed to interfere with that of breaking the enemy's 
main armies, and, the French and British armies being 
unbroken, it was right not to adventure upon another 
task, the reduction of a great city which might be 
obstinately defended, till this was accomplished. 
That Berlin understood the importance of taking the 
French capital, and hoped to take it quickly, may be 
assumed.^* Among other detailed evidence, the tardi- 
ness of a message from Berlin to the Ambassador of the 
United States (then still neutral) in Paris warning him 
to prepare for this event, ^^ and the fact that the German 
armies were not at first provided with maps of the 
region of the capital (see note 2), reinforce the prob- 
ability that this aim was originally, as after August 29, 
subordinated to that of a decisive battle. 

But the wisdom of the decision has been strongly 
questioned. " First to beat the enemy army," says 
General Cherfils, " is a means to an end, and generally 
the best. But this means is only a rule generally 
justified, not at all a principle. The principle of war 
is higher, and, like other principles, immutable — ^it iS 



KLUCK PLUNGES SOUTH-EASTWARD 83 

that the aim of war is to impose peace, and to this end 
to produce on the enemy government or command an 
effect of decisive demorahsation. We all know that 
Paris was not defended, and that, if the Germans had 
pushed right on to the capital with their I Army, 
nothing would have prevented them from destroying 
two of the forts, bombarding Paris, and entering the 
city. I ask if, at that hour, such a disaster would not 
have produced an effect of demoralisation equal to the 
finest victory. The Germans neglected to put in play 
the terrifying surprise of such a catastrophe. I am 
sure the Grand Staff must have regretted it." ^« 

More convincing reasons than this may be found for 
the fact that Kluck was afterwards relegated, first to 
a lesser command, in which he was wounded, and 
then to the retired list. It is an exaggeration to 
speak of the city as " not defended." The garrison 
consisted of four Territorial divisions, to which Maun- 
oury could have added on September 5 the nine 
divisions of his new army. The ring of outer forts, 
with a circumference of nearly a hundred miles, was 
too long to be held by such a force ; but it was also 
too long for investment or general attack by the ten 
or eleven divisions Kluck might have brought up. 
The German commander would, doubtless, have struck 
at a short sector ; and the question, probably un- 
answerable, is whether the defenders, in their in- 
adequate trenches connecting the old-fashioned forts, 
could have prevented him from breaking through, 
at least until the general battle on the Marne was won. 
It is highly probable they could have done so. It is 
certain that Gallieni would have made a spirited and 
obstinate defence ; he had received pecific permission 



84 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

to blow up the Seine bridges within the city, if he 
found it necessary to retire to the south bank. We 
know, also, that Kluck would have had to wait several 
days before his heavy artillery could be brought into 
position. Although the shortest distance between 
the outer forts and the boundaries of the city is about 
eight miles, much of Paris might then have been 
destroyed. But, the Government having gone south, 
would there have been any " decisive demoralisation " ? 
And what, meanwhile, would have happened to the 
remaining armies ? Assuming that the 6th French 
Army would have been wholly occupied with Kluck 
in the Paris area, instead of on the Ourcq, could 
Billow, the Saxons, and the Duke of Wiirtemberg have 
fulfilled their task on the Marne ? Would there not 
have been a dangerous gap on their right ? Kluck 
would then have found it much more difficult to dis- 
entangle himself, and perhaps impossible, in case of a 
general retreat, to keep touch with his colleagues. 

It has been stated, not very convincingly, that, in 
daring to pronounce against such an adventure, Kluck 
encountered the opposition of the Emperor and part 
of the Imperial Staff.^' Von Billow testifies that the 
Staff abandoned the advance on Paris directly after 
the order was given (p. 69). The problem which had 
arisen was of a larger and graver character than that 
which has excited so much ingenious speculation 

III, Joffre's Opportunity 

For it was no exaggeration to say that a rapid 
victory was an essential condition of the German 
plan. The envelopment of the west wing of the Allies 



JOFFRE'S OPPORTUNITY 85 

might succeed if it were effected by the time they 
reached the Somme, or a little beyond, but not later, 
and that for three main reasons. In the first place, 
there was, south of the Somme, Maunoury's force, 
not large at first, but constantly growing, a grave 
threat to Kluck's west flank, whether realised or not. 
In the second place, there was Foch's new army form- 
ing at the centre ; and, between Lanrezac and Foch, 
Billow's advance was so compromised that it had 
become necessary for Kluck to move eastward in order 
to relieve his comrade. Thirdly, Paris stood across 
the path of a more directly southward movement, 
with the certainty of delaying, and the probability of 
dislocating, an immediate attack. The design of 
envelopment by the west was, therefore, necessarily 
abandoned. Between August 29 and September i, 
when he had passed the Somme, Kluck ceased 
his south-westerly course, which no longer had any 
important purpose, and came in touch with Biilow, 
to support his blow at the strongest of the French 
Armies, the 5th. It was probably thought, on the 
following days, that Maunoury would be locked up 
in Paris by a distraught Government, and that the 
British Army, virtually disabled, would not require 
very serious attention. Personal ambition, fear of 
being late for the action that was to give a dramatic 
victory, may have spurred on the commander of the 
I Army.*^ 

So Kluck continued his course till his advance 
guards had reached a point on the Brie plateau 50 
miles south-east of Paris. His first purpose was 
fulfilled. The space between the central lines of the 
German I and II Armies on September 4 may be 



86 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

roughly measured by the distance between Cr6py-en- 
Valois and Fismes — no less than 50 miles. Next day, 
this space was bridged. It could not have been other- 
wise closed, except by arresting one or both forces, 
that is to say by suspending the whole enterprise. 
Paris had been covered as well as was possible with the 
forces in hand, the IV Reserve Corps, with a cavalry 
division, being left north of the Marne, while the II 
Corps was to turn from Coulommiers facing the south- 
east of the capital. It is uncertain how far Kluck 
knew of the strength or position of the French 6th 
Army.*^ As it afterwards came into action on the 
Ourcq, he could not know of it, for it was not yet fully 
constituted ; but he had been repeatedly in conflict 
with some of its elements, from Baupaume to Senlis. 
The German Command can hardly have supposed that 
Paris would be left without a respectable garrison, 
especially as they were certainly cognisant of Gallieni's 
proclamation. Whether they under- or over-estimated 
the strength Gallieni and Maunoury could put forth, 
the result would be much the same. In any case, 
Kluck must close up toward Biilow and cover his 
flank ; new lines of communication must be organ- 
ised ; if the French should attempt a serious flank 
attack, it could be delayed till the main battle had 
been won. 

It was, doubtless, a risky disposition, made more 
than "risky by Kluck's headstrong determination to 
have his full share in the decisive shock. British 
critics, with his failings in the north in mind, have 
dealt very severely with this commander ; French 
writers, better acquainted with the fighting on the 
Ourcq, are more respectful. Kluck's movement. 



JOFFRE'S OPPORTUNITY 87 

like the advance of Prince Ruprecht and Heeringen 
across the face of Castelnau's Army toward the Gap 
of Charmes, may have contained a large element of 
recklessness, born of foolish contempt for the retiring 
forces. But he was not responsible for the dilemma 
in which he was involved. The errror was that of the 
German Grand Staff rather than of any particular 
commander. We shall see that, if Kluck was gambling, 
he had not lost his head. Had the Allied retreat 
been less prolonged, had he been able to come up with 
the French 5th and British Armies sooner, he might 
have won, or at least have stopped on the Marne, 
instead of the Aisne. He had no longer a free choice 
of his movements. To have stayed between Aisne 
and Marne would not have solved the problem ; it 
would have eased the British advance. Every man 
was needed on the extreme front, if the whole aim of 
the invasion was not to be missed. Biilow had had to 
leave one corps behind at Maubeuge, and was just 
losing the support, on his left, of one of Hausen's 
Saxon corps (the XI), ordered off to the Russian 
front. Foch's new army of the centre had, doubtless, 
been discovered before this time, though its numbers 
would not yet be known. Kluck had to throw forward 
every regiment not demonstrably needed elsewhere. 
All the German commands were now engaged in a 
reckless gamble ; but, where his masters lost their 
nerve, Kluck did not. To this complexion had the 
great enveloping movement come under pressure of 
the Joffrean dilemma. With all his anxieties, the 
French Generalissimo may well have smiled blandly 
as he saw the enemy enter between the horns of Paris 
and Verdun. 



88 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

It is important to realise that the consequences we 
have to trace arose, not chiefly from individual blun- 
dering, but from the nature of the invasion, from a 
plan of campaign resting upon the need and expectation 
of a rapid victory, and the French manner of meeting 
it. To this need every lesser aim, however promising 
in itself, had been sacrificed. King Albert was allowed 
to carry his army into the shelter of Antwerp, there to 
prepare for the battle of the Yser. Ostend, Dunkirk, 
Calais, Boulogne, all the coast of Flanders and the 
Channel, with its hinterland, and with them the sea 
communications of England, were ignored in obedi- 
ence to the strategical doctrine of the major objective, 
and in the sure belief that if this were attained, the 
rest would follow easily. The watching world was 
staggered by the immense boldness of these criminals. 
Joffre was in no wise intimidated, never thought of 
temporising, immediately saw that a most daring 
crime can only be overcome by a still more daring 
virtue, and set all his mind to the task of 
gathering the utmost force in the best position for 
the decisive test. That meant abandoning the 
north ; so be it — he, too, must stake all on a 
blow. 

After rescuing the armies from a deadly constraint 
on the frontier, after preparing a mass of manoeuvre 
which would restore to him the initiative, after so 
lengthening the retreat that a virtual equaHty of forces 
was obtained, Joffre's aim was to reach a level front 
whence, his flanks being safe, he could swing round 
the whole Une in a sudden riposte. His wings were 
now, in a measure, protected ; and the same process 
which had brought the Allied forces near their re- 



JOFFRE'S OPPORTUNITY 89 

serves, their supplies, and their most favourable 
battleground had attenuated the enemy's columns, 
dislocated their line, and prejudiced their power of 
manoeuvre. The dilemma which Paris presented in the 
west, Verdun repeated at the other end of the line, 
170 miles away. There, too, the beginnings of a modern 
defensive system were being extemporised. Sarrail 
had just succeeded Ruffey in command of the 4th 
Army ; he would have defended, did, indeed, after- 
wards defend, his circle of forts and hill-trenches as 
Gallieni would have defended the capital. The 
Imperial Crown Prince was faced by a replica of 
Kluck's problem — ^to attack the fortress of the Meuse 
Heights, and to that extent to neglect the French 
field armies ; or to neglect the fortress, and risk all 
that might, and did, happen. Either the invaders 
must entangle themselves upon these protruding points, 
and so weaken the intermediate forces, or they must 
go forward to the crucial encounter leaving a peril 
unreduced upon either flank. That the Crown Prince's 
answer was the same as Kluck's indicates that it was 
not their individual answer only, but the decision of 
the Grand Staff. 

On the west, there are, before the battle of the 
Marne, three main stages in the development of this 
result : the loss of a week at the outset in Belgium, 
which enabled the French command to shift its forces 
north-westward, and the British Army to assemble ; 
the failure of the surprise on the Sambre and Meuse 
to produce a decision ; and the failure, on or south of 
the Somme, either to envelop or to break the retreat- 
ing masses. On the east, where there was less possi- 
bility of surprise or manoeuvre, a like inability to 



90 THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS-VERDUN 

pierce or envelop appeared in five successive failures : 
that of the Gap of Charmes on August 25 ; the battle 
of the Mortagne, at the beginning of September ; the 
battle of the Grand Couronne of Nancy on September 
4-1 1 ; that of Fort Troyon on September 8-13 ; and 
that of the Crown Prince's Army in course of the 
main battle of the Mame. To the German march- 
ing wing the most important mission had been 
entrusted ; and its failure must be adjudged the most 
grave. 

Its greatest exponents have admitted that the 
danger of dislocation is inherent in the tactic of en- 
velopment ; Clausewitz himself laid it down that the 
manoeuvre should only be attempted when the force 
attacked is wholly engaged with the assailant's centre.^'' 
After the Sambre, the German armies never had this 
opportunity ; and ere they could change a plan that 
had governed aU their dispositions, it had aggravated 
the disorder natural in so violent a pursuit. What at 
first sight looks Uke a sudden change of fickle fortune 
is, in fact, the logical end of an immense strategical 
deception, of weaknesses in an imposing organism 
discovered by a higher intelligence, and exploited by 
a higher prudence and courage. However the lesser 
questions we have touched be answeredfin the light 
of fuller knowledge, it seems [sure that]^historyTwill 
pronounce Joffre's master idea one of the boldestfand 
soundest conceptions to be found in miUtary annals. 
It dominated the ensuing battle, which thus yielded an 
essentially strategic victory. Gallieni has been justly 
praised for the promptitude with which he took ad- 
vantage of Kluck's " adventurous situation," The 
only alternative for the latter, however, was another 



JOFFRE'S OPPORTUNITY 91 

situation hardly, if at all, less adventurous ; and 
the choice was imposed upon him — as, at the 
other end of the line, upon the Crown Prince — by 
the French Commander-in-Chief. The manoeuvrer 
had become the manoeuvred before the battle 
began 



CHAPTER V 
THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

I. Gallieni's Initiative 

IT was in the early hours of September 3 that 
the first definite evidence of Kluck's divergence 
south-eastward was reported to the Military 
Government of Paris ; but the officers in charge did 
not venture to disturb their weary chief, who received 
the news only when he rose in the moming.^i At noon, 
he issued to the garrison the following note : "A 
German army corps, probably the Second, has passed 
from Senlis southward, but has not pursued its move- 
ment toward Paris, and seems to have diverged to the 
south-east. In a general way, the German forces 
which were in face of the 6th Army appear to be 
oriented toward the south-east. On our side, the 
6th Army is established to the north-east of the en- 
trenched camp on the front Mareil-en-France-Dam- 
martin-Montge. The British Army is in the region 
south of the Marne and the Petit Morin, from Courte- 
vroult (west) to beyond La Ferte-sous-Jouarre (east)." 
During the day, the news, the importance of which 
Gallieni immediately realised, was confirmed ; the 
evening bulletin issued in Bordeaux announced that 
" the enveloping march of the enemy seems defi- 
nitely conjured." Perceiving the opportunity of strik- 



GALLIENI'S INITIATIVE 93 

ing a hard, perhaps a decisive, blow at the enemy's 
flank, the Governor appears to have resolved at once to 
set Maunoury's Army in movement,^^ and then to have 
proceeded to urge the Commander-in-Chief to make 
this the commencement of the general offensive which 
was to have taken place some days later, when the 
armies had re-formed behind the Seine. " If they do 
not come to us, we will go to them," said Gallieni to 
his Chief of Staff, General Clergerie ; ^^ and at about 
9 a.m. on September 4, he issued to the 6th Army 
the following order : "In consequence of the movement 
of the German armies, which appear to be slipping 
across our front in a south-easterly direction, I intend 
to send your army forward against their flank, that is 
to say in an eastward direction, in touch with the 
British troops. I will indicate your direction of 
march when I know that of the British Army ; but 
take forthwith your dispositions so that your troops 
may be ready to march this afternoon, and to launch 
to-morrow (September 5) a general movement to the 
east of the entrenched camp." 

In course of the morning and forenoon of the same 
day (September 4), Gallieni had three telephonic 
conversations with the Generalissimo. Before the 
last of these communications, between noon and 
I p.m., the Governor, with General Maunoury, went 
by automobile to British headquarters at Melun. Sir 
John French was not there; but, during the evening, 
probably after hearing from General Joffre, he replied 
to Gallieni that the British Army would turn about 
on the morrow, with a view to the resumption of the 
offensive on September 6.^* After reflection, in fact, 
the Generalissimo had accepted Gallieni's view of 



94 THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

the opportunity, and had issued during the evening 
orders to the three armies of the left to get into 
positions of attack on the 5th, and to commence 
the battle on the morning of the 6th. On the 5th, 
Sir John French visited General Joffre, who had 
now come over to Claye, on the road from Paris 
to Meaux, Maunoury's headquarters. After the inter- 
view, there should have been no misunderstandings. 

At the end of August, the French General Staff had 
moved from Vitry-le-Frangois 40 miles farther south 
to Bar-sur-Aube, where, on the outskirts of the quiet 
little town, at the large country house called" Le Jard " 
(29 Faubourg de Paris), which had sheltered a century 
before the Tsar Alexander I and King Frederick 
William II of Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief was the 
guest of M. Tassin, a member of the Paris bar. Refus- 
ing all ceremony, General Joffre occupied a large first- 
floor room looking by two windows upon the gateway 
and the Paris highroad. But it was in a neighbouring 
schoolroom where the Staff bureaux were established, 
and to which the telegraph wires — nerves of the battle 
— were attached, that the historic orders for the great 
encounter were composed. On the evening of 
September 5, another southward move was made to 
Chatillon-sur-Seine, where, for three weeks, the Staff 
occupied the chateau of Colonel Maitre, once belonging 
to Marshal Marmont. It was from the "Chambre de 
TEmpereur " in this old house, so called after a visit 
of Napoleon in 1814, that General Joffre issued his 
final summons to the troops on the morning of the 
battle. 

The text of the General Instructions of September 
4 and 5 is of great importance, for they determined at 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES 95 

least the first shape of the ensuing struggle, and we will 
have to recall them in dealing with one of its most 
critical phases. For the moment, it will suffice to 
point out this apparent ambiguity, that, while the 
general offensive was to commence only on Septem- 
ber 6, Maunoury's Army was to discover itself on 
September 5, in a movement that would necessarily 
provoke strong resistance. 

II. General Offensive of the Allies 

General Joffre's programme was embodied in the 
following series of army orders : 

General Headquarters, September 4 

" I. Advantage must be taken of the adventurous 
situation of the I German Army (right 
wing) to concentrate upon it the efforts 
of the Allied armies of the extreme left. 
All dispositions will be taken during the 
5th of September with a view to commenc- 
ing the attack on the 6th. 
2. The dispositions to be realised by the evening 
of September 5 will be : 

{a) All the available forces of the 6th 
Army, to the north-east, ready to cross 
the Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and 
May-en-Multien, in the general direction 
of Chateau-Thierry [the last phrase was 
telephonically corrected at 10 p.m. to the 
following : " in a manner to attain the 
meridian of Meaux "]. The available 
elements of the ist Cavalry Corps that 



96 THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

are in the vicinity will be put under the 
orders of General Maunoury for this 
operation. 

(6) The British Army, established on the 
front Changis-Coulommiers, facing east, 
ready to attack in the general direction 
of Montmirail. 

(c) The 5th Army, closing up slightly 
to the left, will establish itself on the 
general front Courtacon-Esternay-Sezanne, 
ready to attack in the general direction 
south to north, the 2nd Cavalry Corps 
assuring connection between the British 
and 5th Armies. 

{d) The gth Army will cover the right 
of the 5th Army, holding the southern 
end of the Marshes of St. Gond, and 
carrying a part of its forces on to the 
plateau to the north of Sezanne. 
" 3. The offensive will be begun by these different 
armies in the morning of September 6." 

September 5 

" (e) To the 4th Army : To-morrow, 
September 6, our armies of the left will 
attack in front and flank the I and II 
German armies. The 4th Army, stopping 
its southward movement, will oppose the 
enemy, combining its movement with that 
of the 3rd Arm.y, which, debouching to the 
north of Revigny, will assume the offensive, 
moving westward. 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES 97 

" (/) To the 3rd Army : The 3rd Army, 
covering itself on the north-east, will 
debouch westward to attack the left 
flank of the enemy forces, which are march- 
ing west of the Argonne. It will combine 
its action with that of the 4th Army, which 
has orders to attack the enemy." 
We are now in a position, before entering upon the 
particulars of the battle, to measure in its chief elements 
the very marked change in the balance and relation of 
forces which the French High Command had obtained 
by and in course of the retreat from Belgium. The 
most important of these elements are numbers and 
positions. Both are shown in detail in the following 
tabular pages, setting forth in parallel columns the 
dispositions of the opposed armies immediately before 
the action commenced. 



STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES 

(On September 5-6, except where otherwise indicated, in order 
from West to East) 

ALLIED GERMAN 

6th ARMY (General MAUNOURY), I ARMY (General von 

(H.Q., Claye). Under .the direc- KLUCK), (H.Q., Coulom- 

tion of General Gallieni till Sep- „:^^^^ 

tember 10. '"*^'^^)- 

7th Corps (General Vautier). 

Brought from Lorraine to the 
Amiens region, thence to east of ,,, _ 
Paris. Consisting of 14th Division IV Cavalry Division. 
Active (General Villaret) and 63rd 
Division of Reserve (General Lom- 
bard)— the latter in lieu of the 13th 
Division, left in the Vosges. IV Corps of Reserve (General 

Came into action on September von Schwerin). 
6, and then formed the^left. Consisting of the VII and 

7 



98 



THE ORDER OF BATTLE 



6th Group of Reserve Divisions 
(General Lamaze). 

Also from Lorraine and Amiens, 
after hard fighting and heavy 
losses. Consisting of S5th Divi- 
sion Reserve (General Leguay), 
56th Division Reserve (Genera! 
de Dartein), and a brigade of 
Moroccan Infantry (General Ditte). 

This group came into action on 
the afternoon of September 5, and 
afterwards formed the centre. 

46tii Division (General Drude). 
From Algeria. 

A Cavalry Brigade (General Gillet), 
much fatigued in the retreat from 
Belgium. 

The above units were wholly 
north of the Marne, save for a thin 
connection with the British Army. 

They were reinforced during the 
battle by the following : 

4tfi Corps (General Boelle). 

7th and 8th Divisions, brought 
from the 3rd Army (embarked at 
Ste. Menehould, September 2). 
Some regiments had lost heavily 
on the Meuse. The 8th Division 
(de Lartigues) was sent across 
the Marne on September 6 to 
link Maunoury's and the British 
Armies ; the 7th Division (General 
de Trentinian), on September 8, 
to Maunoury's left, where it was 
afterwards joined by the 8th 
Division. 

6th Group of Reserve Divisions 
(General Ebener). 

Much reduced by fighting near 
Cambrai, and exhausted in the 
retreat. Consisting of 6ist Reserve 
Division (General Deprez) and 
62nd Reserve Division (General 
Ganeval). Engaged September 

7 and 9. 

1st Cavalry Corps (General Sordet. 
Succeeded at q a.m. on September 

8 by General Bridoux). 



XXII Reserve Divisions. 
At the commencement of 
the battle, stood, as rear- 
guard on the west of the 
Ourcq, about Marcilly, 
Barcy, and Penchard, in 
face of the French 6th 
Army. It had nothing be- 
hind to call upon, save 



A Brigade of Landu/ehr, 
which was brought to the 
north of the battlefield from 
the Oise on September 8. 



The following units were 
at first all south of the 
Marne, facing the British 
Expeditionary Force and 
the French sth Army : 

// Corps (General von Lin- 
singen). 

Of Stettin. Ill and IV 
Divisions, one north and 
one south of the Grand 
Morin, between Crecy-en- 
Brie and Coulommiers, 
facing the British. With- 
drawn to the Ourcq on 
September 6. 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES 99 



1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions : much 
fatigued in the retreat. Ordered 
from south of the Seine to Nanteuil- 
le-Haudouin, September 7. 

2j Battalions of Zouaves v^ere 
sent on September 9 to the aid of 
the left wing. A brigade of Spahis, 
detrained on September 10, took 
part in the pursuit to the Aisne. 
Three groups of garrison batteries 
were sent, on September 6, to 
support Lamaze, who had no 
corps artillery. 4 divisions of Terri- 
torials (83, 85, 89, and 92) of the 
Paris garrison did rear duty, but 
were not engaged in the battle. 
Admiral Ronar'ch's Brigade of 
Marines, afterwards famous at 
Dixmude, was not engaged, being 
insufficiently trained. 

BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCE (General Sir John 
FRENCH), (H.Q., Melun). 

8rd Corps (General Pulteney). 

Consisting of the 4th Division 
( Major-General Snow, loth, nth, 
I2th Brigades, and 5th Cavalry 
Brigade), and the 19th Brigade. 
The 4th Division joined before the 
battle of Le Cateau. This formed 
the British left, south of Cr^cy-en- 
Brie. 

2nd Corps (General Sir H. Smith- 
Dorrien). 

Comprising the 3rd Division 
(Hamilton— 7th, 8th, and 9th Bri- 
gades, and 2nd Cavalry Brigade) ; 
and 5th Division (Ferguson — 13th, 
14th, and 15th Brigades, and 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade). This corps 
had borne the heaviest fighting in 
the 150 miles' retreat from Mons, 
its casualties numbering 350 officers 
and 9200 men. These losses had 
been partly made good. 

Ist Corps (General Sir D. Haig). 
1st Division (Lomax — ist, 2nd, 
3rd Brigades, and ist Cavalry 



/ V Corps (General von Armin). 
Of Magdeburg, VII and 
VIII Divisions; south of the 
Grand Morin from Coulom- 
miers to Chevru, facing the 
British. Withdrawn to the 
Ourcq on September 7. 



/// Corps (General von 
Lochow). 

Of Berlin. V and VI Divi- 
sions, across the highroad 
from Montmirail to Pro- 
vins, midway between these 
towns. 



IX Corps (General von Quast). 
Of Altona. Two divi- 
sions, one north of Ester nay, 
and one at the right of this, 
near Morsains. 

(The III Reserve and 
IX Reserve Corps of Von 
Kliick's Army had been 



lOO 



THE ORDER OF BATTLE 



Brigade) ; 2nd Division (Murray — 
4th, 5th, 6th Brigades, and 4th 
Cavalry Brigade). This made the 
British right, east of Rozoy. 

All these troops consisted of 
home regiments of the old regular 
army. 

Sth ARMY (General Franchet 
D'ESPEREY), (H.Q., Romilly- 
sur-Seine). 

2nd Cavalry Corps (General Conneau). 
Brought from the Lorraine front. 

Comprising the 4th, Sth, and loth 
Divisions (Generals Abonneau, 
Baratier, and Gendron). Arriving 
from the 2nd Army at the beginning 
of September, it kept contact with 
the British Army on the left, north- 
west of Provins. 

18th Corps (General de Maud'huy). 
3Sth, 36th, and 38th Divisions 
(Generals Marjoulat, Jouannic, and 
Muteau). Before and behind Pro- 
vins. There was thus fully 10 
miles between it and Sir Douglas 
Haig's Corps. 

8rd Corps (General Hache). 

5th, 6th, and 37th Divisions 
(Generals Mangin, Petain, and 
Comby), south-west of Esternay. 

Ist Corps (General Deligny, succeed- 
ing General Franchet d'Espdrey). 
1st and 2nd Divisions (Generals 
Gallet and Duplessis). Across the 
Grand Morin at Esternay. 

The above three corps faced the left 
of the German I Army. 

10th Corps (General Defforges). 

19th and 20th Divisions (Generals 
Bonnier and Rogerie) east of 
Esternay . Sent to aid of 9th Army 
from September 9 to 11. 

The above four corps extended over 
the plateaux from the British right 
to the Paris-Nancy highroad, 
midway between Esternay and 
Suzanne, their right being ad- 
vanced. 



left behind — partly before 
Antwerp, partly before 
Maubeuge.) 



Cavalry Corps. 

Consisting of the II 
and IX Cavalry Divisions 
(General von der Marwitz) 
facing the left and centre of 
the British Army, and the V 
Division and Guard Cavalry 
Division ( General vonRicht- 
hofen) placed between and 
before the German IV and 
III Corps, south of the 
Grand Morin, at La Fert^ 
Gaucher, facing the junc- 
tion of the French 5th and 
British Armies. The Guard 
CD. was particularly 
strong, having 3 Jager 
battalions and 6 machine- 
gun companies attached. 



II ARMY (General von 
BULOW),(H.Q., Montmi- 
rail). 

Vll Corps Active (General von 
Einem), (XIII and XIV 
Divisions). 

This had come on tardily, 
and was in the rear, 
between Chateau-Thierry 
and Montmirail, when the 
battle opened. Being be- 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES loi 



4th Group of Reserve Diui'sions 
(General Valabregue). 

Consisting of the 51st, 53rd, and 
69th Divisions of Reserve (Generals 
Bouttegourd, Perruchon, and 
Legros). In support and reserve : 
much fatigued after the battle of 
Guise and the retreat. 

Light Brigade of 2nd Division Infantry. 
in reserve. 

9th ARMY (General FOCH), (H.Q., 
Pleurs). 

42nd Division (General Grossetti). 
From the 6th Corps of the Army 
of Verdun. North of Suzanne 
across the Epernay road, in touch 
with d'Esperey's right. 

9th Corps (General Dubois). 

From Nancy ; afterwards part 
of the 4th Army. Consisting of 
the 1st Moroccan Division (General 
Humbert), replacing all but one 
battalion of the i8th Division (see 
below) and the 17th Division 
(General Moussy). On both sides 
of Ffere Champenoise, with advance 
guards north of the St. Gond 
Marshes. 

11th Corps (General Eydoux). 

From the 4th Army. The i8th 
Division (General Lefebvre), from 
Lorraine, came into line on the 
evening of September 7 between 
Connantre and Normee. The 
2ist Division (General Radiguet) 
and the 22nd Division (General 
Pembet) were, at the beginning of 
the battle, about Lenharr6e and 
the important cross-roads of Som- 
raesous, facing the junction of 
Von Billow's and the Saxon Armies, 
with reserves north of the River 
Aube. 

62nd and 60th Reserve Divisions 
(Generals Battesti and Jopp6). 

From the 4th Army. The former 
was affected to the 9th and the 
latter to the nth Corps. 



hind Kliick's left, it has 
sometimes been counted as 
part of the I Army and 
the IX as part of Billow's. 
The VII Reserve Corps 
was detained before Mau- 
beuge, and only reached 
the Aisne on September 13. 

X Corps Reserve (General 
von Hiilsen). 

Consisting of the XIX 
Reserve Division and the 
II Guard Division. South- 
east of Montmirail. It 
was engaged on the 5th in 
collecting its wounded and 
burying its dead. 

X Corps Active (General von 
Eben). 

Of Hanover. Facing 
Foch's left, about Ville- 
neuve-l^s-Charleville and 
St. Prix, at the west end 
of the Marshes of St. Gond. 

Guard Corps (General von 
Plattenberg). 

North and north-east of 
St. Gond Marshes, from 
Etoges to Morains, fac- 
ing Foch's right - centre. 
Placed here, without doubt, 
for the honour of breaking 
the French centre. 

IV Cavalry Corps (General 
von Falkenhayn). 

After the battle of Guise, 
Billow's Army had come 
south through Laon, cross- 
ing the Marne between 
Dormans and Epernay. 

Ill ARMY (General von 
HAtJSEN). 

XII Corps Active (I Saxon), 
(General von Elsa). 

North of Normee and 
Lenharr6e. It came abreast 
of the Guard only on the 
morning of the 7th. 



102 



THE ORDER OF BATTLE 



9th Cavalry Division (General de 
I'Espee). 

In the rear at the Camp de 
Mailly, keeping connection with 
the 4th Army across a gap of 
about 12 miles. 

4th ARMY (General de LANGLE 
DE GARY), (H.Q., Brienne). 

21st Corps (General Legrand). 

13th and 43rd Divisions (Generals 
Baquet and Lanquetot). From the 
Vosges. Detrained on the evening 
of September 8, and engaged Sep- 
tember 9 on the left, east of the 
Camp de Mailly. 

17th Corps (General J. B. Dumas). 
33rd and 34th Divisions (Generals 
Guillaumat and Alby). From 
Courdemanges to Sompuis. 

12th Corps (General Roques). 

23rd and 24th Divisions (Generals 
Masnon and Descoings), reduced 
by previous casualties to about 6 
effective battalions. At Vitry and 
Courdemange. The 23rd Division 
was lent to the 17th Corps till after 
the passage of the Marne. 

Colonial Corps (General Lefebvre). 
2nd and 3rd Colonial Divisions 
(Generals Leblois and Leblond). 
Experienced troops, largely re- 
enlisted from the general army. 
They had suffered heavily in the 
Belgian Ardennes, losing many 
officers. At Blesmes and Dom- 
preray. 

2ncl Corps (General Gerard). 

3rd and 4th Divisions, less a 
brigade ( Generals Cordonnier and 
Rabier). At Maurupt and Ser- 
maize. 

A division of each of the last 
two corps was shifted from 
de Langle's right |to his left on 
September 8. De Langle's Army 
extended along the railway from 
Sompius, by Blesmes Junction, to 
Sermaize. 



Xn Corps Reserve (General 
von Kirchbach). 

The XXIV and XXIII 
Divisions ; across the Cha- 
lons highroad north of 
Somraesous. The former, 
which had been besieging 
Givet, could only join on 
September 7. It was turned 
south-west against Foch, 
the XXIII south-east 
against de Langle. 

XIX Corps (General von 
Laffert). 

On September 6, was 
south of Chalons, west and 
north-west of Vitry, facing 
de Langle's left. 

IV ARMY (DUKE Albrecht 

of WURTEMBERG), 

(H.Q., Triaucourt). 
VIII Corps Active (General 

Tulffe V. Tscheppe u. Weid- 

enbach). 
Of Coblenz. North-east 

of Vitry. 

VII / Corps Reserve (General 
von Egloffstein). 
About Ponthion. 
XVIII Corps Active (General 
von Tchenk). 

Having lost heavily, was 
replaced during the battle 
by the 

XVIII Corps Reserve. 

Both had come down the 
west side of the Argonne 
and the Ste. Menehould 
highroad. About Somme- 
Yevre and Possesse. 

A Cavalry Division. 

V ARMY (The Imperial 
CROWN PRINCE). 

VI Corps (General von Prictt- 
witz). 

Of Breslau. Had come 
south by Les Islettes, and 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES 103 



3rd ARMY (General SARRAIL), 
(H Q., Ligny-en-Barrois). 

15th Ccrps (General Espinasse). 

29th and 30th Divisions (Generals 
Carbillet and Colle). From the 
2nd Army ; detrained, September 
7. A brigade was diverted, Sep- 
tember 8, to the aid of the 4th 
Army. Near Revigny. Part of 
the corps was afterwards sent 
east to defend the passages of the 
Meuse. 

6th Corps (General Micheler). 

9th and loth Divisions (Generals 
Martin and Gossart). North of 
Revigny, about Laimont and 
Villotte. General Gossart replaced 
General Roques, killed on Sep- 
tember 6. 

7th Cavalry Division (General 
d'Urbal). 

About Isle-en-Barrois. Sent on 
September 11 to the Heights of 
the Meuse. 

6th Corps (General Verraux). 

I2th and 40th Divisions (General 
Souchier, succeeded by General 
Herr, and General Leconte) and 
107th Brigade of the 54th D.R. 
(General Estfeve). South of the 
Argonne, about Beauzee-sur-Aire. 

8rd Group of Reserve Divisions 
(General Paul Durand). 

65th (General Bigot); 67th 
(General Marabail) ; 75th (General 
Vimard). Behind and extending 
the 6th Corps on the Aire. 

72nd Division of Reserve (General 
Heymann). 

Sent from the garrison of Verdun 
by the Governor, General Coutan- 
ceau, to Souhesme-la-Grande, in 
support. 

When the battle was engaged 
there remained only a few 
battalions in and before Verdun 
and on the Heights of the Meuse. 

Sarrail's Army was deployed south- 
westward from near Souilly to 
Revigny. 



was now south of the 
Argonne, striking toward 
Revigny. 

VI Corps Reserve. 

A brigade only on the 
front, at Passavant and 
Charmontois. The rest 
west of the Meuse, near 
M ontfaucon, facing Verd un. 

Landcuehr Division of the 
same, before Verdun. 

XIII Corps (General von 
DiJrach). 

Of Stuttgart. Coming 
by Ste. Menehould, it had 
reached Triaucourt. 

XVI Corps (General von 
Mudra). 

Of Metz. Coming down 
the east side of the Argonne, 
it had reached Froidos-sur- 
Aire, aiming at Bar-le-Duc. 

V Corps Reserve (General 
Count Solms). 

Was still on the east 
bank of the Meuse about 
Consenvoye, north of Ver- 
dun. 

A Division of the IV Cavalry 
Corps. 



V Active Corps. 

Sent from Metz on Sep- 
tember 6 to the Meuse 
Heights the force which 
attacked Fort Troyon and 
neighbouring points. 



104 



THE ORDER OF BATTLE 



The composition of the ist and 2nd Armies of 
Generals Dubail and de Castehiau, and of the German 
armies facing them, is given in the chapter deaUng 
with the defence of the eastern frontier (pp. 198-200). 

With so much accuracy as is yet possible, the 
relative strength of the opposed forces at the maximum 
was as follows : 



SUMMARY OF STRENGTH 
ALLIES f GERMANS 



Divisions. 
Infantry. Cavalry. 



French 6th Army 

British Army 

French 5 th Army 
,, 9th „ 
» 4th ,, 
„ 3rd „ 



9i 

5i 



10 

10^ 



3i 

3 
I 



57 9 

(of which 41 Active) 
(The B.E.F. inckided 5 Cavalry 
Brigades) 

French 2nd and ist 

Armies (approx.) . 22 Divs 

(of which II Active) 



Divisions. 
Infantry. Cavalry. 

German I Army 11 5 

„ II „ 8 2 

„ III „ 6 

,, IV „ 8 I 

V ,, II I 

From Metz i 

45(?48) 9 
(of which 31 Active) 



German VI and VII Armies 

(approx.) . . 24 Divs. 

(till Sept. 7, of which 12 Active) 



This comparison of totals is of only limited value, 
for two main reasons : (i) As has been explained, the 
German reserve divisions were markedly stronger 
than the French, and the German corps generally 
were more homogeneous. (2) The table shows only 
the maximum development of each army. Light 
artillery was probably in about the same proportion as 
the infantry, with a marked advantage of quality on 
the side of the Allies ; it had not been possible to 
bring the full German superiority in heavy guns to 



GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES 105 

bear on the new front. It will be safe to say that 
between the regions of Paris and Verdun the Allies 
had obtained a distinct superiority in active forma- 
tions, and one more marked at the height of the battle 
in the area of decision. Antwerp and Maubeuge held 
before them bodies of German troops that might have 
turned the balance in the south ; the occupation of 
towns and the guarding of communications retained 
others ; whether from nervousness or over-confidence, 
BerHn had called two corps (nth and Guard R.C) 
from France for the Russian frontier — a "fateful" 
step for which Ludendorff disclaims responsibility. 
On the other hand, two new French armies had 
been created, chiefly at the cost of the eastern 
border ; many units had been re-formed ; the upper 
commands had been strengthened ; and the whole 
line had been brought near to its bases. " The 
farther the Germans advanced, the French and 
British adroitly evading a decisive action, the more 
the initial advantage passed from the former to the 
latter," says a German writer already cited.^ " The 
Germans left their bases farther and farther behind, 
and exhausted themselves by fatiguing marches. 
They consumed munitions and food with a fearful 
rapidity, and the least trouble in the supply services 
might become fatal to masses so large. Meanwhile, 
the French were daily receiving fresh troops, daily 
approaching their stores of munitions and food." 

This great overturn of material strength was the first 
advantage the French Command had worked for and 
obtained. It is to be noted that on neither side was 
any mass held as a general reserve, Joffre had hoped 
to keep back the 21st Corps, but even this proved 



io6 THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

impossible. " The strategic situation," he telegraphed 
to M. Millerand on September 5, " is excellent, and we 
cannot count on better conditions for our offensive. 
The struggle about to begin may have decisive results, 
but may also have for the country, in case of check, 
the gravest consequences. I have decided to engage 
our troops to the utmost and without reserve to obtain 
a victory." 

HI. Features of the Battlefield 

The second advantage gained has already been 
indicated ; it consisted in the attainment of a concave 
front resting upon the entrenched camps of Paris and 
Verdun, and by them guarded against any sudden 
manoeuvre of envelopment. Intermediately, this front 
lay across the heights between the Marne and the 
Seine, along the chief system of main lines and high- 
roads runnmg eastward from the capital, those of 
Paris-Nancy. This 200-miles stretch of country, so 
typically French in character and history, loosely 
united by the Marne and the tributaries it carries into 
the Seine on the threshold of the capital — an agricul- 
tural country whose only large cities, Rheims and 
Chalons, were in the enemy's hands — falls into four 
natural divisions, corresponding with the Allied left 
(west), left-centre, right-centre, and right (east). 

The western region, between the suburbs of Paris 
and the gully holding the little river Ourcq and its 
canal, is the Ile-de-France and the Valois, rolling 
farmlands of beet and corn, with some parks, bordered 
on the north by the forests of Chantilly and Villers- 
Cotterets, and on the south by the broad valley of the 



FEATURES OF THE BATTLEFIELD 107 

Mame. A landscape most intimately French in its 
rich, spacious quietude, in the old-time solidity of its 
villages and their people, in the gracious dignity of 
its chateaux and ruined abbeys, with Meaux bells 
pealing across the brown slopes to the sister cathedral 
of Senlis, and both looking east to the giant donjon of 
La Ferte-Milon. This is the battlefield of the Ourcq, 
where Kluck was rounded up by Maunoury and the 
British. The ancient cathedral and market-town of 
Meaux marks its hmit near the junction of the lesser 
and greater rivers. 

East of the Ourcq this district becomes more crumpled 
in its rise towards the Montague de Rheims ; while, 
south of the Mame, extends the larger and richer 
country of Brie, famous for its cheeses, its ferUs, erst- 
while baronial strongholds, and for the scenes of some 
of Napoleon's greatest victories. In structure, this is a 
broken triangular plateau, cut by westward-flowing 
streams (the Mame, Petit Morin, and Grand Morin), 
bounded on the south by the Seine and Aube, and 
rising eastward to the Montague de Reims and the 
Falaises de Champagne, where it falls abruptly. 
Coulommiers, Chateau-Thierry, and Provins are sub- 
stantial market-towns, and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, 
Montmirail, and Sezanne smaller centres of rural life. 
This wide plateau of Brie, the Allied left-centre, was 
the starting-point of the British recoil, and the field 
contested by d'Esperey's Army against Von Biilow, 

Beyond the Rheims-Epemay wine district and the 
St. Gond Marshes (source of the Petit Morin), we 
pass into the great expanse of the Champagne moor- 
lands, poor and thinly populated, where large tracts 
of chalk soil carry nothing but plantations of stunted 



io8 THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

pines and firs. Chalons-sur-Marne, its capital, has a 
large permanent garrison, with fixed camps and 
manoeuvre grounds hard by. Vitry-le-Frangois, at the 
junction of the Saulx and Omain with the Mame, and 
of the Paris-Nancy and Chalons-Rheims railways, is 
the only other considerable town. On the west of 
this region, Foch held against Biilow and the Saxons ; 
on the east occurred the shock of de Langle's army 
with that of the Duke of Wiirtemberg. 

Finally, beyond Revigny, the forces of General Sar- 
rail and the Imperial Crown Prince fought across a 
more composite region, consisting, in the south, of 
the Barrois — ^the district of Bar-le-Duc — and, to the 
north of this, the near part of the thickly-wooded 
Argonne hills, the Verdun Heights, and the plain 
between. Verdun was and remained a defensive 
position worthy of its ancient renown ; and the 
Argonne, with Valmy on one flank and Varennes on 
the other (to cite only two historic names), has always 
been a barrier against invasion secondary to the 
Heights of the Meuse. These latter are continued with 
only small breaks by the Heights of the Moselle, where, 
especially on the hills near Nancy, took place the 
coincident struggle by which the eastern defence Hne 
was preserved. While this must be borne in mind, as 
an essential part of the general French victory, it seems 
legitimate and convenient to treat it separately ; a 
brief recital of what there occurred is, accordingly, 
postponed to the end of our narrative. 

The mihtary geographer will have much to add to 
this note of the he of the land. He will > be able to 
show that all the natural features of the country 
affected the result : the rivers of the western area in- 



FEATURES OF THE BATTLEFIELD 109 

conveniencing both sides, but especially the invader ; 
the patches of forest and the direction of highroads 
limiting their movements ; the French gaining from a 
virtual monopoly of railway services a power of rapid 
transfer of troops that was one of the decisive factors 
of the battle. Everywhere, hill positions proved to 
be of great tactical value ; and this is supremely true 
of the eastern ranges. The Argonne block delayed and 
split the Crown Prince's columns, and so greatly helped 
Sarrail to maintain his hne. The Upper Meuse and 
its earthy rampart were a still more precious protection. 
Between Verdun and Nancy, a distance of 60 miles, 
only one point was attacked, in the crisis, and this 
was held by a single fort, that of Troyon. Yet another 
hill range as signally aided the enemy in the end of 
the battle, when the victorious Allies were brought up 
sharp against the Laon Mountains, north of the Aisne. 
Throughout the field, superior knowledge of the ground 
must be counted among the advantages of the French. 
The most important of these natural features, how- 
ever, is of less consequence than the strategical gain 
of a front whereon the French wings were both safe, 
while the German wings were both threatened. Gal- 
lieni, in throwing the 6th Army upon Kluck's flank, 
did but anticipate the inevitable by one or two days. 
What happened arose necessarily out of the strategy 
of the retreat, in the direction and form of which 
Joffre never lost his initiative. It is possible that, 
had he retired farther, the victory might have 
been more complete. Actually, the five German 
armies were drawn within a hemicycle 200 miles wide 
and 30 miles deep. Their right could not help passing 
before Maunoury, or their left before Sarrail, except by 



no THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

refusing battle. They dare not turn aside ; but the 
penalty of going on was to offer two cheeks to the 
smiter. There is, however, no trace of hesitation. 
The common soldiers still thought they were ad- 
vancing. " Nach Paris." At Headquarters, the tactic 
of envelopment having failed, everything was risked 
on a converging attack upon the French centre. 

IV. The Last Summons 

We can now enter upon the details of the titanic 
encounter with a clear impression of its general 
character. As soon as the relation of forces was 
realised, the tactical purposes dictated by the cir- 
cumstances to either side were these, and could not 
be other : for the French, to attack on the wings, 
especially the western, where there was a promise of 
surprise, while holding firm at the centre till the 
pressure there was relieved ; for the Germans, to 
procure a swift decision at the centre, while sufficiently 
guarding the threatened flanks. But their initiative 
gave the Allies the benefit of the move : precious 
hours elapsed ere Kluck could adequately reply. 
Thus, the disposition of forces governs the whole 
story of the battle, and gives it a natural unity. It 
began on the west and developed eastward, as it 
were, by a series of reverberations, until the shock 
was returned by Sarrail. In this direction, there- 
fore, we must follow its successive phases. If we speak 
of a battle of the Ourcq, a battle of St. Gond, and so 
on, it is only to make what can but be a bird's-eye 
view clearer by a just emphasis. These are so many 
acts in the battle of the Marne, one and indivisible. 



THE LAST SUMMONS 1 1 1 

We have referred above solely to the measurable 
factors ; the moral of the armies will best be seen 
in the process and the result. But there is a pre- 
vision of it in the evenness of the alignment reached on 
September 5th — much superior to that of the enemy, 
for some units of the German centre were crowded 
together, while the Crown Prince's troops were 
scattered — and in the readiness of these defeated and 
weary men for an instant recoil. On the morning 
of the 6th, the words of the Generalissimo rang out 
like a bugle-call along the front : 

" G.H.Q. (Chatillon-sur-Seine), September 6, 7.30 
a.m. (telegram 3948). 

"At the moment when a battle is engaged on which 
depends the salvation of the country, every one must he 
reminded that the time has gone for looking backward. 
All efforts must be employed to attack and repel the enemy. 
Any troop which can no longer advance must at any cost 
hold the ground won, and he slain rather than give way. 
In the present circumstances, no failure can he tolerated." 

Sir John French struck a more conventionally 
cheerful note : "I call upon the British Army in 
France to show now to the enemy its power, and to 
push on vigorously to the attack beside the 6th 
French Army. I am sure I shall not call upon them 
in vain, but that, on the contrary, by another mani- 
festation of the magnificent spirit which they have 
shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the 
enemy's flank with all their strength, and in unison 
with their Allies drive them back." 

No such general orders on the German side have 
been made public ; but the following summons to 
the Coblentz Corps of the IV Army, signed by General 



112 THE ORDER OF BATTLE 

Tulffe von Tscheppe u. Weidenbach, was afterward 
found at Vitry-le-Frangois : 

" The aim of our long and arduous marches has 
been achieved. The principal French forces have 
been compelled to accept battle after being con- 
tinuously driven back. The great decision is now at 
hand. For the welfare and honour of Germany, I 
expect every officer and man, despite the hard and 
heroic fighting of the last few days, to do his duty 
unfailingly and to his last breath. Ever3rthing 
depends upon the result of to-morrow." 



CHAPTER VI 

BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

I. A Premature Engagement 

EXACTLY at noon on Saturday, September 5, 
the divisions of General Lamaze, constituting 
the right (save for elements connecting it with 
the British) of the French 6th Army, came under 
fire from advanced posts of General Schwerin's IV 
Corps of Reserve, hidden on the wooded hills just 
beyond the highroad from Dammartin to Meaux. A 
surprise for both sides ; and with this began the 
battle of the Ourcq. 

The battlefield — a rough quadrilateral, extending 
from the Dammartin road eastward to the deep 
ditch occupied by the Ourcq and its canal, and bounded 
on the north by the Nanteuil-Betz highway, on the 
south by the looping course of the Marne — consists 
of open, roUing beet- and corn-fields where some part 
of the crops were still standing. A soldier would call 
it an ideal battlefield, its many and good roads helping 
the movement of troops, its wooded bottoms and 
the stone walls of its farmsteads and hamlets giving 
sufficient cover, its hills good artillery emplacements. 
The eastern and higher part of the plateau is crossed 
from south-east to north-west by three ridges, against 
which the French offensive beat in successive waves. 
8 



114 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

The northernmost jises to 300 feet above the Ourcq, 
from near May-en-Multien, along the httle river 
Gergoyne, by Etavigny and Acy, to Bouillancy ; the 
central ridge, that of the Therouanne, runs from 
opposite Lizy-sur-Ourcq, by Trocy and Etrepilly, to 
Marcilly ; the southernmost from Penchard, through 
Monthyon and Montge, to Dammartin. The combat, 
as we shall see, began in the last-named area, its centre 
of gravity then moving northward. The Germans 
had the better of the hill positions, with forward 
parties well spread out ; and, as in Lorraine and 
the Ardennes, directly they were threatened they 
entrenched themselves, though not continuously or 
deeply. Caught in full movement toward the Marne, 
Kluck's rearguard at once protected itself as it had 
been taught to do. The position was an awkward one, 
in the angle of two river-courses. But the German 
communications necessarily traversed the Ourcq, 
and hereabouts the west bank rises high above the 
eastern, covering the passage and commanding the 
country for miles around. 

Starting out in the morning from the hamlet of 
Thieux, 3 miles south of Dammartin, Lamaze's 
columns were directed as follows : de Dartein's 
Division, the 56th Reserve, on the left, toward St. 
Soupplets, by way of Juilly and Montg6 ; the 55th, 
under General Leguay, toward Monthyon, by Nan- 
touillet ; the Moroccan Infantry Brigade of General 
Ditte, toward Neufmontiers. After tramping nearly 
a hundred miles in three days and nights, with scanty 
food and sleep, and frequent rear actions, Lamaze's 
Corps had spent a whole day at rest, and, though far 
from its full strength, was a little recovered from the 



A PREMATURE ENGAGEMENT 115 

pains of the retreat. The sight of Paris near at hand, 
and the feeling that the supreme crisis was reached, 
set up a higher spirit, and prepared the men for the 
stirring appeal of the Generalissimo. They were now 
to need all their recovered confidence and courage. 

The 5th battalion (276th regiment) of the 55th 
Division was settling down to its midday meal in face 
of the hamlet of Villeroy, when it was surprised by a 
storm of shells from three of Schwerin's batteries, 
masked by the trees on the heights of Monthyon and 
Penchard. A French 3-inch battery in front of the 
battalion, and another brought up toward Plessy- 
I'Eveque, at once returned this fire, as it was afterward 
found, with good effect. But the heavier German 
field-guns, stationed 8 or 9 miles away in the loop 
of the Marne, at Germigny and Gue-a-Tresmes, and 
farther north behind Trocy, were far out of range 
of the French pieces, and were worked with impunity 
until near the end of the battle. Between Monthyon 
and Penchard, the enemy had three groups of machine- 
guns, which kept up a deadly rain of bullets. In two 
and a half hours, the 5th battahon, just referred to, 
lost 250 men out of a short thousand ; in course of the 
day, there fell of the 19th company all the chief officers, 
including the brilUant young writer, Lieut. Charles 
Peguy, and 100 men.^^ Nevertheless, the line jerked 
itself forward by short bounds past Plessis and 
Iverny toward the Montg^-Penchard ridge. Neuf- 
montiers was the first village carried by assault ; and, 
generally, the Moroccan chasseurs made the most 
rapid progress — their officers, with swords uplifted in 
gloved hands, leading them through the cornfields 
and orchards — until they reached the stronghold of 



ii6 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

Telegraph Hill, by Penchard, where they were thrice 
repulsed during the afternoon. By 6 p.m., the enemy 
being reinforced, all the captured ground was lost. 
The 55th Division, before Monthyon, and the 56th, 
on its left, were also at once arrested; but, having 
administered this check. Von Schwerin proceeded to 
abandon his advanced position, from Neufmontiers 
northward. On the left, a patrol of the 56th 
Division found St. Soupplets evacuated, at g p.m. 
In the evening, while the 7th Corps was coming 
in on its left, from the highroad between Plessis 
Belleville and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, Lamaze's front 
was drawn back lightly to the line Montge-Cuisy- 
Plessy I'Eveque-Iverny-Charny. Night brought a 
lull in the battle, a snatch of broken sleep for some 
of the rank and file at least. A harvest moon shone 
red through the smoke of flaming hayricks and farm- 
houses. 

This was far from being what General Joffre had 
counted upon in ordering the 6th Army to be in a 
position on the morning of the 6th, as an essential 
part of the general offensive, to pass the Ourcq and 
march upon Chateau-Thierry. Maunoury was still 
9 miles from the Ourcq at Lizy, with no prospect 
of an easy passage. " Some one had blundered." 
It is clear that Maunoury's reconnaissance service was 
gravely at fault. But there is more than that. In 
determining to precipitate the intended movement of 
the 6th Army, the Generalissimo depended upon the 
telephonic representations made to him by Gallieni. 
Knowing that, from his starting points on the morning 
of the 5th, Maunoury had 12 or 14 miles to make 
to reach the Ourcq, the Governor of Paris must have 



A PREMATURE ENGAGEMENT 117 

assumed that no opposition would be encountered — 
a rash conclusion in face of a commander like Kluck." 
Lamaze's force was too small to sweep aside any 
substantial rearguard, too large to come into action 
without giving the alarm. Why was the 7th Corps 
not in line with it ? Ever5rthing must depend upon 
the efficacy of this flank blow. When the enemy 
was discovered on the hills of Monthyon and Penchard, 
should contact have been broken till the attack could 
be made in full force ? Suppose that it did not then 
succeed, after the loss of precious hours ? Cruel 
dilemma ! The decision was to go ahead ; and the 
result came near being the abortion of the whole plan 
of battle. 

The morning of September 6 gave Lamaze an easy 
success on his left, offset by grievous difficulties on 
his right. The 56th Division, having occupied St. 
Soupplets at daybreak, rapidly reached the Therouanne 
at Gesvres, Forfry, and Oissery ; and Marcilly was 
taken in the afternoon. The 55th, checked for a time 
at the central height of Monthyon, next met a more 
determined resistance before Barcy and Chambry. The 
former village was lost twice, and taken a third time, at 
the cost of many lives. Ditte's brigade, strengthened 
by Zouaves from the 45 th Division, reoccupied Neuf- 
montiers, and took Penchard and Chambry, but failed 
before the Vareddes ridge. Everywhere it was 
the same tale ; though served with the utmost 
courage, the bayonet is no match for the machine-gun. 
Before retreating toward the loop of the Marne, the 
Germans burned down, by means of hand grenades, 
the village of Chauconin, with its household goods 
and farm implements. It is curious that the large 



ii8 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

town of Meaux altogether escaped damage during the 
battle. 

All possibility of surprise was now past ; and an 
average gain of about 5 miles had been dearly 
bought. Kluck, just installed at Coulommiers, 14 
miles away, had been instantly sobered by the news 
from his rear, and with a speed and judgment worthy 
of his repute had taken measures to meet the danger .^^ 
The French left, the 7th Corps, had no sooner come 
into action on this morning of the 6th than two enemy 
columns were signalled as having reached the Ourcq 
about Vareddes and Lizy. By the middle of the after- 
noon, when Lamaze was facing the hills beside Etrepilly, 
and General Vautier's two divisions, which had easily 
attained the line Villers St. Genest-Bregy, were striking 
out from the first to the second line of heights, from 
Bouillancy to Puisieux, with the prospect of turning 
the right of the German IV Reserve Corps, they found 
this new adversary before them. It was a part of the 
II Corps, withdrawn from the British front by a 
hard night march, and now thrown adroitly against 
Maunoury's left wing. 

II. The British Manceuvre 

To understand how this withdrawal, so big with 
results, was possible, and to do justice to Sir John 
French's command in regard to it, we must leave 
Lamaze and Vautier at grips with the two German 
corps on the Ourcq, and turn for a moment to the 
situation south of the Marne. 

On September 3, the British Army lay just south of 
Meaux, from Lagny to Signy Signets, having destroyed 



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naiitotLiLljzt y^pTV 

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Miks 



THE BRITISH MANOEUVRE 119 

the Marne bridges behind it at General Joffre's request. 
Kluck, as we have seen, was then approaching the 
river from the north-west, coming on at a great pace. 
Several of his Staff officers, pelting eastward from 
Meaux in an armoured automobile at nightfall, did not 
see that the last arch of the Trilport bridge was broken, 
pitched over, and were drowned. A little study of 
the map will show that Kluck's rapid movement — ^his 
pontoon corps established bridges of boats across the 
Marne on the night of the 3rd, and the next day his 
patrols were beyond the Petit Morin and on the Grand 
Morin — ^required not simply a farther retreat, but a 
different direction of retreat, of the British force. To 
throw it up against the neighbouring French columns, 
those of the 5th Army (commanded by General 
Franchet d'Esperey since the evening of September 3) 
was exactly what Kluck was aiming at. To avoid such 
a calamity, and perhaps to tempt the rash commander 
farther south, Joffre asked Sir John French to retire 
some 12 miles farther, drawing his right south-westward, 
pivoting on his left. This manoeuvre, which to the 
British commander could only seem the natural pursu- 
ance of the French Army Orders of September 2, 
by him received on the following day, was carried out 
on September 4. The Expeditionary Force, as it was 
called, had been on the Continent for hardly three 
weeks, had fought in that time two great battles and 
many smaller engagements, and had retreated 160 
miles in twelve days, losing much material and nearly 
a fifth of its original strength, about 15,000 officers 
and men. Behind the Forest of Crecy, close to the 
railway junctions south of Paris, it was able, on the 
night of September 4 and during the 5th, to pick up 



120 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

much-needed reinforcements, bringing its effective 
strength up to five divisions and five cavalry brigades, 
with guns and suppUes. 

At midday on September 5, when the battle of 
the Ourcq was beginning, the I German Army had 
reached the following positions : — Marwitz's IX Cavalry 
Division was north of Crecy, the II near Coulommiers. 
Richthofen's V Cavalry Division was at Choisy, 
south-west of La Ferte-Gaucher, the Guard Cavalry a 
little farther east, near Chartronges. The II Corps 
was extended from the Marne near Montceaux to the 
Grand Morin west of Coulommiers. The IV Corps 
was on the latter river about La Ferte-Gaucher. The 
III. Corps was on the great highroad about Sancy and 
Montceaux-les-Provins ; and the IX north of Esternay. 
The general strategical significance of these dispositions 
will presently appear ; for the moment, we are con- 
cerned with them specially in relation to Maunoury's 
and the British Armies. Twelve hours later, Kluck's 
front was advanced a little farther, extending from 
near Crecy-en-Brie, along the Grand Morin, by Coul- 
ommiers and La Ferte-Gaucher, to Esternay, with the 
cavalry of Marwitz before the centre and left. The 
bulk of this force was aimed at the 5th French Army ; 
but the II and part of the IV Active Corps faced the 
British. Such was the position at the moment when 
Kluck, informed of the danger to his rearguard, de- 
cided to send back to the Ourcq his II Corps, bring- 
ing the western wing of the invasion to a sudden and 
humiliating end. 

Neither at French nor at British Headquarters were 
these dispositions exactly known ; still less could the 
German commander's intentions be known. The last 



THE BRITISH MANCEUVRE 121 

stage of the British retirement, asked for by General 
Joffre, had taken the body of Sir John French's troops 
out of direct contact with the enemy. They had to 
embody newly-arrived men and guns, and then to 
return over this ground. Joffre's order of September 4 
had named as the British line for the evening of the 
following day " the front Changis-Coulommiers, /iSjcw^ 
east, ready to attack in the general direction of Mont- 
mirail " — due east, that is to say, not north-east. It 
is evident, from this instruction, that the Generalissimo 
(i) did not anticipate any serious resistance west or south 
of Coulommiers, for the British could not be fighting 
on their north flank while marching due east, and 
they could not start from Coulommiers when the enemy 
was 8 miles farther south ; and (2) did not anticipate 
a sudden withdrawal of Kluck northward, which would 
require the British to turn thither in aid of Maunoury. 
When Joffre and French met at Melun on September 5, 
the instruction was modified, but not radically ; 
it was now, in Sir John's words, " to effect a 
change of front to my right— my left resting on the 
Marne, and my right on the 5th Army, to fill the gap 
between that army and the 6th." The right of the 
5th Army, however, was not at Coulommiers — both 
Changis and Coulommiers were in the hands of 
the enemy — but Courtacon, 12 miles farther to the 
south-east ; and to join the 6th and 5th Armies 
implied a north-easterly, not an easterly frontage. 
Joffre so far recognised the difficulty of filhng this wide 
space with five divisions as to instruct Gallieni to send 
across the Marne the 8th Division of the French 4th 
Corps ; and this came in, with prompt effect, between 
Meaux and Villiers-sur-Morin, 5 miles farther south, 



122 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

beside the British 3rd Corps, at 9 a.m. on September 6. 
There then still remained a space of over 20 miles 
between the 6th and 5th Armies, and it is, therefore, 
idle to suggest, as some zealous partisans of Gallieni 
have done,^^ that the British commander was needlessly 
nervous as to the continuity of the line, when it became 
evident that considerable bodies of the enemy were 
spread across his path. 

It was not till September 7 that any need appeared to 
help Maunoury. But, as we now know, Kluck ordered 
the withdrawal of his 11 Corps to the Ourcq at 3.30 
a.m. on September 6 — 2| hours before the beginning of 
the Alhed offensive. The withdrawal was well covered, 
and was not observed for twenty-four hours. The 
change of direction of the British advance toward the 
north could not be effected with the instancy that 
paper strategists have imagined ; and the necessity of 
keeping touch with d'Esperey continued. The ques- 
tion whether the British advance was timid and halting 
must be judged in the light of the facts not as we now 
know them, but as they revealed themselves from day 
to day ; and in the light not of Gallieni's desires or 
needs only, but of the whole battle, and particularly 
of the instructions given to the British Army by 
General Joffre, who alone was responsible for the whole 
battle. That Maunoury would be seriously engaged 
with Kluck's rearguard on the afternoon of the 5th 
was not anticipated by the French ; it could not, then, 
be anticipated by the British. Since criticisms are 
raised as to one side of a converging movement, it 
must be pointed out that, if the French attack on the 
Ourcq had been delayed for twelve hours, and had 
not anticipated the general offensive, all would have 



THE BRITISH MANOEUVRE 123 

been well. Kluck would have been unable to evade 
one assailant in order to throw all his force upon the 
other ; and the tasks of Maunoury and the British 
would have been more advantageously divided. We 
are here, apparently, in face of one of those failures of 
information and agreement which are liable to occur, 
even under the best leadership, between armies of 
different nationality when plans are suddenly changed. 
It may now be recognised that the battle of the Mame 
would have yielded a completer, cheaper, and speedier 
victory if the rectangular movement of the French 6th 
and British Armies had been more exactly designed 
and timed to a strict simultaneity. There was a lack 
of assimilation. Perhaps the British were slow in 
getting under weigh ; it is much more certain that 
Gallieni was precipitate. 

The front of the British 3rd (incomplete), 2nd, and 
1st Corps at the opening of the offensive lay, then, from 
Villiers-sur-Morin, across the edge of the Forest of 
Crecy, by Mortcerf, Lumigny, Rozoy, and Gastins, to 
near the Forest of Jouy, where Conneau's Cavalry 
Corps connected with the infantry of the 5th Army. 
The battle here opened with an enemy attack. To 
mask its withdrawal to the Ourcq, a part of the German 
II Corps had delivered, early on the morning of 
September 6, a blow at the British right, and fighting 
was sharp till noon over the farmlands of the Brie 
plateau between Hautefeuille and Vaudoy — that is, 
8 miles south-west of Coulommiers. " At this 
time," says Field-Marshal French, " I did not know 
that a retreat had really set in, or how the various 
German corps and divisions were placed." Columns 
of the IV Active Corps were still farther south, to the 



124 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

east of Vaudoy, on the Provins road, with large forces 
of cavalry and the III Corps on their left. It was a 
dehcate part of the front, the space between the 
British and 5th French Armies. During the after- 
noon, while the khaki Hne slowly progressed over the 
stubble fields and broken forest around the villages 
of Lumigny, Pezarches, and Touquin, unmistakable 
evidence began to come in that the German foreguard 
had become a rearguard, and that the body of the II 
Corps had been in retreat all day. The charred walls 
of the hamlets of Courchamps and Court aeon, de- 
stroyed with deliberate ferocity, marked the most 
southerly points of the invasion in the western field. ^^ 
To the Allied soldiers who knew not Maunoury, it must 
have seemed that their offensive was commencing 
magically well. About 10 a.m., the British left and 
centre — the 4th Division and the 2nd Corps — ^had been 
surprised to find the pressure on their front suddenly 
relieved. On their right, the ist Corps soon saw its 
way free, and strode northward. At 6.30 p.m., the 
IV Active Corps received orders to follow the II 
Corps back to the Ourcq. Thus, by evening on Sep- 
tember 6, Sir John French was able to reach the Grand 
Morin, from Crecy-en-Brie eastward, with scouts 
beyond the stream at MaisonceUes. Coulommiers, 
where Kluck had had his headquarters, was occupied 
during the night. 

The AlUed plan was now fully revealed. Instead of 
presenting on the Grand Morin an ironclad face, safe 
in flank and rear, the I German Army had been 
suddenly thrown on to a rectangular defensive on a 
front of 50 miles between Betz and Courtacon, 
against attacks converging from the west, south-west. 



THE BRITISH MANCEUVRE 125 

and south. That evening, at Joffre's request, the 
British Une was directed more to the north, thus 
emphasising the effect of Maunoury's move. From 
this moment, the withdrawal of the whole of Kluck's 
forces over the Mame must have been envisaged. On 
the following day, September 7, in fact, the III and 
IX Corps (west of Montmirail), were preparing to 
follow the IV Active Corps across the Mame ; but 
the Allies were then aware of what was happening. 
Marwitz's Cavalry Corps covered the movement along 
the Grand Morin, with one division to the west, one to 
the east, and one 4 miles north of Coulommiers, 
while Richthofen's Divisions operated farther east, 
all available artillery supporting them. The task was 
fulfilled with much resource and energy ; but the 
position was not one that could be long maintained, 
for the British 3rd Corps was at Maisoncelles, 4 
miles beyond the Grand Morin, and the French 8th 
Division threatened the German flank at double this 
distance northward by occupying St. Fiacre and 
Villemareuil. At noon, Marwitz gave way, falling 
back to the Petit Morin, from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre 
south-eastward. By evening, the British 3rd and 2nd 
Corps were beyond the Grand Morin at La Haute 
Maison and Aulnoy ; the ist was held back somewhat 
from Chailly to near La Ferte-Gaucher, in touch with the 
French 5th Army. General de Lisle's Cavalry Brigade, 
with the 9th Lancers and the i8th Hussars, showed 
especial vigour. The men were full of cheer, and ready 
for anything ; but Sir John French was a careful 
commander. The measure of the enemy's retreat 
could not be immediately taken through the curtain of 
cavalry and artillery — aviation was in its infancy in 



126 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

those days. All the strength available was in line ; 
and it was so thin a line as to tempt surprise. The 
Field-Marshal considered the alternative of sending 
direct help round to Maunoury, but concluded that the 
best aid would be to drive rapidly to and across the 
Marne.^i 

III. A Race of Reinforcements 

On the Ourcq, each adversary was bringing up 
reserves, and was trying to turn the other by the north, 
with a slight advantage in time on the French, but a 
superiority of speed on the German, side. We left the 
centre of the 6th Army, on September 6, practically 
stationary about Marcilly and Barcy ; while, moving 
from Bregy and Bouillancy, the 7th Corps gained 
Puisieux and Acy during the afternoon, and the 
8th Division, thrown across the Marne, drove some 
enemy contingents into the woods of the river loop 
east of Meaux. Maunoury decided to attack frontaily 
the three plateaux of Vareddes, Trocy-Vincy, and 
Etavigny, throwing picked columns into the valleys 
between, that of the Therouanne at Etrepilly and the 
Gergoyne ravine at Acy-en-Multien, in the hope of 
turning the hill positions. His field batteries were 
now in force at Bouillancy, Fosse-Martin, La Ramee, 
Marcilly, and Penchard ; but he had no heavy artillery. 
Worse, from September 5, when his only aviator was 
brought down at Vareddes, to September 9, when 
Captain Pellegrin found a machine and discovered the 
nest of German mortars in the gullies by Trocy, he 
had no air scouts, so that, almost throughout the 
battle, the German gunners dominated the field. 



A RACE OF REINFORCEMENTS 127 

On September 7, Schwerin's IV Reserve Corps, 
strengthened during the day by a part of the IV 
Active Corps, raUied against Lamaze's harassed men, 
who, still untutored to spade work, suffered heavily, 
but did not give way. Ditte's Moroccan Brigade 
commenced at dawn a new move toward Vareddes, 
was beaten off, spent the afternoon in a fearful hand 
to hand struggle on Hill 107, won it, but was finally 
driven back to Chambry. The Algerian troops of 
General Drude, the 45th Division, had come in on the 
right-centre ; and they were able, during the morning, 
to make a long stride forward east of Marcilly. 
Beyond Barcy, however, they were immediately 
stopped ; repeated charges were broken, many officers 
and men being left on the ground. During the night, 
under a brilliant moon, the north wing of the 
division cut its way into the village of Etrepilly, but 
could not carry the cemetery, 300 yards beyond, and 
had to fall back. 

The !7th Corps [was no more fortunate. After 
taking Etavigny and the hillsides above Acy with 
a rush, it was suddenly overwhelmed by a massive 
counter-attack of the newly arrived II Corps, and 
had to abandon both villages, re-forming before Bouil- 
lancy and Puisieux. Many units had lost nearly all 
their officers. A panic was threatened. At a moment 
when it seemed that the left of the army could not be 
saved. Colonel Nivelle, with five field batteries of the 
5th artillery regiment, gave a first exhibition of the 
qualities which, two years later, were to secure the 
defence of Verdun, and to bring him to the chief 
command. Carrying forward through the wavering 
ranks of the infantry a group of his field-guns, he set 



128 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

them firing at their utmost speed upon the close-packed 
columns of the enemy. The " 75 " is a murderous 
instrument in such circumstances ; and those grey- 
coats who remained afoot broke in disorder. It was an 
hour's relief ; but manifestly this wild situation could 
not long continue. The enfeebled lines approached 
the extreme limit of endurance. And still the tide of 
slaughter swayed to and fro. Nogeon, Poligny, and 
Champfleury Farms — ^the first north, the others south, 
of Puisieux, large stone buildings topping the plateaux 
— were the scenes of most bloody and obstinate en- 
counters. Nogeon, the largest of them, was stormed 
and lost three times at intervals during the day. Under 
sustained fire from Trocy, its massive walls were 
broken ; the corn barns took fire and blazed across 
the expanse of the battlefield. 

In the evening. Von Schwerin drew back his lines a 
little from the edge of the plateau, and the ruined 
farms and hamlets gave the French a precarious shelter. 
At the same time, a reciprocal attempt at envelopment 
by the north began to design itself. The 6ist Reserve 
Division had just been brought up from Point ose ; 
and Maunoury decided to throw it, with the ist Cavalry 
Corps, out to his extreme left, the former at Villers 
St. Genest, the latter beyond Betz. Almost simul- 
taneously, new German detachments reached the Ourcq, 
and were set to prolong to the north the front of the II 
and IV Corps, while a Landwehr Brigade acting as 
line of communication troops was summoned urgently 
from Senlis. There was now no question of the 6th 
Army fulfilling its original task ; the utmost hope was 
that it might hold till the British came up, across the 
enemy's rear. Maunoury had to cope with an equal 



THE PARIS TAXI-CABS 129 

mass in better positions — three strong corps, the IV, 
the II, and the IV Reserve, with the IV Cavalry 
Division — ^against Lamaze's two Reserve Divisions, 
Drude's Division, the 7th Corps, the 6ist R.D., and 
the Cavalry Corps. Only the III and IX Corps and 
Marwitz's Cavalry remained beyond the Marne ; and, 
though the British pressure was increasing, the enemy's 
withdrawal had not been seriously disturbed. Kluck's 
boldness, skill, and decision were undeniable. It was 
evident that he had recovered from the first shock, and 
meant, if possible,to overwhelm its authors. Exhausted, 
and tormented by thirst, it was with sinking hearts that 
the Army of Paris looked up to the smoking hills. 

Viewed from French General Headquarters, however, 
the prospect was more favourable. The retreat of the 
I German Army was gravely compromising the posi- 
tion of its neighbour, the II ; and its effects were 
beginning to show farther to the east. For three days, 
these two forces were moving in opposite directions — 
Kluck to the north-west, Biilow to the south-east. 
The task of exploiting the dislocation thus produced fell 
to the British and d'Esperey's Armies. The role of the 
6th Army was thus radically changed by the develop- 
ment of events ; but it remained as important as ever 
in the whole design. If Gallieni and Maunoury could 
have reviewed the field from the Ourcq to Verdun, they 
would have been well satisfied. 

IV. The Paris Taxi-Cabs 

I spent September 7 among the rear columns of the 
6th Army, In the morning, the little town of Gagny, 
half-way between Paris and Claye (Maunoury's head- 
9 



130 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

quarters), and the last point one could reach by rail 
from the city, was full of men of the 103rd and 104th 
regiments, belonging to the 4th Corps (General Boelle), 
just arrived from Sarrail's front. They sat in and 
before the cafes, lay on the grass of the villa gardens, 
lounged in the school playground, where their rifles 
were stacked and their knapsacks piled. Some had 
managed to get their wives and children to them, and 
were telling great tales of the first month of war. 
I went out into the deserted countryside toward the 
front, passing marching columns, motor-wagons, 
dispatch-riders, here a flock of sheep in charge of uni- 
formed shepherds, there a woodland bivouac, and in 
the evening returned to Gagny. More regiments had 
arrived ; the town was boiling from end to end. In 
the main street, a battalion was already marching out 
to extend Vautier's left, a thin file of country folk 
watching them, waving handkerchiefs, the girls run- 
ning beside the ranks to give some handsome lad a 
flower. Up the side roads, other columns waited their 
turn, standing at ease, or sitting on the edge of the 
pavement ; a few men lay asleep, curled up against the 
houses. But the most curious thing was a long queue 
of Parisian taxi-cabs, a thousand or more of them, 
stretching through by-roads out of sight. The watch- 
ful and energetic Gallieni had discovered, at the cost 
of us boulevardiers, a new means of rushing rein- 
forcements to the point where they were direly needed. 
It was the idea of his chief of staff. General Clergerie. 
Joffre had at this moment only one remaining unit 
of the Regulars to give to Maunoury — a half of the 4th 
Corps, which had been brought round by rail from 
the Verdun front, and of which we have seen the 8th 



THE PARIS TAXI-CABS 131 

Division in action south of Meaux. The 7th Division 
had detrained in Paris during the afternoon of Sep- 
tember 7. It was to be sent to Maunoury's extreme 
left, near Betz, 40 miles away. Ever3rthing might now 
depend upon speed. It was found that only about a 
half of the infantry could be carried quickly by train. 
Clergerie ^^ thought the remaining 6000 men might be 
got out by means of taxi-cabs. The Military Govern- 
ment of Paris already had 100 of the " red boxes " 
at its disposal ; 500 more were requisitioned within 
an hour, and at 6 p.m. they were lined up, to our 
astonishment, beside the Gagny railhead. Each cab 
was to carry five men, and to do the journey twice, 
by separate outward and return routes. Measures 
were taken in case of accident, but none occurred. 
This first considerable experiment in motor transport 
of men was a complete success ; and at dawn the 7th 
Division was in its place on the battlefield. 

On September 8, the British Expeditionary Force, 
steadily gathering momentum, reached, and in part 
crossed, the Petit Morin, taking their first considerable 
number of prisoners, to the general exhilaration. On 
the left, the 3rd Corps advanced rapidly to the junction 
of that river with the Marne ; but the enemy had 
broken the bridges at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and held 
stubbornly to their barricades on the north bank 
through this night and the following day. Farther 
up the deep and thickly wooded valley, the 2nd Corps 
had some trouble between Jouarre and Orly ; while, on 
the right, the ist Corps, after routing the German 
rearguards at La Tretoire and Sablonnieres, made the 
passage with the aid of a turning movement by some 
cavalry and two Guards battalions of the ist Division. 



132 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

The orders of this day for the 6th Army were to 
attack on the two wings — Dnide's Algerian Division 
(relieving the exhausted 56th Reserve and the Moroc- 
can Brigade), with the 55th Reserve, on the right, 
towards Etrepilly and Vareddes ; the 6ist Reserve 
Division, General Boelle's 7th Division, and Sordet's 
cavalry, on the left — ^while the 7th Corps stood firm 
at the centre, and, south of the Marne, the 8th Divi- 
sion pressed on from Villemareuil toward Trilport, in 
touch with the British. For neither side was the 
violence of the struggle rewarded with any decisive 
success. On the French right, the Germans had more 
seriously entrenched themselves, and had much 
strengthened their artillery. Lombard's Division of 
the 7th Corps was heavily engaged all day at Acy ; 
at night the enemy still held the hamlet, while the 
chasseurs faced them in the small wood overlooking 
it. On the left, the 7th Division of the 4th Corps had 
no sooner come into action than it had to meet a 
formidable assault by the IV Active Corps. This was 
repulsed ; but the Cavalry Corps seems to have 
been unable to take an effective share in the battle. 
During the afternoon, German troops occupied Thury- 
en-Valois and Betz. Reinforcements were continually 
reaching them. At nightfall, although Boelle's divi- 
sions were resisting heroically, and even progressing, 
the outlook on the French extreme left, bent back 
between Bouillancy and Nantheuil-le-Haudouin, had 
become alarming. Maunoury, however, obtained from 
General Gallieni the last substantial unit left in the 
entrenched camp of Paris, the 62nd Division of Re- 
serve, and gave it instructions to organise, between 
Plessy-Belleville and Monthyon, a position to which 



THE PARIS TAXI-CABS 133 

the 6th Army could fall back in case of necessity. 
In course of the night, GaUieni sent out from Paris by 
motor-cars a detachment of Zouaves to make a raid 
toward Creil and Senlis. It was a mere excursion ; 
but the alarm caused is very comprehensible when the 
extreme attenuation of the supply Unes of the German 
I Army is remembered. Marching 25 miles a day, 
and sometimes more, it had far overrun the normal 
methods of provisioning. During the advance, meat 
and wine had been found in plenty, vegetables and fruit 
to some extent, bread seldom ; here, in the Valois, 
the army could not feed itself on the country, and 
convoys arrived slowly from the north. Artillery 
ammunition was rapidly running out. Hunger 
quickly deepens doubt to fear. 

But Maunoury's men were at the end of their 
strength. On the morning of September 9, a deter- 
mined attack by the IV Active Corps, supported by the 
right of the II, was delivered from Betz and Anthilly. 
The 8th Division had been summoned back from the 
Mame, to be thrown to the French left. Apparently 
it could not be brought effectively into this action ; 
and the 6ist and 7th Divisions and the 7th Corps 
failing to stand, Nanteuil and ViUers St. Genest were 
lost, the front being re-formed before Silly-le-Long. 
" A troop which can no longer advance must at any 
cost hold the ground won, and be slain rather than 
give way." Such a summons can only be repeated 
by a much-trusted chief. Maunoury repeated it 
in other words. Thousands of men, grimy, ragged, 
with empty bellies and tongues parched by the torrid 
heat, had already gone down, wiUingly accepting the 
dire sentence. Few of them could hear or suppose 



134 BATTLE OF THE OURCQ 

that the enemy was in j^et extremer pHght. So 
it was. Early in the morning, Vareddes and 
Etrepilly had been found abandoned ; greater news 
had been coming in for hours to Headquarters — 
some of it from the enemy himself by way of 
the Eiffel Tower in Paris, where the French " wire- 
less " operators were picking up the conversations 
of the German commanders. Marwitz was particularly 
frank and insistent ; his men were asleep in their 
saddles, his horses broken with overwork. He was 
apparently too much pressed to wait for his message 
to be properly coded. By such and other means, it 
was known that Kluck and Billow were at loggerheads, 
that, even on the order of Berlin, the former would not 
submit himself to his colleague, and that, in conse- 
quence, Biilow in turn had begun to retreat before 
Franchet d'Esperey. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE " EFFECT OF SUCTION " 

I. French and d'Esperey strike North 

THE unescapable dilemma of the Joffrean 
strategy had developed into a second and 
peremptory phase. In deciding to withdraw 
from the Brie plateau and the Marne, rather than risk 
his rear and communications for the chance of a victory 
on the Seine, Kluck, or his superiors, had, doubtless, 
chosen the lesser evil. The marching wing of the 
invasion was crippled before the offensive of the Allies 
had begun ; but Gallieni's precipitancy had brought 
a premature arrest upon the 6th Army. Beside this 
double check, we have now to witness a race between 
two offensive movements — Biilow and Hansen pouring 
south with the impetuosity of desperation, while, 
along their right, the British Force and the French 5th 
Army struck north between the two western masses 
of the enemy with the fresh energy of an immense 
hope. Which will sooner effect a rupture ? 

Logically, there should be no doubt of the answer. 
Kluck was mainly occupied with Maunoury ; Biilow, 
with Foch. Between them, there was no new army 
to engage the eight corps of Sir John French and 
Franchet d'Esperey. The cavalry and artillery 

force of Marwitz and Richthofen, strong as it was, 

13s 



136 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

could do no more than postpone the inevitable — 
always provided that Maunoury and Foch could hold 
out. Every day, the pull of Kluck to the north-west 
and of Billow to the south-east must become more 
embarrassing. French writers have applied an 
expressive phrase to the influence of this pull — " effet 
de ventouse," effect of suction — though hardly 
appreciating its double direction. The maintenance 
of a continuous battle-line is axiomatic in modern 
military science. It follows from the size of the 
masses in action, the difficulty, even with steam and 
petrol transport, of moving them rapidly, and their 
dependence upon long lines of supply. The soldier 
bred upon Napoleonic annals may long for the oppor- 
tunity of free manoeuvre ; all the evolution of warfare 
is against his dream. An army neither feeds nor 
directs itself ; it is supplied and duected as part of 
a larger machine executing a predetermined plan. 
Superiority of force is increased by concentration, 
and achieves victory by envelopment of the enemy 
as a whole, or his disintegration by the piercing of 
gaps, a preliminary to retail envelopment or dispersal. 
A course which loses the initial superiority and requires 
a considerable change of plan is already a grave pre- 
judice ; when to this is added a necessary expedient 
leading to an extensive disturbance of the line, prudence 
dictates that the offensive should be suspended until 
the whole mass of attack has been reorganised in 
view of the new circumstances. The German Command 
dare not risk such a pause. It persisted ; and the 
penalty lengthened with every hour of its persistence. 
The more Kluck stretched his right in order to cover 
his communications by Compi^ne and the Gise valley, 



FRENCH AND D'ESP:6rEY STRIKE NORTH 137 

the wider became the void between his left and the 
II Army, constantly moving in the opposite direction. 
When French and d'Esperey found this void, a like 
difficulty was presented to Biilow — to be enveloped 
on the right, or to close up thither, leaving a breach 
on his other flank, which the Saxon Army would be 
unable to fill. Thus, Maunoury's enterprise on the 
Ourcq, though falling short of full success, produced 
a series of voids, and, at length, a dislocation of the 
whole German line, which was only saved from utter 
disaster by a general retreat. 

General Franchet d'Esperey, who had been brigadier 
in 1908, divisional commander in 1912, a gallant 
and energetic officer now fifty-eight years of age, suc- 
cessful with the ist Corps at Dinant and St. Gerard 
in Belgium, and in the important battle of Guise, 
had, on September 3, succeeded Lanrezac at the head 
of the largest of the French armies, the 5th. Its task 
— ^in touch with Foch on the right, and with the British, 
through Conneau's cavalry corps, on the left — ^was to 
press north toward Montmirail, against Kluck's left 
(III and IX Corps, and Richthofen's cavalry divisions) 
and the right wing of Biilow (VII Corps and X 
Reserve Corps). In later stages of the war, the 
junction of two armies often showed itself to be a 
point of weakness to be aimed at. With four active 
corps and three divisions of reserves in hand, d'Esperey 
had, even before the German withdrawal began, a 
considerable advantage — indicating Joffre's intention 
that it should be the second great arm of his offensive, 
that which should make the chief frontal attack. 
On the other hand, the enemy held strong positions 
along the Grand Morin, and, behind this, along 



138 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

the Vauchamps-Montmirail ridge of the Petit Morin. 
During their retreat the AUies had used the oppor- 
tunity offered by the valleys of the Marne and its 
tributaries for delaying actions ; these streams were 
now so many obstacles across their path. The first 
French movement, on September 6, was powerfully 
resisted. On the left, the cavalry occupied Courtacon.^^ 
At the centre, the i8th and 3rd Corps co-operating 
(prophetic combination — Maud'huy, Mangin, and 
Petain !), the villages of Montceaux-les-Provins and 
Courgivaux, on the high road from Paris to Nancy, 
which was, as it were, the base of the whole battlefield, 
were taken by assault. On the right, the ist Corps 
was stopped throughout the forenoon before Chatillon- 
sur-Morin by the X Reserve Corps. D'Esperey 
detached a division, with artillery, to make a wide 
detour and to fall, through the Wood of La Noue, 
upon the German defences east of Esternay. Thus 
threatened, the enemy gave way ; and the market- 
town of Esternay was occupied early on the following 
morning. The loth Corps continued the hne toward 
the north-east, after suffering rather heavy losses 
beyond Sezanne. 

On the morning of September 7, the air services 
of the 5th Army reported the commencement of 
Kluck's retreat ; and soon afterwards a corresponding 
movement of Billow's right was discovered to be 
going on behind a screen of cavalry and artillery, 
supported by some infantry elements. D'Esperey 
had no sooner ordered the piercing of this screen than 
news was brought in of the critical position of the 
neighbouring wing of Foch's Army, the 42nd Division 
and the 9th Corps, through which Billow's X and 



FRENCH AND D'ESPfiREY STRIKE NORTH 139 

Guard Corps were trying to break, from the St. Gond 
Marshes toward Sezanne. He at once diverted his 
20th Division to threaten the western flank of this 
attack (which will be followed in the next section) 
about Villeneuve-les-Charleville, Meanwhile, rapid 
progress was being made on the centre and left of the 
5th Army. Between Estemay and Montmirail ex- 
tend the close-set parklands called the Forest of 
Gault, with smaller woods outlying, a difficult country 
in which many groups of hungry German stragglers 
were picked up during the following days. Through 
this district, the ist Corps and the left of the loth, 
with General Valabregue's three divisions of reserves 
behind, beat their way ; while, farther west, in the 
more open but broken fields between the Grand and 
the Petit Morin, the i8th and the 3rd Corps made 
six good miles, to the hne Ferte Gaucher-Trefols. 
More than a thousand prisoners were taken during 
the day, with a few machine-guns and some abandoned 
stores. 

We have seen (pp. 124-5, 131) the British Expedi- 
tionary Force at the beginning of a like novel and 
exhilarating experience. Its five divisions, having 
seized Coulommiers on the night of September 6, had 
pressed on to the Petit Morin, and, from its junction 
with the Marne eastward to La Tretoire, where ob- 
stinate opposition was offered, had secured the cross- 
ings. D'Esperey's left wing thus found its task 
Ughtened ; and the i8th and 3rd Corps were ordered 
to sweep aside the remaining German rearguards, and 
to strike across the Petit Morin on either side of 
Montmirail. September 8 was thus a day rather of 
marching than fighting, except at Montmirail, on 



140 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

whose horse-shoe ridge the enemy held out for some 
hours. ^* In the evening, General Hache entered the 
picturesque town, and set up his quarters in the old 
chateau where Billow's Staff had been housed on the 
previous day. On the left, Maud'huy pushed the 
i8th Corps by MontoHvet over the Petit Morin, and 
after a sharp action took the village of Marchais-en- 
Brie. On the right, the ist Corps was checked at 
Courbetaux and Bergeres, the German VII Corps 
having come into line ; so that the loth Corps, be- 
tween Soigny and Corfehx, had to turn north-west- 
ward to its assistance. This was scarcely more than 
an eddy in the general stream of fortune. The moral 
effect of a happy manoeuvre goes for much in the 
result. The British and d'Esperey's men forgot all 
their sufferings and weariness in the spectacle of the 
enemy yielding. British aviators reported Kluck's 
columns as in general retreat, certain roads being 
much encumbered. Biilow had necessarily with- 
drawn his right to maintain contact ; his centre and 
left must foUow if the pressure were continued. 

The hour of decision approached. During the morn- 
ing of Wednesday, September g, Sir John French's 
2nd and ist Corps crossed the Mame at Luzancy, 
Saacy, Nanteuil, Charly, and Nogent-l'Artaud. This 
part of the valley was scarcely defended ; and a 
brigade of the 3rd Division had progressed 4 miles 
beyond it by 9 a.m. Anxious news for the German 
Staff. Unfortunately, our right was arrested until 
afternoon by a threat of attack from Chateau-Thierry ; 
and, lower down the river about La Fert^, the 3rd 
Corps, still represented only by the 4th Division and 
the 19th Brigade, was stopped until evening before 



FRENCH AND D'ESP^REY STRIKE NORTH 141 

the broken bridges and rifle-parapets on the northern 
bank. Some guns then carried over near Changis 
bombarded the German artillery positions beyond 
the Ourcq, a notice to quit that had prompt effect. 
Chateau-Thierry was left to the French i8th Corps, 
which occupied the town that night. Meanwhile, 
Smith-Dorrien and Haig entered the hilly country 
about Bezu, Coupru, and Domptin, on the road from 
Chateau-Thierry to Lizy-sur-Ourcq. Marwitz vainly 
essayed to obstruct the northward movement. Beaten 
in an action near Montreuil-aux-Lions, he informed 
Kluck that he could do no more, and hurried back 
to the Une of the little river Clignon, about Bussiares 
and Belleau, which were reached by 4 p.m. A little 
later, British aviators brought in word that the enemy 
had evacuated the whole angle between the east 
bank of the Ourcq and the Marne, and that, on the 
other hand, the withdrawal of the German I Army 
was creating a void beyond Chateau - Thierry : the 
cavalry of I^chthofen, sent thither by Biilow, was in the 
same predicament as that of Marwitz farther west. 
At daybreak on September 10, Pulteney's Corps left 
the Marne behind. Meeting no serious resistance, 
the British crossed the Clignon valley, and by even- 
ing occupied La Fert6-Milon, Neuilly-St. Front, and 
Rocourt. 

These were marching days for the 5th Army. 
Conneau's cavalry, reinforced by an infantry brigade 
and extra batteries, passed the Marne at Azy on the 
9th, and, harrjdng Billow's right flank, reached Oulchy- 
le-Chateau next day. The i8th Corps, with the 
reserve divisions in support, pushed on from Chateau- 
Thierry toward Fere-en-Tardenois ; and the 3rd 



142 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

Corps, which had occupied Montigny, half - way 
between Montmirail and the Marne, on the 9th, forced 
the passage, under heavy fire from the hills at Jaul- 
gonne, on the loth. The ist Corps had a heavier 
task. Having progressed as far as the Vauchamps 
plateau, it was wheeled back to the south-east to help 
the loth Corps, which d'Esperey had transferred to 
Foch's Army of the centre, now in the gravest peril. 

II. Battle of the Marshes of St. Gond 

While the 6th Army, within sight of the Ourcq, was 
suffering its great agony, while the " effect of suction " 
was showing itself in the Anglo-French pursuit of 
Kluck, very different were the first results at the centre 
of the long crescent of the Allied front. Kluck was 
saved by his quick resolution, together with Marwitz's 
able work in covering the rear. Biilow was in no such 
imminent danger. His communications with the north 
were at first perfectly safe. The situation of his 
right wing, which must either fall back or lose contact 
v,ith the I Army, was awkward ; but, doubtless, 
Kluck's success would soon re-establish it. The 
circumstances indicated for the remainder of the II 
Army and the neighbouring Saxon Corps an instant 
attempt to break through the French centre, or at least 
to cripple it, and, with it, all Joffre's offensive plan. 
The very strategic influence which helped the British 
and d'Esperey, therefore, at first threw a terrible 
burden upon Foch and the " detachment " which on 
September 5 was renamed the " 9th Army " ; yet it 
was by this same influence that, in the end, though by 
the narrowest of margins, he also won through. 



BATTLE OF THE MARSHES OF ST. GOND 143 

The theatre of this struggle is the south-western 
corner of the flat, niggardly expanse of La Champagne 
Pouilleuse, lying between the depression called the 
Marshes of St. Gond and the Sezanne-Sommesous 
railwaj^ and highroad. It is very clearly bounded on 
the west by the sharp edge of the Brie plateau ; on the 
east it is bordered by the Troyes-Chalons road and 
railway. Sezanne on the west, and Fere Champen- 
oise at the centre, are considerable country towns ; 
the right is marked by the permanent camp of Mailly. 
To the north of Sezanne, the hill of Mondemont, 
immediately overlooking the marshes and the plain, 
and the ravine of St.Trix, on the Epeirnay road, where 
the Petit Morin issues from the marshes and breaks 
into the plateau, are key positions. The Marshes of 
St. Gond (so called after a seventh-century priory, of 
which some rains remain) witnessed several of the most 
poignant episodes of Napoleon's 1814 campaign " from 
the Rhine to Fontainebleau." They were then much 
more extensive. Between the villages of Fromentieres 
and Champaubert, there survives the name, though 
little else, of the " Bois du Desert," where 3000 
Russian grenadiers are said to have been slain or 
captured by Marmont's cuirassiers, while hundreds of 
others were drowned. A month later, Bliicher was 
back from Laon attacking on the same ground ; and 
Marmont and Mortier were in full retreat along the 
road to Fere Champenoise. Pachod's national guards, 
the " Marie Louises," turned north to the marches of 
St. Gond as to a refuge. The Russians and Prussians 
surrounded them ; and only a few of the French lads 
escaped by the St. Prix road. To-day the marshes 
are largely reclaimed and canalised ; but this clay bed, 



144 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

extending a dozen miles east and west, and averaging 
more than a mile in breadth, fills easily under such a 
rainstorm as fell upon the region on the evening of 
September 9, 1914, and at all times it limits traffic to 
the three or four good roads crossing it. The chief of 
these, from Epernay to Sezanne and Fere Champenoise 
respectively, pass the ends of the marshes at St. Prix 
and Morains ; the former is commanded by Monde- 
mont, the latter by Mont Aout, near Broussy, 

Was this " last barrier providentially set across the 
route of the invasion "^^ forgotten? Joffre's earlier 
plan did, indeed, involve the abandonment of all the 
plain extending to the Aube ; the decision to stand 
on the line of the marshes was a consequence of 
Gallieni's initiative. Foch's Army had been carried 
beyond them in its retreat, but, fortunately, not far 
beyond. On the morning of September 5, advance 
columns of Billow's left had entered Baye ; patrols had 
reached the Petit Morin bridge at St. Prix, and the 
north-centre of the marshes at Vert-la-Gravelle. A 
little more dash, and the Germans would have pos- 
sessed themselves of all the commanding points. It 
was about 10 a.m. that Foch received the General- 
issimo's order closing the retreat : " The 9th Army 
will cover the right of the 5th Army, holding the 
southern passages of the Marshes of St. Gond, and 
placing a part of its forces on the plateau north of 
Sezanne." Foch at once directed the appropriate 
movements ; and, by the evening of September 5, the 
following positions were reached : 

French Left. — Driven back from St. Prix by forces 
belonging to Billow's X Active and Reserve Corps, 
the 42nd Division (General Grossetti) held the neigh- 



BATTLE OF THE MARSHES OF ST. GOND 145 

bouring hills from Villeneuve-les-Charleville and Soisy 
to Mondemont, 

Centre. — During the afternoon, Dubois advanced 
the 9th Corps (Moroccan Division and 17th Division) 
from Fere Champenoise to Broussy and Bannes, and 
thence pushed two battalions over the marshes to 
TouIon-la-Montagne, Vert-la-Gravelle, and Aulnizeux 
in face of the Prussian Guard Corps, the main body of 
which was at Vertus. The Blondlat Brigade of the 
Moroccan Division attacked Congy, but failed, and fell 
back on Mondemont, The 52nd Reserve Division was 
in support about Connantre. 

French Right. — The nth Corps (General Eydoux) 
rested on the east end of the marshes at Morains-le- 
Petit, and from here stretched backward along the 
course of the Champagne Somme to Sommesous, with 
the 60th Reserve Division behind it. They had before 
them the Saxon XII Active Corps and one of its 
reserve divisions. At Sommesous, General de I'Espee's 
Cavalry Division covered a gap of about 12 miles 
between Foch's right and de Langle de Cary's left at 
Humbauville. 

Thus, on the eve of the battle, the gth Army, 
inferior to the enemy in strength, especially in artillery, 
presented to it an irregular convex front. Biilow was 
at Esternay on the west ; Hansen was approaching the 
gap on its right flank ; the centre was protruded 
uneasily to and beyond the St. Gond Marshes. The 
expectation of General Headquarters had, apparently, 
been that the German onset would fall principally on 
the right of the 5th Army. Foch was, therefore, 
instructed to give aid in that direction by pushing his 
left to the north-north-west, while the rest of his line 
10 



146 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

stood firm until the pressure was relieved. In the 
event, these roles were reversed : it was d'Esperey who 
had to help Foch. The original dispositions, however, 
had a certain effect upon the course of the battle. They 
gave the 9th Army a pivot on the Sezanne plateau ; and 
the obstinacy with which this advantage was retained 
seems to have diverted the German commanders, till 
it was too late, from concentrating their force on the 
other wing, the line of attack from which the French 
had most to fear. 

Foch was the offensive incarnate ; but, on the morning 
of September 6th, he could do no more than meet, and 
that with indifferent success. Billow's attack upon his 
left-centre. He was weakest where the enemy was 
most strong : a large part of the French guns could 
not reach the field for the beginning of the combat ; 
the 9th Corps, in particular, felt the lack of three groups 
of artillery it had left in Lorraine. Failing this support, 
the two battalions holding Toulon-la-Montagne were 
quickly shelled out of their positions. In vain Dubois, 
commanding the 9th Corps, ordered the Moroccan 
Tirailleurs to march on Baye, and the 17th Division to 
retake the two lost points. A crack regiment, the 77th, 
crossed the marshes and entered Coizard village. 
Major de Beaufort, cane in hand, on a big bay horse, 
at its head, crying to his men, shaken by rifle fire from 
the houses : " Forward, boys ! Courage ! It is for 
France. Jeanne d'Arc is with us." The 2nd and 3rd 
battalions went on, and tried to climb Mount Toulon. 
The fighting continued all day, ending in a painful 
retreat to Mont Aout through two miles of swampy 
ground, in which the men plunged up to the waist 
rather than risk the shell-ploughed causeway. The 



BATTLE OF THE MARSHES OF ST. GOND 147 

Guard followed as far as Bannes, and the X Corps 
occupied Le Mesnil Broussy and Bfoussy-le-Petit, 
where the French batteries arrested them. Small 
French detachments clung to Morains and Aulnay 
through the day and night ; otherwise, the north of 
the marshes was lost. Against the left, Biilow was 
less successful. The 42nd Division and the Moroccan 
Division withstood repeated assaults of the X Corps 
at Soisy-aux-Bois and on the edge of the St. Gond 
Wood. The struggle, however, was most severe : 
Villeneuve, occupied on the evening of September 5, 
was lost at 8 a.m. on the 6th, recaptured an hour 
later, lost again at noon, and recovered at night. On 
the right, the nth Corps had to evacuate Ecury and 
Normee under heavy fire ; Lenharree and Sommesous 
were partially in flames, but still resisted. 

Unawed, in his quarters at Pleurs, Foch wrote the 
following order for th^ morrow : — " The General 
Commanding counts on all the troops of the gth Army 
exerting the greatest activity and the utmost energy 
to extend and maintain beyond dispute the results 
obtained over a hard-pressed and venturesome enemy." 
Many of the generals, lieutenants, and men may have 
thought these last words too highly coloured. Foch 
himself knew more of the real situation. He knew, as 
did Biilow, how gravely the latter was prejudiced by 
Kluck's predicament. Already, the prospect had 
arisen of the I German Army being gripped by the 
closing vice of Maunoury and the British. Already, 
d'Esperey's great force was moving north along 
Billow's flank toward Montmirail. Joffre's master- 
stroke was revealed. Was the victory that Berlin and 
the armies counted as certain to slip away at the 



148 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

eleventh hour ? For the first time in a triumphant 
generation, a German Army was in danger of defeat ; 
nay, all the armies were in danger. Astounding 
change of fortune ! The greycoat soldiery, dulling 
their weariness in the loot of cottages and farms, the 
subaltern officers, making free with the wine cellars of 
old manor houses, did not know it ; but such was the 
fact. Their commanders were not the men easily to 
take alarm ; yet, at this moment, alarm must have 
struck them. 

III. Defence and Recapture of Mondemont 

The grand manoeuvre of envelopment had failed. 
The alternative plan remained : to smash the French 
centre and roll up the lines on either side. On the 
morning of September 7, this effort began with a fierce 
onslaught across the ravine of the Petit Morin against 
the Sezanne plateau from Mondemont to Villeneuve. 

On Foch's extreme left, nothing was gained. The 
42nd Division was now receiving perceptible support 
from the loth Corps of the 5th Army, which during 
the day, as we have seen, completed the clearance of 
the Forest of Gault, to the west of Villeneuve. Toward 
Mondemont, however, the X Active Corps made 
some progress, throwing the defenders back to the 
western borders of Soisy, again taking Villeneuve, and 
reaching through the St. Gond Wood nearly to the 
hamlet of Chapton. The bare crest called the Signal 
du Poirier gave the German gunners an excellent 
platform, with views over a large part of the French 
lines. One of their chief targets was the chateau of 
Mondemont, a two-story mansion, dating from the 



RECAPTURE OF MONDEMONT 149 

sixteenth century, with pepper-pot corner towers, 
enclosing a large square courtyard. General Humbert 
had set up here his Staff quarters ; but by noon the 
bombardment had become so severe that he had to 
leave it to advanced posts of the Moroccan Division, 
first, however, insisting on taking a proper lunch in 
the salle-a-manger with the trembling family. These 
were sent to the rear, and Humbert moved to the 
neighbouring chateau of Broyes. In a later stage of 
the war, Humbert struck me rather as the thinker, a 
quiet, keen intelligence, and a fine gentleman. At 
this earlier time, one of the youngest generals in the 
French Army, he appears rather as the man of spirited 
action. Beaming with gay confidence, he abounded 
in the gestes that the French soldier so loves. Once 
several members of his escort were killed by a shell 
exploding in their midst ; like Grossetti, afterwards to 
be known as " the Bull of the Yser," danger only 
stimulated him. " The Germans are bottled up," he 
said ; " Mondemont is the cork. It must be held at 
any price." At 5 p.m., a combined attack, by parts 
of the 42nd and Moroccan Divisions, with the 77th 
regiment of the gth Corps, was made with the object 
of freeing the Mondemont position. Little ground 
was gained, and the losses were very heavy ; it was a 
momentary relief, no more. 

At length the German Command recognised that the 
French defence was weakest toward and beyond Fere 
Champenoise, and that a simultaneous attack by 
both their wings, with most strength on the east, might 
shatter it. First, however, the flank of the Guard 
Corps along the marshes must be cleared. This pre- 
liminary occupied the whole of September 7. On the 



ISO THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

west. Dyes was taken during the morning in the 
advance on Mondemont. On the east, the French 
companies outlying at Morains and Aulnay had to 
abandon these villages at 8 a.m., under threat of being 
taken in reverse along the railway. Morains is only 
four miles by highroad from Fere Champenoise ; and 
here the picked infantry of the Guard were striking at 
the junction of the 9th and nth Corps, with solid Saxon 
regiments closing in upon the latter to the south-east. 
Seeing their danger, Radiguet and Moussy concerted 
a movement by which, during the afternoon, Aulnizeux 
was taken and the German advance checked. In the 
evening, at the third attempt, the enemy recovered 
the village ; and in the last hours of the night his 
genera] offensive along the Sezanne and Fere roads 
began. It will be convenient to follow first the western 
arm of the attack. 

At 3 a.m. on September 8, after a sharp cannonade, 
the French machine-gunners on Mondemont Hill 
observed spectral forms approaching in open order — 
these were advanced parties belonging to the X 
Corps, with some elements of the Guard. They were 
easily repulsed ; and, immediately afterwards, the much- 
thinned ranks of the 42nd and Moroccan Divisions, 
with the 77th regiment of the 9th Corps, were launched 
anew towards St. Prix. Although Biilow had received 
reinforcements, and had placed more batteries between 
Congy and Baye, the Moroccans occupied Oyes and its 
hill and the Signal du Poirier by 8 a.m., while the left 
of the 42nd carried Soisy at the point of the bayonet. 
Unfortunately, the debacle that was happening coin- 
cidently on Foch's right put any exploitation of this 
success out of the question. A fresh defensive front 



RECAPTURE OF MONDEMONT 151 

had to be created south of the marshes, facing east ; 
the 77th regiment was recalled to St. Loup in the 
middle of the afternoon for this purpose. The 42nd 
Division seems to have been shaken by this removal of 
a sorely-needed support ; and Biilow, promptly 
advised of it, ordered his columns forward once 
more. 

On an islet in the west end of the marshes, between 
the villages of Villevenard and Oyes, stand a Rennais- 
sance gateway and other remnants of the ancient 
Priory of St. Gond, and in their midst the humble 
dwelling of " the last hermit of St. Gond," as M. le 
Goffic calls him, the Abbe Millard, corresponding 
member of the French Antiquarian and Archaeological 
Societies. A victim of dropsy, the Abbe was laid up 
when the approach of the Germans was announced. 
" So, then," he calmly remarked, " I shall renew my 
acquaintance with Attila." His housekeeper, a typi- 
cally vigorous Frenchwoman, would have no such 
morbid curiosity. " You have no parishioners but 
the frogs. Monsieur le Cur6 ; and they can take care 
of themselves against your Attila. Come along " — 
and, bundling some valuables into a wheelbarrow, 
and giving Father Millard a stick, she carried him off 
into safety. As they left, a body of Senegalese sharp- 
shooters came up, and began to build across the high- 
way an old-fashioned barricade of tree-trunks, carts, 
and blocks of stone. " Some barbed wire and a 
continuous trench, such as the Germans use, would 
have been better," remarks M. le Gofhc ; " but we re- 
mained faithful to our old errors, and, nearly every- 
where, our men fought in the open or behind sheaves 
and tree trunks." 



152 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

After hours of an ebb-and-fiow of bayonet charges 
and hand to hand combats, the French lost in succession 
Broussy-le-Petit, Mesnil-Broussy, Reuves, and Dyes — 
all the morning's gain had vanished by nightfall. 
With the Germans entrenched a mile away, and only a 
single Zouave battalion in reserve, Humbert insisted 
that Mondemont must be held ; and his corps com- 
mander, Dubois, desperately seeking to cover the void 
on his right with the 77th Regiment, told the officers 
that retreat was not to be thought of. Heavy rain 
fell during the evening, obstructing the movements of 
all the armies. On both sides, that night, the chiefs 
knew that the issue was a matter of hours, of very 
few hours. We saw in the first section of this chapter 
that, on the evening of September 8, the left of the 5th 
French Army had passed, and its centre reached, the 
Petit Morin, while the loth Corps immediately threat- 
ened Billow's flank at Bannay, only 2 miles west of 
Baye. The " effect of suction " was working wonder- 
fully. An order found during the day on a wounded 
officer, directing that the regimental trains should be 
drawn up facing north, showed the preoccupations of 
the German Staff. If the Guard and the Saxons could 
complete the rout of Foch's right-centre, they might 
yet win through ; but there was no longer a 
moment to spare, for Biilow had no force capable 
of long withstanding d'Esperey's north-eastward 
thrust. 

Against Foch's left, Biilow played his last stake at 
daybreak on September 9. A whole brigade, march- 
ing from Oyes under cover of mist, brushed aside the 
two battahons of sharpshooters, mounted Mondemont 
hill, and seized the chateau and village, which were 



RECAPTURE OF MONDEMONT 1 5 3 

rapidly provided with a garrison and machine-guns. 
The 42nd Division was in course of withdrawal at 
this time, its place being taken b}?' the 51st Division 
of the neighbouring army. Humbert still would not 
take defeat : borrowing two battalions of chasseurs 
from Grossetti, he sent them to the assault of the 
promontory. They failed. At about 10.30 a.m., 
the 9th Corps lost Mont Aout, the stronghold of Foch's 
centre, and fell back upon the lower hills between 
Allemant and Linthes. If the whole left and centre 
of the gth Army were not to be swept, after its 
right, into the plain, the last footing on the Sezanne 
plateau must be held at any price But how ? Many 
companies of the Moroccan Division had lost all their 
officers and most of their men. The breakdown of 
his right had driven Foch to an extreme expedient 
which we will presently follow more closely — the 
transfer thither of the 42nd Division ; all Grossetti 
could do for Humbert after his early morning failure, 
therefore, was to lend him his artillery for a couple of 
hours. From Dubois and his own corps, Humbert 
was able again to borrow the 77th Regiment. After 
a massed fire of preparation on the woods and slopes 
around the chateau of Mondemont by nine batteries, 
the hungry, haggard survivors of the 77th, divided 
into two bodies under Colonels Lestoquoi and Eon, 
approached the hill from the west and east, while four 
companies gathered to the south of the chateau as a 
storming force under Major de Beaufort. 

We have already seen this only too chivalric officer 
defjdng the prime conditions of modern warfare in 
the capture of Coizard ; here is a yet more pathetic 
exhibition of the ancient style of heroism. It was 2.30 



154 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

of a bright afternoon, the air oppressive with heat, 
smoke, and dust. The commandant called a priest- 
soldier from the ranks, and asked him to give suprem^e 
absolution to the men who wished to receive it. They 
knelt, and rose. The major, putting on his white 
gloves, then gave the order to charge. Bugles sounded ; 
the men ran forward " in deep, close masses," 
shouting and singing. Many fell before reaching the 
garden of the chateau. De Beaufort, standing for a 
moment under a tree to consider the next step, was shot 
dead. A few men got through a breach in the garden 
wall, only to meet a rain of bullets from loopholes in 
the house. A score of officers (including Captain de 
Secondat-Montesquieu, a descendant of the great 
French writer) were lost, with a third of the effectives. 
At 3.30, Colonel Eon withdrew the remainder of the 
storming party. 

For a breathing space only. The chateau was, in fact, 
besieged. Three field-guns were brought within 400 
yards of it ; and at 6 p.m. three companies advanced 
upon the quadrangle of buildings, four others upon 
the village, at the foot of the hill. Forty minutes 
later. Colonel Lestoquoi led his last remaining 
company forward, crj^ing : " Come on, boys ; another 
tussle, and we are there." This time, chateau, park, 
farm, and churchyard, and finally the village, were 
carried. " I hold the village and the chateau of 
Mondemont," Lestoquoi reported to General Humbert ; 
" I am installing myself for the night." 

The battle of Mondemont was over ; one wild ebb- 
wave, and the peace of nature's fruitfulness fell for all 
our time upon the riven fields, the multitude of graves, 
the desolate marshes. 



FOCH'S CENTRE BROKEN 155 

IV. Foch's Centre broken 

Far other and graver was the course of the eastern 
arm of the German attack, after the loss of the marsh 
villages by the French 9th Corps on September 7. 

Dubois' shaky line, along the south of the marshes, 
was continued eastward by the nth Corps (including, 
now, the i8th Division) from near Morains to Normee, 
and this by the 60th Reserve Division, thence to 
Sommesous, and the 9th Cavalry Division, reaching 
out to the left of de Langle's Army (the 17th Corps), 
These faced, respectively, the Prussian Guard Corps, 
the Saxon XII Active Corps, and part of its reserve. 
No great InequaUty, so far ; but Biilow and Hansen 
were bringing up reinforcements, and preparing a 
terrible surprise. Throughout September 7, the 
Saxons had been hammering at Eydoux' front along 
the Somme-Soude. Lenharree, defended throughout 
the afternoon and evening by only two companies, 
became untenable during the night. All the of&cers 
had fallen, Captain Henri de Saint Bon last of them, 
crying to his Breton reservists of the 6oth Division : 
" Keep off ! Do not get killed to save me." On 
entering the village, and seeing what had happened, 
the Saxon commander ordered his men to march 
before the French wounded, saying : " Salute ! They 
are brave feUows." So began the darkest episode, 
the nearest approach to a German victory, in the battle 
of the Mame. 

An hour before — at 3 a.m. on September 8 — their 
guns pushed forward under cover of darkness, the 
general assault by Billow's and Hansen's armies had 
begun. It was well planned according to the information 



156 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

of those commanders, and, considering how serious an 
obstacle the marshes presented to their centre, remark- 
ably conducted. On the west, the resolution of the 
defenders of Mondemont would have gone for nothing 
without the increasing support of d'Esperey's loth 
Corps. At the left-centre, the marshes gave Dubois 
sufficient cover to enable him to wheel half his force 
eastward. Beyond that, the conditions favoured the 
enemy, for the only main roads converged upon Fere 
Champenoise ; and, if the French were driven back, a 
dangerous block would inevitably be produced. 
Against the extreme right, the Saxons were not in 
great force ; and, on that flank also, the neighbouring 
French Army gave vital aid. 

So, in the misty dawn of September 8, the greycoats, 
picked Prussians and burly Saxons, swarmed forward, 
seeming to renew themselves irresistibly. Foch, 
talking to his Staff overnight, had exclaimed that such 
desperation suggested the need of compensating for 
ill fortune elsewhere ; and now he opened a black day 
with a characteristic phrase of stubborn cheer : " The 
situation is excellent ; I order you again vigorously 
to take the offensive." The situation excellent ! 
Foch would not use words of meaningless bravado ; 
he may have been thinking of d'Esperey knocking at 
Billow's side door. At this hour (7 a.m.), he could 
not yet know that the loss of Lenharree had been 
followed by the turning of two regiments of the 20th 
Division, and two others of the 60th Reserve Division, 
defending the passages of the Somme-Soude, and that 
the lines on either side were crumpling up. So it was. 
From a number of personal narratives, often con- 
tradictory and exaggerated, we can draw an outline 



FOCH'S CENTRE BROKEN 157* 

of what occurred in the surprise of Fere Champenoise, 
without pretending to determine exactly where, or by 
what f aiUng of exhausted men, the confusion originated. 
Before Normee, outposts of the nth Corps, scattered 
by the sudden fierceness of the onslaught, left un- 
covered the 35th Brigade (of the i8th Division), which 
lay bivouacked in the woods. One regiment, the 32nd, 
was surrounded, and only a half of its effectives, with a 
few junior officers, escaped. The 34th Brigade, behind 
it, had time to fall back without loss, through Con- 
nantre to Oeuvy, along with the survivors of the 35th. 
The remnants of the defenders of Lenharree retreated 
toward Connantre, firing steadily. As far as Fere 
Champenoise, the chase ran fast along the four roads, 
from Bannes, Morains, Ecury, and Normee. In the 
little country town, crouched in a depression of the 
hills, and so indefensible, an army chaplain ^® was con- 
ducting service in the parish church, at 9 a.m., when 
bullets began to spatter on the walls, and the first cries 
of fl5dng men were heard above the noise of breaking 
windows. At 10.30, the Prussian Guard entered the 
town, drums and fifes playing. Presently, with bodies 
of Saxons from Normee, they continued the pursuit, 
which proceeded more slowly toward Connantre and 
Oeuvy and the valley of the Maurienne. Here and 
there, small French groups turned at bay, because they 
could go no farther, or hoping to stem the retreat. 
Thus, 200 men of the 66th and 32nd Regiments came to 
a stand in one of the dwarf-pine woods south of Fere. 
They had no officer among them ; but a sergeant-major 
named Guerre took them in hand, and disposed them 
in four sections, " like the square at Waterloo," he said. 
One German attack was beaten off ; but when a field- 



158 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION'' 

gun came up. Guerre decided that the only hope was 
to make a sortie. It cost the brave man his life, 
About 30 of his fellows got away, including two privates, 
Malveau and Bourgoin, who, after wandering in the 
German lines, and being directed by a dying German 
officer, brought the flag of the 32nd Regiment during 
the evening to the commander of the 35th Brigade. 

Perhaps it was because of the convergence of roads 
upon Fere, noted above, that, whereas the original 
breakdown occurred on Foch's right, the pursuit 
became concentrated upon his centre. The most 
important consequence of this fact was that the German 
Command never discovered the weakest part of the 
French front, and the dislocated right was able to escape 
from restraint and to re-form. The greater part of 
the 6oth Reserve Division, which had extended from 
Vassimont and Haussimont to Sommesous, where 
two regiments arrested the Saxon advance for two 
hours, rallied early in the atternoon between Semoine 
and Mailly. General de I'Espee's cavalry, with some 
infantry elements, held up a brigade of the Saxon 
XII Corps south of Sompuis ; and the neighbouring 
army of de Langle effectively engaged the XIX Corps 
between Humbauville and Courdemange. 

Westward of the main stream of pursuit, the posi- 
tion of Foch's left was more delicate and critical. At 
the extreme left, we have seen that, during the morn- 
ing, the 42nd Division recaptured Villeneuve and Soisy, 
while the Moroccan Division reached St. Prix and the 
Signal du Poirier. The 42nd held its gains throughout 
the day ; but the 9th Corps, shaken by frontal attack 
across the marshes, and left with its flank in the air 
by the breakdown of the nth Corps, had no choice 



FOCH'S CENTRE BROKEN 159 

but to withdraw its right, and suffered heavily ere it 
could take up new positions. Coming on from Morains, 
the Prussian Guard took the homesteads called Grosse 
and Petit Fermes, on the way to Bannes, in reverse 
by the east . Three French regiments were here thrown 
into confusion, cavalry plunging into the batteries, 
and fugitives obstructing the roads. The panic, how- 
ever, was soon over. At 7.30 a.m., the retreat sounded ; 
at 9 a.m., Moussy was reorganising the 17th Division 
on the hue Mont Aout-Puits, with the 52nd Reserve 
Division in support. Hither the faithful 77th Regi- 
ment was called from Mondemont during the morning 
to help form an angular front, across which the Germans 
passed south in pursuit of the scattered elements of the 
nth Corps. The headquarters of the 9th Army were 
moved back from Pleurs to Plancy, on the Aube. 

Thus, at noon on September 8, the shape of the vast 
battle was markedly changed. D'Esperey was on the 
Petit Morin near Montmirail, and his loth Corps near 
Corfelix. From the latter point, Foch's left extended 
south-east to Connantre. His centre, broken in to a 
depth of ten miles, was floating indefinitely in the 
valley of the Maurienne. The right, supported by 
de Langle, giving no immediate anxiety, his first 
problem, therefore, was to save the centre without 
losing the solidity of the left. It is in such emergencies, 
when a few hours even of loose and unsuccessful 
resistance may turn the balance, that the virtues of a 
race and the value of traditions and training in an army 
reveal themselves. The breakdown before Fere 
Champenoise did not degenerate into a rout. Eydoux 
pulled the fragments of the nth Corps together on the 
line Corroy-Gourgancon-Semoine, and in the evening 



i6o THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

delivered a counter-attack which gave him momentary 
possession of the plateau of Oeuvy. Dubois aided this 
reaction by striking at the west flank of the German 
advance. Early in the afternoon, after a preparatory 
fire by 15 batteries near Linthes, the 52nd Reserve 
Division was thrown eastward toward Fere Champ^n- 
oise. This effort failed, as did another in the even- 
ing ; and Dubois had to withdraw slightly, first from 
Puits to Ste. Sophie Farm, then to Chalmont, while the 
Prussians held Connantre and Nozay Farm. 

V. Fable and Fact of a bold Manoeuvre 

That evening, Foch conceived a manoeuvre so 
characteristic of the man, so evidently after his own 
heart, that the facts of its execution have been hidden 
under a mass of sparkling fable. " If, by whatever 
mental vision," the master had said in one of his 
lectures, " we see a fissure in a dam of the defence, or a 
point of insufficient resistance, and if we are able to join 
to the regular and methodical action of the flood the 
effect of a blow with a ram capable of breaking the 
dam at a certain place, the equilibrium is destroyed, 
the mass hurls itself through the breach, and over- 
whelms all obstacles. Let us seek that place of weak- 
ness. That is the battle of manoeuvre. The defence, 
overthrown at one point, collapses everywhere. The 
barrier pierced, ever3rthing crumbles." That it was 
Foch, not Billow, who had been on the defensive makes 
no difference : Foch never thought of war in pure 
defensive terms. Now he saw his opportunity. 

There was no subtlety in the object. A rush which 
fails to produce a complete breach opens a flank 



FABLE AND FACT OF A BOLD MANCEUVRE 1 6 1 

plainly inviting attack ; and the Staff at Plancy had 
had its eyes fixed all day upon the new German flank, 
6 miles long, from Mont Aolit to Corroy. Twice the 
9th Corps had struck at it without success. The bold- 
ness of Foch's design lay, not in its objective, which 
was evident, but in the means proposed for its exe- 
cution. The right of the 9th Corps could do no more ; 
its left, the Moroccan Division, had lost the south 
bank of the marshes, and was hard put to it to hold 
the hills around Mondemont. Nothing remained 
but the 42nd Division, which, though greatly fatigued, 
was in somewhat better posture about Soisy. Two 
demands now competed in the mind of the French 
commander. He regarded Mondemont as a key- 
position to be defended at all costs; and the removal 
of Grossetti, without compensation, would gravely 
endanger it. But more than in any position he 
beUeved in forcing a result by a well-directed blow 
when the enemy offered the chance. D'Esperey's 
loth Corps, it is true, had before it the chance of 
breaking across Billow's communications at St. Prix 
and Baye ; it had otherwise no pressing call to make 
such a movement. Farther south, there were both need 
and opportunity — the need of relieving the 9th and nth 
Corps, the opportunity of a decisive action. Grossetti, 
then, must ome to Linthes, and d'Esperey's 51st 
Division, in reserve of the loth Corps, must take his 
place west of Mondemont. D'Esperey's loyalty in 
agreeing to this arrangement cannot be too warmly 
praised. [The comradeship of arms, so influential a 
factor in the victory of the Mame, was nowhere more 
admirably illustrated. 

But dawn on September 9 broke upon a^situation 
II 



1 62 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

aggravated to the extreme, in which the projected 
manoeuvre might well seem a blunder of recklessness. 
Billow and Hausen had summoned their exhausted 
men to undertake a last essay. On the French left, 
Mondemont fell at 3 a.m. Two hours later, the Guard 
and the two Saxon Corps burst upon the centre and 
right with all their remaining force. Neither the 9th 
nor the nth Corps was in a condition to meet this 
trial ; but, in general, they faced it bravely. At 
9 a.m., the 21st Division (nth Corps) could resist no 
more, and fell back from Oeuvy to Hill 129, south of 
Corroy, whence its commander, Radiguet, wrote to 
Foch : " My troops could not hold out any longer 
under a bombardment such as we have suffered for 
the last two hours. They are in retreat all along the 
line. It is the same with the 22nd Division. I am 
going to try, with my artillery and what I can gather 
of infantry, to rally on the plateau south of Corroy. 
My regiments have fought admirably, but they have an 
average of only four or five officers left." 

Foch replied from Plancy, at 10.15 ^•'^- '• " The 
42nd Division will arrive on the front Linthes-Pleurs. 
Whatever be the position, more or less in retreat, of 
the nth Corps, we count on resuming the offensive 
with the 42nd Division toward Connantre and Corroy, 
an offensive in which the 9th Corps will have to take 
part against the (German) right from Morains to 
Fere Champenoise. The 42nd Division has been on 
the way since 8.30, and will be ready to go into action 
about midday. The loth Corps has liberated it. 
The loth is at our disposition, and has orders to 
support the Moroccan Division to prevent the enemy 
penetrating to the west of the Marshes of St. Gond." 



FABLE AND FACT OF A BOLD M ANCEUVRE 1 6 3 

On receiving similar instructions, Dubois sent two 
squadrons of hussars to make a provisional link 
between the 9th and nth Corps, and intimated to 
his divisional commanders not only that they must 
stand firm, but that, in the classic phrase of Joffre, 
" no failing will now be tolerated." 

Blind words, only to be justified on the lines of 
Nogi's apophthegm : " Victory is to him who can resist 
for another quarter of an hour." They were hardly 
uttered when Mont Aout, the north-eastern bastion of 
Dubois' line, stubbornly defended for five days, was 
lost. Much of the artillery of the Prussian Guard 
had been concentrated on this outlj^ing watch-tower 
of the Sezanne hills ; and, in those early days of the 
war, nerves were not so steeled that a position heavily 
bombarded and definitely turned could be long held. 
Of the two brigades of the 52nd Reserve Division, the 
104th had been detached to Moussy's 17th Division ; 
the 103rd remained under the command of General 
Battesti. Of the former, the 5th battalion, 320th 
Regiment, under Commandant Mean (known as an 
author under the pseudonym " Jean Saint- Yves ") was 
posted on the north slopes of Mont Aout ; two com- 
panies of the 51st Chasseurs were on the east ; and 
Lt.-Col. (afterwards General) Clandor, with the 6th 
battalion, was in the wood at the foot of the hill. 
Meau, with wounded head bound in bloody bandages, 
" Hke a Crimean veteran," as a combatant says, 
was keeping his men firm under a rain of light and 
heavy shells commencing at about 9.30 a.m., and 
Clandor was also determined to hold, when it sud- 
denly became known that the 103rd Brigade, on their 
right, had received an order to retreat, apparently 



1 64 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

given by Battesi in alarm at the extent of the enemy's 
advance.^' First in twos and threes, then in masses, 
the reservists left the woods that cover the eastern 
slopes of the hill, and hurried westward, groups of 
horsemen galloping past them, and gun-teams plunging 
through the meadows. The whole Une was thus 
shaken ; and, shortly afterward, the two batteries 
which had hitherto sustained the men on the crest 
were silenced by German guns that had got round 
behind Ste. Sophie Farm. At 11.45 a.m., Moussy 
gave Mean and Clandor orders to fall back ; but their 
obstinacy had its reward — Mont Aout was never 
occupied by the enemy. The debris of Battesti's 
brigades were rallied during the early afternoon on 
the hills of AUemant and Chalmont. A part of 
Moussy's Division was driven south, and, after a 
gallant recoil at Ste. Sophie Farm, drew off to the 
west. 

|What had become of Grossetti and the 42nd, the 
last hope of the French centre ? From Soisy to 
Linthes is a march of only 12 miles, and they were to 
have started at dawn — had started, Foch said, at 
8.30 a.m. Exhaustion, hitches in the replacement by 
the 51st, and the needs of Mondemont may explain the 
harrowing delay. Messengers were sent out, without 
result. Foch, fuming at Plancy, issued note upon 
note to encourage [his lieutenants. " Information 
shows," he wrote at noon, " that the German Army, 
after having marched without rest since the beginning 
of the campaign, [has reached the extreme limit 
of fatigue. Order no longer exists in their units ; 
regiments are mixed together ; the Command is 
confused. The vigorous offensive of our troops has 



FABLE AND FACT OF A BOLD MANOEUVRE 1 6 5 

thrown i surprise t into the ranks of the enemy, who 
thought we should not offer any further opposition. 
It is of the highest importance to profit by these 
circumstances. In the decisive hour when the honour 
and safety of the French Fatherland are at stake, 
officers and soldiers will draw from the energy of our 
race the strength to stand firm till the moment when 
the enemy 'will collapse, worn out. The disorder 
prevailing among the German troops is a sign of our 
coming victory ; by continuing with all its force the 
effort begun, our army is certain to stop the march 
of the enemy and to drive him from our soil. But 
every one must share the conviction that success will 
fall to him who can endure longest." 

There were, in fact, disorders in the invading host. 
All morning, Prussian and Saxon soldiery had been 
making pubhc revel in Fere Champenoise, breaking 
open and pillaging houses and shops, drinking, dancing, 
and singing in the streets. Nevertheless, the fight- 
ing columns advanced steadily. At i p.m. the 
Guard reached Nozay and Ste. Sophie Farms and 
entered Connantre, and the Saxons Gourgancon. 
Radiguet's Division of the nth Corps, after a brave 
stand at Oeuvy, drifted before them, first to Fresnay, 
then to Faux and Salon. Foch did not waver in his 
intentions. " The 42nd Division is marching from 
Broyes to Pleurs," he wrote at i p.m. "It should face 
east between Pleurs and Linthes, so as to attack 
afterward in the direction of the trouee between Oeuvy 
and Connantre. The attack will be supported on the 
right by the nth Corps, on the left by all available 
elements of the 9th Corps, which will take for their 
objective the road between Fere Champenoise and 



1 66 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

Morains." The meaning of the word tvouee as here 
used must not be mistaken. It presumably meant 
the highroad to Fere Champenoise. There was no 
such " gap " between the Prussian and Saxon forces 
as some writers have imagined ; and they were both, 
at the time of this note, three miles or more south of 
the line Oeuvy-Connantre. 

Though the situation was not so simple as the 
idea of a " gap " would suggest, Foch had accurately 
gauged its character and the pecuhar weakness of the 
German advance. It has been noted that this was 
at first incHned (partly by the lie of the roads) in a 
south-westerly direction. One result was to reheve 
the pressure on the French extreme right, where the 
6oth Reserve Division withdrew easily from Mailly 
to Villiers-Herbisse, while de TEspee's cavalry re- 
ceived strong support from the neighbouring army. 
On their east flank, therefore, the Saxons had to move 
with care. On their right, the Prussian Guard had 
been attracted westward, and there checked, at 4 p.m. , 
by an attack of portions of the 9th Corps. The Saxons 
had progressed more easily, and had overrun the 
Prussians by several miles, thus prolonging the flank 
at which Foch intended to strike. There was no 
" fissure " at this time, but rather an overlapping ; 
when, on the following day, a real gap opened between 
Billow's and Hausen's Armies (on the Epernay and 
Chalons roads respectively), the retreat was too fast 
for the French to take advantage of it. 

Foch's design was the classic combination of flank 
and frontal attack. Grossetti was to drive east-north- 
east from Linthes-Pleurs, beside the main road and 
railway, toward Fere Champenoise, while, on his left. 



FABLE AND FACT OF A BOLD MANCEUVRE 1 67 

Dubois gave what aid he could in the same direction, 
and Eydoux came up from the south. It was to be the 
same famous manoeuvre that Maunoury and the 
British had commenced three days before, without 
immediate success, but from which the whole " effect 
of suction," with its momentous consequences, had 
arisen. Thanks to those three days of heroic effort and 
sacrifice, Foch's success was instant and complete, 
though it was not such as the fables have it.^® Indeed, 
the enemy did not wait for the assault. He bolted. 
A doubtful story goes that a German aviator observed 
the approach of Grossetti's columns, and gave Von 
Billow's Staff timely warning. The truth appears to 
be that the German retreat had been ordered between 
3 and 5 p.m. At 6, under a red sunset, the 42nd 
Division arrived, and, supported by three, later in- 
creased to five, groups of artillery, moved slowly 
forward from the line Linthes-Linthelles, to bivouac 
near Pleurs.^^ The 9th Corps alone came into touch 
with the enemy ; and a rearguard resistance was 
enough to impede its hastily re-formed ranks. At 
daybreak on the loth, the 34th Brigade entered Fere 
Champenoise, which had been evacuated the previous 
evening, picking up 1500 stragglers ; while the 42nd 
Division was occupying Connantre, where 500 men of 
the Grenadier Guards were made prisoner at the 
chateau. As Grossetti's columns crossed the hills in 
the dawn-light, the air was poisonous with rotting 
humanity, and spectral forms arose begging for a cup 
of water. They were men wounded in the surprise of 
the 8th who had lain in the open for nearly three days. 
The front of the 9th Army was restored ; and, 
weary but exultant, it prepared to go forward to the 



i68 THE "EFFECT OF SUCTION" 

general victory. Whether, in the end, the movement 
of the 42nd Division counted for anything in this 
result, we can know, if ever, only when the German 
archives are opened. The chief factor lay not in the 
form of any particular manoeuvre, but in the sheer 
persistence of the French centre. Foch and his men 
won by Nogi's " quarter of an hour." 



C H A P T E R V I.I I " 

FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

I. The Battle of Vitry-le-Franqois 

IN the original design of the whole battle, the action 
of the right or eastern half of the Allied crescent 
was to be reciprocal to that of the left — ^while the 
centre held, Sarrail was to strike out from the region 
of Verdun westward against the flank of the Prince 
Imperial, as Maunoury struck out eastward from the 
region of Fsnis against that of Kluck, Something of 
this intention came into effect ; but it was much 
modified by two circumstances. In the first place, 
General Joffre was driven both by major opportunity 
and by penury of means to make a choice. He 
decided that Verdun rather than Paris must run the 
greater risk, that Kluck's headlong advance made the 
west the chief theatre for his offensive ; and, to make 
sure on the west, he further weakened the eastern 
armies. It was, then, on terms of something less than 
equality of numbers that Sarrail and de Langle had 
to meet the Crown Prince, the IV Army, and the 
Saxon left, with their greatly superior equipment. 
Secondly, the danger beyond the Meuse could not be 
ignored ; and anxiety on this score necessarily handi- 
capped Joffre's plan. The German idea was to cut 

Verdun off on either side : no direct attack was made 

169 



170 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

upon the fortress, the Crown Prince proceeding around 
the entrenched camp by the west, whUe the Lorraine 
armies approached on the east and the IV Army 
swept over the empty flats of Champagne. On 
September 5, the German V Army, coming down both 
sides of the Argonne, had reached the open country 
south of the forest of Belnoue, that is, from 20 to 30 
miles south-west of Verdun. It was, doubtless, ex- 
pected that the Meuse fortress would be abandoned, 
as, indeed, it must have been had the French retreat 
continued longer. Stopped as it was, the Crown 
Prince awoke from his dream of making a new and 
greater Sedan between Dijon and Nancy to ftnd himself 
under the necessity of forming a double front, toward 
the east and the south, a very unfavourable position in 
which to continue an offensive, to say nothing of the 
possibility of defeat. So far, good ; but the situation 
was anything but secure. The French were perilously 
fixed on both sides of the Meuse in a long, sharp 
salient which had to be defended on three sides. 
Maunoury and the British, on the west, had escaped 
any danger of envelopment before the battle began. 
Without a battalion to spare, Sarrail and Langle stood 
throughout the struggle, the former with his back, the 
latter with his flank, to a wall that might give way at 
any moment. Even a small piercing of the French 
line between Verdun and Nancy would have involved 
the fall of the whole salient ; while a still more dis- 
astrous realignment must have followed a failure of 
Castlenau and Dubail between Nancy and the Vosges. 
In these circumstances, Sarrail could not produce, 
Langle had not the benefit of , such an " effect of suction " 
as governed the issue farther west. If the struggle 



THE BATTLE OF VITRY-LE-FRANgOIS 171 

could not be harder, it was more protracted. Partly 
because it became, when the French reinforcements 
arrived, a death-grapple of nearly equal masses — ^more 
or less than 400,000 men on either side — with little 
opportunity for manoeuvre, partly because it occurred 
over obscure countrysides, it has not been adequately 
appreciated. It is, however, no less important than 
the battles of the left and the centre ; for, if there was 
involved in them the fate of the capital, here not only 
Verdun, but Nancy and Toul, with the armies of the 
eastern frontier, were in the scales. Langle and Sarrail 
share equally with Gallieni and Maunoury, French, 
d'Esperey, and Foch the honours of the total victory. 
The theatre of this part of the conflict forms a 
triangle, Vitry-Verdun-Bar-le-Duc, whose base is ex- 
tended on the west to the Camp de Mailly, on the east 
to the hills on the farther bank of the Meuse. It is 
naturally divided into two sectors of very different 
character : (i) the left, or western, stretching from Mailly 
to near Revigny, in which the French 4th Army had 
to meet on a level front the Saxon left and the IV Army 
of the Duke of Wiirtemberg ; (2) the right, or eastern, 
including the southern Argonne, the salient of Verdun, 
and the Heights of the Meuse, held by Sarrail's 3rd 
Army against the V Army of the German Prince 
Imperial and a force from the Army of Metz. Both 
French groups had been greatly weakened to help 
other commands, Langle giving his 9th and nth 
Corps to form Foch's Army, while Sarrail surrendered 
the 42th Division to Foch, and the 4th Corps to 
Maunoury. These transfers, necessary to provision 
the Generalissimo's offensive, were compensated just, 
and only just, in time ; thanks to a better outlook 



172 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

on the eastern frontier, Langle de Gary received the 
2 1st Corps from the Vosges on September 9, and 
on the 8th Sarrail received the 15th Corps from 
Lorraine, closing with it an alarming gap between the 
3rd and 4th Armies. Sarrail then had about ten 
divisions to the Crown Prince's twelve ; Langle's force 
was also slightly outnumbered. 

On the evening of September 5, Langle's front stood 
thus : On his left, the 17th Corps faced the Saxon 
XIX Corps between the moorland camp of Mailly and 
the Sommesous-Vitry railway. At his centre, across 
what may be called the delta of Vitry-le-Frangois, a 
wide alluvial plain where the merged waters of the 
Ornain and the Saulx join the Marne, some elements 
of the I2th Corps and the Colonial Corps stood against 
the VIII Corps, active and reserve, of the IV Army. 
Vitry, an important junction of railways, roads, and 
waterways, is completely dominated by the hiUs to the 
north of the delta ; and the 12th Corps, to which its 
defence would have fallen, had been so pimished during 
the retreat that the greater part of it had to be with- 
drawn to the Aube for reconstitution on the evening 
of September 5. The Germans, therefore, occupied 
the town without much difficulty, and rapidly gathered 
behind it a strong force of artillery. While the French 
thus lost the cover of the Saulx and the Marne-Rhine 
Canal, they could still fall back upon the St. Dizier 
Canal and the Marne. The centre front, at the begin- 
ning of the battle, ran from the Mailly hills at Humbau- 
viUe, through the villages of Huiron, Frignicourt, 
Vauclerc, and Favresse, to Blesmes railway junction. 
On Langle's right, the 2nd Corps had passed the Saulx 
and its tributary the Ornain, and the Marne-Rhine 



THE BATTLE OF VITRY-LE-FRANgOIS 173 

Canal, leaving only advanced posts on the north of the 
valley, toward Revigny. To it were opposed Duke 
Albrecht's VIII Reserve and XVIII Active Corps. 
The German programme was to break through by 
Vitry and Revigny into the upper vaUeys of the Seine, 
Aube, Marne, and Ornain. Tangle's orders were to try 
to make headway northward, in co-ordination with 
Sarrail's attack toward the west. In fact, he was 
barely able to hold his ground until successes on either 
side relieved the pressure. 

Happily, the German Command had not discovered 
the weakness of the junction between Foch's and 
Langle's forces ; and the Saxons did not at first prove 
formidable. The 17th Corps was, therefore, able on 
September 6 to make a short advance west of Courde- 
manges, nearly to the railway. At the centre, the 
remaining battahons of the 12th Corps and Lefebvre's 
Colonials were attacked violently in the morning. 
Huiron and Courdemanges, at the foot of the hills, 
were lost, but retaken during the evening. The three 
delta hamlets of Frignicourt, Vauclerc, and Ecriennes 
were also lost, the last two to IV Army regulars 
who had crossed the St. Dizier road and canal. On 
the right, the enemy forced the Marne-Rhine canal 
west of Le Buisson ; and for a moment there was a 
danger of the Colonials being cut off from the 2nd 
Corps. To fill the breach. General Gerard transferred 
a brigade of the 4th Division from Pargny to near 
Favresse. Perhaps because of the consequent weak- 
ness of the right of the 2nd Corps, it could not hold the 
Une of the canal from Le Buisson to Etrepy ; and Von 
Tchenk's XVIII Corps entered Alhancelles, 5 miles 
west of Revigny, and crossed the Ornain, in the after- 



174 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

noon. Reinforced by his Reserve, Tchenk pushed 
his advance on the following day, September 7, seizing 
Etrepy village, where the Saulx and Ornain join 
across the Rhine canal, at dawn, and Sermaize a few 
hours later. 

Langle was here faced with a grave danger. His 
centre was still holding pretty well : Huiron was again 
lost, but the Colonials had recovered Ecriennes. On 
his left, the 17th Corps slightly improved its position, 
albeit the hazardous thinness of this part of the French 
front could not be much longer concealed. It was for 
his wings, therefore, that he was most anxious ; and 
thither the two promised corps of reinforcements, the 
15th and 2ist, were directed. The 15th reached the 
right, to prolong Sarrail's line, just in time. The enemy 
had, at a heavy cost, passed the Saulx-Ornain valley, 
with its many lesser water-courses, and had reached 
the edge of the wooded plateau of Trois-Fontaines, 
beyond which, ten miles south of Sermaize, lay the 
important town of St. Dizier. To break through thus 
far would be to cut off Sarrail at Bar-le-Duc from 
Langle at Vitry-le-Frangois ; it would be the doom of 
Verdun, and probably of the French centre. The great- 
ness of the stake, the bitterness of the disappointment, 
afford the only explanation of the abnormal savagery 
shown by the Crown Prince's troops in this region. 

On September 8, the fighting reached its fiercest 
intensity. Tchenk pressed furiously his attack against 
and around Pargny, which his men entered at 5 p.m., 
after suffering heavy losses, Maurupt was also taken, 
but Gerard quickly recaptured it. The crisis, though 
not the struggle, was over with the arrival of the 15th 
Corps between Couvonges and Mogneville, threaten- 



SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT 175 

ing Tchenk's left flank if he should attempt any 
farther advance. At the centre, a reconstituted 
half of the 12th Corps and the Colonial Corps were 
engaged in desperate combats. Courdemanges, Ecri- 
ennes, and Mont Moret fell in the morning ; but the 
hill was retaken at nightfall. Several times driven 
out of Favresse, a brigade of the 2nd Corps finally held 
the village, and arrested the progress of the VIII Re- 
serve Corps towards Blesmes railway junction. With 
constant violence of give and take, these positions 
were little changed on the following day. On the left, 
two regiments of the 17th Corps, pending the arrival 
of the other half of the 12th (23rd Division), bore 
throughout the 8th the onset of a fresh Saxon Division 
(xxiii of the XII Reserve Corps) to the west of 
Humbauville ; while the remainder of the 17th Corps 
fell back a little before the XIX Corps, but advanced 
anew in the afternoon. In the evening, the balance 
was more than restored by the appearance of 
Baquet's Division of the 21st Corps at the extreme 
left of the army, which next day (September 9) drove 
the Saxon right back in disorder toward Sommesous, 
liberating Humbauville, and enabling the 17th Corps 
also to gain ground. The other Division of the 21st 
Corps (43rd) had now reached the scene ; and, on the 
loth, Langle was able to make a strong offensive on 
this side, in association with Foch's pursuit of the 
retreating Saxons. 

II. Sarrail Holds the Meuse Salient 

The French 3rd Army, when Sarrail took over its 
command from Ruffey on August 30, was a thing of 



i;6 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

shreds and patches. The 42nd Division of Sarrail's 
own 6th Corps was being sent to Foch, leaving behind 
two other divisions, and a brigade of a third which had 
been broken up. The 4th Corps was about to leave for 
Paris, to take part in the battle of the Ourcq. There 
remained the 5th and the diminished 6th Corps, 
General Paul Durand's Group of Divisions of Reserve 
(67, 75, and 65), formerly under Maunoury, the 72nd 
Reserve Division, forming part of the garrison of 
Verdun, and the 7th Cavalry Division. Verdun 
depending directly upon General Headquarters, 
Coutanceau and Heymann, the governor and the 
divisionaire, were not subject to Sarrail's orders ; but 
they co-operated admirably. Yet another southron, 
Sarrail was fifty-eight years old, a tall, slight figure, with 
(at that time) short white beard and moustache, blue 
eyes, and a gentle manner bespeaking the scholar and 
thinker rather than the man of action he proved him- 
seK to be. After service in Tunis and with the Foreign 
Legion, he had been advanced by Generals Andr6 and 
Picquart, and rose by steady stages from colonel in 
1905 to corps commander. Across the mists of more 
painful days, I recall the strong impression he made 
upon me when I first met him at Verdun in December 
1914. 

From near the frontier, the 3rd Army had fallen 
back, at the end of August, westward to the Meuse 
between Stenay and Vilosnes, leaving the reserve group 
and garrison troops to make a thin line of defence on the 
east of the river, just beyond the radius of the entrenched 
camp and the edge of the Meuse Heights from Ornes 
to Vigneulles. " Entrenched camp " is the conven- 
tional name ; but there were no serious entrenchments 



SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT 177 

in those days, and scarcely any, as I can testify, three 
months later. The forts and thickly-wooded hills 
were sufficient, with the field army free, to determine 
the German Grand Staff to leave Verdun, as it was 
leaving Paris, aside. The French, however, could yet 
have no certainty on this score. During the first days 
of September, the 5th and 6th Corps pivoted around the 
west of Verdun ; and, when they had completed the 
semicircle, the problem had to be faced. The hazard 
of the old fortress was no mere matter of sentiment. 
Its fall would mean the loss of all it could contribute 
to the contemplated attack on the enemy's flank, and 
of a great strength of artillery and munitions that 
could not be removed, as well as of a form^idable 
position. On the other hand, there lay Joffre's plan, 
and the reasoning that had saved the British Army 
from internment at Maubeuge. The Generalissimo's 
orders were express : the 3rd Army must keep its 
Uberty, and must, accordingly, retire to the north of 
Bar-le-Duc, and possibly as far as Joinville. It was 
not only Verdun, but his power of threatening the 
German flank, that Sarrail hoped to save. He resolved, 
therefore, to give ground as slowly as possible, keeping 
his right in touch with the fortress to the last moment, 
and to risk, up to a certain point, a breach of contact 
with de Langle de Gary. At daybreak on September 
6, his forces were ranged over the broadly - rolling 
fields and moorlands, facing westward, as follows : 

Right. — Several regiments of the Verdun garrison 
were coming into line about Nixeville, and the three 
reserve divisions were spread thence along the Verdun- 
Bar highroad (afterwards famous as the " Via Sacra ") 
and narrow-gauge railway as far as Issoncourt, having 
12 



178 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

before them the German XVI Active Corps reinforced 
some hours later by the VI Reserve. 

Centre. — The 6th Corps extended through Beauz^e 
south-westward to near Vaubecourt, with d'Urbal's 
cavahy about Lisle-en-Barrois, facing the German 
XIII Corps. 

Left. — The 5th Corps stood across the path of the 
German VI and part of the Duke of Wiirtemberg's 
XVIII Corps among the villages north of Revigny, 
from Villotte to Nettancourt. 

Although the dispositions of the German V Army — 
one corps of which was detained 10 miles north, and 
another a like distance west, of Verdun — at this juncture 
do not suggest over-confidence, an order found on the 
field shows that the Crown Prince now believed himself 
sure of a dramatic victory. At 8 p.m. on Saturday the 
5th, instructions had been issued for the XVI, XIII, 
and VI Corps (in this order from east to west), with 
the XVIII Reserve on their right, to drive resolutely 
south, and to seize Bar-le-Duc and the Marne crossings 
to and beyond Revigny, whUe the IV Cavaky Corps 
exploited the breach between Sarrail and Tangle's 
forces, and hurried on " on the line Dijon-Besangon- 
Behort." As a whole, this design at once failed. The 
German advance had hardly begun when Heymann's 
and Durand's reservists, on the north, threatened its 
line of supply by an attack toward Ville-sur-Cousance, 
St. Andre, and Ippecourt ; while, at the centre, the 6th 
Corps pushed toward Pretz, Evres, and Sommaisne. 
The small advantages gained were soon negatived, and 
at night the Une was back at Rampont, Souhesmes, 
Souilly, Seraucourt, and Rembercourt ; but a half of 
the Crown Prince's units were held, if not crippled. 



SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT 179 

This must have been all the more irritating to him 
because of the rapid success of his VI Corps and 
the IV Army. During the morning, in fact, the 
French left was driven out of Laheycourt, Sommeilles, 
and Nettancourt, then from Brabant and Villers-aux- 
Vents, and before night from Laimont and the market- 
town of Revigny. The Crown Prince had reached the 
Marne just as Kluck was beginning to retire from it. 
General Micheler and the 5th Corps, mourning many 
of their men and a divisional chief, General Roques, but 
cheered to think that the first reinforcements from 
Lorraine would arrive on the morrow, drew together 
their ranks at VUlotte, Louppy, and Vassincourt. 

On September 7, the encounter became closer and 
more severe, without any marked change of position, the 
67th and 75th Divisions, on the right, carr5dng Ippecourt 
by assault (to lose it next day), the 6th Corps resisting 
obstinately on either side of Rembercourt, and, on the 
left, the 5th Corps meeting furious attacks around 
Vassincourt . In the evening, the 29th Division of Castel- 
nau's 15th Corps passed the Marne to Combles and 
Fains, two battalions of chassem's reaching Couvonges 
and the neighbouring woods. On the morning of the 
8th, Sarrail's 5th Corps was supported and extended 
by the full strength of the 15th, One brigade of the 
latter was directed by Vassincourt toward Revigny, 
but could make no headway. Other brigades came 
into action near Louppy and MogneviUe ; nevertheless, 
ViUotte and Louppy-le-Chateau were lost. News 
arriving that de Langle's right had been driven back 
from Sermaize to Cheminon, and that Duke Albrecht's 
forces were at the foot of the Trois-Fontaines plateau, 
d'Urbal was ordered to take his cavalry corps round. 



i8o FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

and to harry the east flank of Tchenk's movement. 
No sooner had it reached the upper Saulx valley 
for this purpose than Sarrail hurried it back and 
away north-eastward to meet a yet extremer danger 
beyond the Meuse. 

Below St. Mihiel, the river meanders beside a wall 
of steep hills, on the crests of which were situated a 
number of forts, dependencies of the Toul and Verdun 
systems, designed as observatories and points of 
arrest against an enemy march toward the principal 
crossings. The most important of these forts were 
Genicourt, Troyon, and the Roman Camp along the 
east, and Paroches on the west, banks. Troyon was 
an extensive square structure, sunk in a deep, wide 
moat, and garrisoned by about 450 men. Com- 
manding the gap of Spada, it enjoyed, in its remote 
solitude, magnificent views over the plain of the 
Woevre as far as Metz, and the hills and valleys 
between St. Mihiel and Verdun. It has not been 
explained why the troops of Metz did not reach the 
Meuse earUer ; probably their heavy artillery delayed 
them. On the morning of September 7, there was no 
sign of trouble on the Heights, and the commander 
of Troyon, Captain Xavier Heym, went out partridge 
shooting. At noon, forces of infantry and cavalry, 
with thirty cannon, were reported on the roads from 
Hattonchatel and Heudicourt. The bombardment 
began at 2 p.m. ; and before another day had passed, 
400 heavy shells, some of them from 12-inch mortars, 
had been thrown upon the fort, putting seven guns 
out of action, and demolishing large parts of the case- 
mates and galleries. This news wa,s a crown to 
Sarrail's anxieties. He had no reserves left ; the 3rd 




VERDUN 
5ALIETMT 

SveniriA 
ex Sept. '7* 

D.R= JDivLsion ofSizserve 
nR.V= Kaserve Dlvl^ of 
Verdun. 
R.C-= Corps of 'Reserve 
C.= " " Aciivs 



SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT i8i 

Army was wholly engaged. Its right might at any 
time be crushed, its left enveloped : now it was 
menaced in the rear. The dispatch thither of some 
thed cavalry was, of course, the merest bluff. What- 
ever might have been the fate of Verdun, the crossing 
of the Meuse at a higher point would have meant the 
withdrawal of Sarrail's right, and the opening for the 
Crown Prince of the shorter route for reinforcements 
and supplies which he so much needed. 

On the evening of September 8, Joffre authorised the 
commander of the 3rd Army to draw back from 
Verdun along the west bank of the Meuse. Sarrail, 
who by this time knew of Kluck's retreat and the 
magnificent efforts of the French centre, was deter- 
mined to hold on, at least till Troyon should fall ; but 
the river bridges were cut and the forts left to their 
own resources. At 9 a.m. on the 9th, Verdun sig- 
nalled that Fort Genicourt was being bombarded by 
heavy guns. At 11 o'clock, Troyon no longer had a 
piece in action. There were then in the neighbouring 
hills enemy columns amounting to the greater part 
of an army corps, with artillery, aviation parks, and 
convoys. Two infantry assaults were repelled by 
rifle and machine-gun fire. Meantime, General 
Durand's Reserve Divisions maintained their ground 
near Verdun, the 75th suffering severely in repeated 
attacks on the Crown Prince's line of communica- 
tions ; and, on the left, part of the 15th Corps having 
pushed across the Saulx into the Trois-Fontaines 
Forest, and then struck north, Mogneville was cap- 
tured by assault from two sides. 

The turning-point of the battle had been reached. 
During the night of September 9, while his 6th Corps 



1 82 FROM VITRY TO VERDUN 

was repelling a furious attempt of the XIII and XVI 
Corps to break through, Sarrail learned that the 
British were well over the Marne, with d'Esperey 
nearly abreast of them, that Biilow had succumbed to 
Foch's will, and that the Saxons had begun to yield 
before Langle. Many an exhausted trooper, in 
lonely thickets, ditches, and broken farm buildings, 
only received the glad tidings two days later ; yet 
the magic spark of a definite hope was lit. The 4th 
Army could now look after itself. The 3rd had failed 
to make good its first threat against the German 
flank. Even at this distance, however, the western 
" effect of suction " was at last faintly felt. The 
XVIII Reserve Corps was perceptibly weakening. 
During the loth, the 15th Corps pushed through to 
the edge of the Trois-Fontaines Forest, approached 
Sermaize and Andernay, and sent some hundreds of 
prisoners to the rear. If the right could only hold ! 
In the afternoon the XIII and XVI were reinforced 
by the VI Reserve Corps (replaced by the V 
Reserve). Rembercourt, Courcelles, Seraucourt, and 
Souilly, were lost in succession. The struggle con- 
tinued unrelaxed along a line but slightly withdrawn, 
from Conde-en-Barrois, through Erize-la-Petite and 
NeuviUe, to Rambluzin ; and on the extreme right, 
about Vaudelaincourt, the 72nd Division performed 
prodigies. In the evening, the 67th and 75th Reserve 
Divisions were actually removed from the line, pre- 
paratory to an abandonment of Verdun. The enemy 
did not perceive the movement till too late. 

And the gallant four hundred of Troyon continued 
to bar the way to the Meuse. Under cover of a flag, 
two German officers and a trumpeter rode up to the 



SARRAIL HOLDS THE MEUSE SALIENT 183 

fort, and demanded its surrender. " Never ! " replied 
He5mi ; " I shall blow it up sooner." And finally : 
" Get out, I've seen enough of you. A hientot, d, 
Metz." '" Who could imagine that " hientot " was 
four years away ? 



CHAPTER IX 
VICTORY 

IT is now apparent that a record of the battle 
covering the whole front day by day would 
give no clear view of its development. The 
climax came not everywhere at the same hour, or even 
on the same day, but in a remarkable succession — 
beginning on the Ourcq about noon on vSeptember 9, 
and immediately afterward on Foch's front (the two 
areas most directly menaced by the advance of French 
and d'Esperey), reaching de Langle de Cary the next 
morning, and Sarrail only on the night of the loth. 
It remains to trace the completion of the victory. 

Maunoury had failed of his objective : after four 
days of grinding combat, he had advanced his centre 
some 10 miles eastward, but was, at noon on September 
9, still an average of 6 miles short of the Ourcq, 
before Vareddes, Etrepilly, and Acy-en-Multien ; 
while his left was painfully bent back from the last- 
named point westward to Silly-le-Long. Every effort 
to obtain an effective superiority of strength, and to 
break through or around the enemy's right, had been 
thwarted by Kluck's speed in supporting that flank. 
Looking at this part of the field only, it might be 
supposed that a substantial reinforcement of either 
side at this moment would have precipitated a disaster 
on the other. A wider view shows a very different 



VICTORY 185 

balance. If Maunoury could have found one or two 
fresh divisions, the German I Army might have 
been shattered ; a further French withdrawal to and 
beyond the Marne would not have entailed any such 
grave consequences. In fact, both armies were 
exhausted ; neither had any remaining reserve to call 
in. The decision came from the next sector of the front. 
Since Le Cateau, the little British Army had played 
only a secondary part ; it was now to have the honour 
of saving the left wing of the Allies for the third time. 
From the moment it began to recross the Marne, 
solidly extended by d'Esperey, its intervention became 
a conclusive factor. It must have been during the 
morning of the 9th that the German Grand Staff 
reconciled itself to the necessity of a general retreat, 
at least from Senlis as far east as Fere Champenoise. 
In after years, when the simple art of entrenchment 
had been elaborated and the men had become in- 
credibly hardened to shell-fire, these same wooded 
hillsides would be contested foot by foot. At this 
time, freer and larger movements were required, 
especially when no considerable aid could be expected, 
when supplies were short, and the danger appeared 
on two sides. Kluck's very persistence, not having 
attained any positive result, told against him. His 
men might be persuaded that this was " not a 
retreat, but only a regrouping of forces for strategic 
reasons " ; '^ all officers but the youngest knew that 
the " smashing blow " had been broken, the famous 
enveloping movement had failed, a new plan of cam- 
paign must be thought out. For that, rest must be 
found upon a naturally strong defensive position such 
as the line of the Aisne and the Laon mountains. 



1 86 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

By noon on September 9 — a gloomy, showery 
day — ^the call was urgent. The I Army could do no 
more. Its ammunition was nearly exhausted. Its 
best units were physically and morally broken. 
It had no longer the strength to bury its dead 
— they were unclothed and cast upon great pyres 
of straw and wood ; and the odour of burn- 
ing flesh added a new horror to the eastern part 
of the battlefield. Kluck's advance from Nanteuil 
and Betz, during the morning, was only a di- 
version, a last blow to secure liberty of movement. 
At II a.m., the French found Betz evacuated ; 
Nanteuil and Etavigny were still held. Whipped 
on by Headquarters, General Boelle's two divisions 
of the 4th Corps crept forward again. During the 
afternoon, aviators observed long enemy convoys, 
followed by troop columns of all arms, crowding all 
the roads from the Ourcq to the Aisne. For several 
critical hours they were screened by a vigorous de- 
fence of the centre lines east of Etrepilly and Puisieux. 
This and a slight reaction near Nanteuil were the 
final spasms of the battle of the Ourcq. We have 
seen that Marwitz, beaten by the ist British Corps at 
Montreuil-aux-Lions, 13 miles due east of Etrepilly, 
in the early afternoon, had gone back to the CHgnon, 
and that the whole angle of the Marne and Ourcq had 
been evacuated. Kluck could flatter himself to have 
held out to the last possible moment. Gradually the 
remainder of his artillery was removed from the Trocy 
plateau ; and, under cover of night, all but rearguards 
made off to the north-east. The 6th Army seems to 
have been too weary to discover the flight of its re- 
doubtable foe until daybreak on the following morn- 



VICTORY 187 

ing. The pursuit began at once, following both sides 
of the Ourcq. It was checked on the left by small 
detachments under cover of the Forest of Villers- 
Cotterets, an obstacle the importance of which was 
to be more fuUy proved in the last year of the war ; 
while Kluck established new lines along the hills 
beyond the Aisne, from the Forest of Laigle to Soissons. 
So the red tide of battle sank from the stubble- 
fields and coppices above Meaux ; but burning farm- 
steads and hayricks, broken bridges, shattered 
churches and houses, many unburied dead, and piles 
of abandoned ammunition and stores spoke of the 
frightful frenzy that had passed over a scene marked 
a week before by quiet charm and happy labour. 
In the orchards and folds of the open land, the bodies 
of invader and defender lay over against each other, 
sometimes still grappling. Every here and there 
horses rotted on the roads and fields, presently to be 
burned on pyres of wood, for fear of pestilence arising. 
Most of the human victims had been buried where they 
fell ; little wooden crosses sometimes marked their 
great common graves. On September 10, General 
Maunoury addressed to his troops the following 
message of congratulation and thanks : 

" The 6th Army has supported for five full days, without 
interruption or slackening, the combat against a numerous 
enemy whose moral was heightened by previous success. 
The struggle has been hard ; the losses under fire, from 
fatigue due to lack of sleep and sometimes of food, have 
surpassed what was to be anticipated. You have borne 
it all with a valour, firmness, and endurance that words 
are powerless to glorify as they deserve. Comrades ! 
the Commander-in-Chief asked you in the name of the 
Fatherland to do more than your duty ; you have re- 



1 88 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

sponded to his appeal even beyond what seemed possible. 
Thanks to you, victory crowns our flags. Now that you 
know the glorious satisfaction of it, you. will not let it 
slip away. As for me, if I have done some good, I have 
been repaid by the greatest honour that has been granted 
me in a long career, that of commanding such men as 
you." 

Fifteen miles of high, open farmlands, cut by deep 
valleys, divide the Upper Ourcq from the Aisne. The 
British Army covered rather more than this distance 
on September ii and 12, meeting serious opposition 
only at Braisne and on the high ground between the 
Vesle and the Aisne. The cavalry on the left, indeed, 
reached the latter river at Soissons on the evening of 
the nth. Here the German retreat came to an abrupt 
end. Sir John French speaks loosely of the German 
losses as " enormous " ; in fact, his ist and 2nd 
Corps and cavalry took in one day 13 guns, 7 
machine-guns, about 2000 prisoners, and many broken- 
down wagons. The spectacle of boot}/, always 
fallacious, was in this case peculiarly so. The main 
body of the enemy was defeated, but not routed ; 
driven back, but not dispersed. From Courchamp 
to Soissons, the fullest measure of the retreat, is, by 
road, about 60 miles. Many stragglers gave them- 
selves up along this route in a starving condition ; 
many others hid for days in the woods of the Brie table- 
land and the Tardenois, where I witnessed several 
man-hunts conducted by French and British rear- 
guards. In the final pursuit, Kluck may have lost 
5000 or 6000 men — a small number compared with the 
costs to either side of the previous fighting. 

The best of battle-plans is the most adaptable. 



VICTORY 189 

Perhaps Joffre had not looked to the British Expedi- 
tionary Force for such a contribution to the general 
end. Maunoury, by his original orders, was to cross 
the Ourcq toward Chateau - Thierry, driving Kluck 
up against Biilow ; d'Esperey was to sweep up north- 
ward and meet him at right angles. The shifting of 
the greater part of the German I Army to the west 
of the Ourcq, and the consequent thinning of its con- 
nection with the II Army, displaced the action 
without changing its essential character. In the 
event, it was the British Army that led the northward 
movement '^ ; d'Esperey, who, at the outset, had four 
active corps and three divisions of reserve for a front 
of only 25 miles (from Jouy-le-Chatel to Sezanne), while 
quickly compelling the withdrawal of Billow's right, 
was able to give his neighbour, Foch, aid without 
which the whole victory would have been com- 
promised. 

On the evening of September 9, General Franchet 
d'Esperey issued from his headquarters at Montmirail 
the following stirring message to his army : 

" Soldiers ! On the memorable fields of Montmirail, 
Vauchamps, and Champaubert, which a century ago 
witnessed our ancestors victories over the Prussians 
of BlUcher, our vigorous offensive has triumphed over the 
German resistance. Held on his flanks, his centre broken, 
the enemy is now retreating toward the east and north 
by forced marches. The most redoubtable Corps of old 
Prussia, the Westphalian, Hanoverian, and Brandenburg 
contingents, are falling hack hurriedly before you. 

" This first success is only a prelude. The enemy 
is shaken, hut not definitely beaten. You will still have 
to undergo severe hardships, to make long marches, to 
fight hard battles. May the image of your country soiled 



igo THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

by barbarians be ever before your eyes ! Never has a 
complete sacrifice for it been more necessary. 

While saluting the heroes who have fallen in the 
last few days, my thoughts turn toward you, the victors 
in the next battle. Forward, soldiers, for France ! " 

At the time when the commander of the 5th Army 
penned these words, the situation was a singular one. 
The issue of the battle as a whole was, in fact, decided : 
the retreat of the three western, if not also of the 
next two, German armies had been ordered. Yet 
the only part of the Allied line that had been materi- 
ally advanced was that before French and d'Esperey ; 
and Foch, Langle, and Sarrail were still in a situation 
apparently desperate. Instead of being on the Marne 
between Epernay and Chalons, Foch's centre was 
lying in fragments 30 miles to the south, at Faux and 
Salon, after the debacle of Fere Champenoise. Why, 
then, did Biilow beat a hasty retreat at about 5 p.m. 
on that critical day ? We have done justice to the 
manoeuvre of Grossetti's Division ; even if this had 
been executed six hours earlier, it could not have 
sufficed to produce a transformation so sudden and 
complete. To understand the German collapse, a 
wider stretch of the front at the hour named must be 
scrutinised. Its chief feature will be found in the 
length of Billow's right flank, extended no less than 
40 miles from Chateau - Thierry to Corroy. Over 
against this flank were gathered three corps of the 5th 
and five divisions of the 9th Armies ; while the 
German thrust was being made by only four Prussian 
corps with a few Saxon detachments. The disparity 
was greater in quality than in numbers. D'Esperey 's 
Corps were relatively fresh, and in high spirits ; Billow's 



VICTORY 191 

were fagged and to some extent disorganised. In these 
circumstances, the detachment of the loth Corps to 
Foch, and the attack of the ist Corps at CorfeHx and 
Le Thoult, would probably have an effect upon the 
German Command which the transfer of the 42nd 
Division to Linthes would emphasise. Grossetti's 
movement might be risked ; the possibility of a larger 
blow from the west against a flank of 40 miles could 
not be faced. On a smaller scale, the Saxons were in 
like danger from the east, where the 21st Corps, just 
detrained from the Vosges, had made a disturbing 
appearance during the day. The German centre had 
had too much and too little success — ^too little to give 
an immediate decision, too much, and at too heavy 
a price, for the security of its own formation. 

That evening it blew a half-gale, and poured cats- 
and-dogs, along the Marne valley and the Sezanne 
hills. The clay pocket of St. Gond became a quag- 
mire ; the few roads crossing the west part of the 
marshes were covered by the French " 75 's," and the 
slaughter they wrought gave rise to legends recalling 
what happened a century before. The loth Corps, 
extended by the 51st Reserve Division, struck out 
eastward during the night from Champaubert, Baye, 
and Soizy, and on September 10 cleared the plain 
between the marshes and the Chalons highroad. At 
5 a.m. on the loth, the Moroccan Division and the 
9th Corps reached the east end of the marshes, but 
were stopped before Pierre-Morains and Ecury, where 
a sharp engagement took place. The 42nd Division 
was also checked on the Somme before Normee and 
Lenharree, as was the nth Corps, which had come up 
on its right, before Vassimont and Haussimont. On 



192 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Friday, September ii, the French entered Epernay, 
the champagne capital ; and on the following day the 
enemy evacuated the city of Rheims, continuing to 
hold the neighbouring hill forts. Thousands of men 
and large quantities of ammunition and material were 
abandoned ; but it soon became evident that the 
retreat was not an aimless flight. On September 
II, 12, and 13, the German gunners on Mt. Berru 
and Nogent I'Abbesse bombarded the ancient and 
beautiful city. The fagade of the cathedral, with its 
precious sculptures and windows, received irreparable 
damage ; the choir-stalls and other fine woodwork 
within were destroyed, the Archiepiscopal Palace, 
the City Hall, and neighbouring buildings burned down. 
The establishment of a solid German rampart extend- 
ing from the Oise across the Laon hills, dipping to 
the outlying forts of the old Rheims defences, and then 
reaching across Champagne, through the Argonne, 
and around Verdun, to Metz, was to prove one of the 
great achievements of the war, a defiance through 
nearly four years of sacrifice, For a moment, at the 
end of the battle of the Marne, it seemed that such a 
possibility might be averted. Conneau's 2nd Cavalry 
Corps, the i8th Corps, and the 53rd and 69th Reserve 
Divisions had all passed the Aisne, between Bourg 
and Berry -au-Bac, on September 14. Conneau 
now found himself supporting a frontal attack of 
d'Esperey's i8th Corps and reserves upon the abrupt 
cliffs by which the Aisne hills fall to the flats 
of Champagne, the Craonne plateau, A force from 
Lorraine under General von Heeringen was to be 
brought into this vital sector, between Kluck and 
Billow ; meanwhUe, the connection was uncertain. 



VICTORY 193 

While, a little farther west, Sir Douglas Haig was 
boldly reaching up to the Chemin des Dames, d'Esp6rey 
sent Conneau north-eastward as far as Sissonne ; and 
thence one of his divisions was ordered to take in 
reverse the German troops posted above Craonne. 
Success seemed assured, when the i8th Corps and 
the reserve divisions were beaten back ; and Conneau, 
fearing to be isolated on the north of the river, re- 
crossed it. All the energy of General Maud'huy was 
needed to preserve a foothold on the right bank. 
Within a fortnight, the long deadlock of trench war- 
fare had begun, and a new phase of the war had 
opened in the north-west. 

At 7 a.m. on September 12, a patrol of chasseurs 
of the 9th Army entered Chalons, the Saxons hurry- 
ing off before them to the Suippes valley ; a few 
hours later. General Foch established his headquarters 
in the old garrison town. The Saxon Army was now 
in a condition worse than that of the British after 
Le Cateau ; and it disappeared as an independent 
command with the fixing of the Unes in Champagne. 
Foch's rapid march to the north-east made the 
German positions south of the Argonne impossible. 
From September 11, Langle was able to devote him- 
self wholly to the IV Army. By noon that day, 
they had evacuated their defences in and around 
Vitry-le-Frangois ; and in the evening, the left of 
the 4th Army (21st, 17th, and 12th Corps) reached 
the Marne between Sogny and Couvrot, while the 
Colonial Corps passed the Saulx near Heiltz-l'Eveque, 
and the 2nd held the Ornain from Etrepy to Ser- 
maize, in touch with the 15th Corps of Sarrail's 
Army, which was approaching Revigny. When, on 

13 



194 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

September 12, General Espinasse's troops entered that 
town, it had been systematically destroyed. The 
central streets presented an extraordinary scene of 
devastation. Nothing remained except parts of the 
lower walls and, within, masses of stone, brick, and 
mortar broken small, with scraps of iron and charred 
wood. The town hall, a graceful building in French 
classic style, had about a half of its outer fabric 
standing. The church, which was of historic interest, 
was roofless and much damaged within. Houses and 
shops had been first pillaged, and then fired. Most 
of the neighbouring villages had been similarly treated. 
One scene stands out in my memory. Sermaize-les- 
Bains was a pleasant town of 4000 inhabitants, on the 
Saulx, with a mineral spring, a large sugar refinery, 
and a handsome old church. It had been demolished 
from end to end by skilled incendiarism. Of 500 
houses, only half a dozen remained standing. Except 
a few chimneys and pieces of wall, the rest was a 
rubbish heap, recalling Pompeii before the antiquaries 
cleared it up. There had been an ironmonger's shop 
— you could trace it by the masses of molten iron and 
clotted nails. There had been a glass and china shop 
— j^ou could trace it by the lumps of milky coagulate 
that stuck out among the litter of brick. When I 
arrived, a few of the inhabitants were returning, 
women, children, and old men, carrying with them 
large, rough loaves of bread, or wheeling barrows 
of firewood. The church was roofless and gutted, 
the nave piled with fragments of stone. The curb's 
house was also burned out. In the middle of a grass- 
plot behind it stood a white statue of the Virgin, 
turning clasped hands toward the ruins. 



VICTORY 195 

How much these and other indulgences impeded 
the military effort of the Crown Prince's men, how 
much they strengthened the spirit of the French 
soldiers, may be supposed, but not measured. They 
mark with an odious emphasis for history the hour 
not only of a signal defeat, but of a profound dis- 
illusionment, which was to deepen slowly to the utter 
discredit of a system and an idea hitherto not seriously 
challenged. The game was played ; with rage, the 
Prince Imperial submitted. Having held his left im- 
passive for a day, while the right pivoted slowly 
backward toward the Argonne, on the night of Sep- 
tember 12 the order was given for a general and rapid 
withdrawal ; and on the following days, the French 
4th and 3rd Armies found themselves in face of new 
enemy lines drawn fron the MoronviUiers hills near 
Rheims, by Souain, ViUe-sur-Tourbe, and Varennes, 
to the Meuse at Forges, 8 miles north of Verdun. 
The Chalons- Verdun road and railway were dis- 
engaged, a result of great importance, and the old 
fortress, with its outposts on the Meuse Heights, was 
definitively relieved. The Crown Prince pitched his 
tent on the feudal eyrie of Montfaucon. General 
Sarrail picked up his direct communications with 
Paris, faced round to Metz and the north, and prepared 
for the future. 

And the master of the victorious host ? On Sep- 
tember II, he had issued the following " Ordre 
general No. 15 " : 

" The battle that has been proceeding for five days 
is ending in incontestable victory. The retreat of the 
German I, II, and III Armies is accentuated before j)ur 
left and our centre. In its turn, the IV enemy Armyjias 



196 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

begun to fall back to the north of Vitry-le-Frangois and 
Sermaize. Everywhere the enemy is leaving on the ground 
many wounded and quantities of munitions. Every- 
where prisoners are being taken. While they advance our 
troops note the marks of the intensity of the struggle, and 
the importance of the means employed by the Germans 
to resist our onset. The vigorous renewal of the offensive 
determined our success. Officers and soldiers, you have 
all answered my appeal. You have deserved well of the 
Fatherland." 

In a telegram to the Minister of War, he added : 
" The Government of the RepubHc may bejproud of 
the armies it has organised." Neither then nor later 
did any phrase more worthy of the occasion than these 
fall from the pen or the Ups of the Generalissimo. In 
success as in failure, he was the same silent, weighty, 
cheerful figure — Joffre the Taciturn, to the end. 



CHAPTER X 
THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 

GENERAL JOFFRE'S Instruction of Septem- 
ber I had prescribed that the whole offensive 
should pivot upon the right. The defence of 
the eastern front, as a wall protecting the western and 
central armies, and the pivot of their recoil — essential 
condition of the general success — ^was assigned to 
Generals de Castelnau and Dubail. The 2nd and ist 
Armies had been severely punished at the outset of 
the campaign ; and, evidently, a heavy task now lay 
before them. The second of the German princes, 
Ruprecht of Bavaria, with the last corps of the 
Bavarian Army, could not be given other than a 
principal role ; and Heeringen, chief of the 7th Army, 
Prussian War Minister during a critical part of the 
period of preparation, was also a veteran of the 
Grand Staff, with which he had worked for more than 
thirty years. On September 6, the Grand Quartier 
General specified that Castlenau and Dubail should 
remain on their positions defensively till the end of 
the battle of the Marne. We have seen that, after 
the failure of the offensives of Morhange-Sarrebourg 
and Mulhouse, the two armies retreated rapidly, but 
in such a way that, taking up an angular formation 
from the Grand Couronn6 of Nancy southward to the 

Gap of Charmes, and thence eastward to the Donon, 

197 



198 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

they were able, on August 25, to fall upon the two 
flanks of the advancing enemy with instant effect. 
There was then a pause, due in part to heavy fogs, 
for several days, in which either side prepared for a 
new encounter. 

The circumstances differed considerably from those 
in the west. For their abortive offensives, the two 
armies had been given a distinct superiority of force 
on the eastern frontier ; but, after the successful 
defence of the Gap of Charmes, this superiority had 
been drawn upon repeatedly by the Generalissimo to 
feed his main design. Thus, Castlenau had sent from 
the 2nd Army : on August 15, the i8th Corps, to Lan- 
rezac, for the advance to the Sambre ; on August 18 
and September 4, the 9th Corps, to the 4th Army, from 
which it was detached to Foch's Army of the centre ; 
on September 3, the 15th Corps, to Sarrail ; and on 
September i, the greater part of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, 
to the space between the British and French 5th 
Armies. At the same time, Dubail, while absorbing 
gradually the body of Pau's " Army of Alsace," sent 
the 2ist Corps, on September 4, to Langle's left, and 
the 13th Corps, on September 9, to the region of 
Compiegne for the battle of the Aisne ; after which, in 
the middle of September, when the great victory had 
been won, the ist Army took over the whole of the 
Nancy front from the 2nd Army. These deplace- 
ments were necessary, and remarkably timed and 
executed ; but they represent a not inconsiderable 
diminution of effective strength at a grave juncture. 
To compensate for their losses, the High Command 
could only send to the Lorraine Armies divisions of 
reserves. Their performance surpassed all French, 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 199 

and rather justified German, anticipations. It is, 
however, to be remarked that the opposed forces of the 
Bavarian Crown Prince and Heeringen underwent a 
similar transformation. In addition to their reserve 
divisions, they received between them, at the end of 
August and the beginning of September, something 
like 100,000 men of the Ersatz and Landwehr. An 
Ersatz Division of the Guard was engaged near 
Luneville, and Bavarian and Saxon Ersatz Divisions 
appeared on the Upper Meurthe. A large part of the 
Bavarian and Rhenish Landwehr was also used m 
Lorraine. Heeringen 's Army, itself constituted in 
Alsace, moved northward after Dubail, and, when 
arrested on the Upper Mortagne and the Northern 
Vosges, detached two of its corps to the Bavarian Army 
for the crucial attack on the Grand Couronne. Metz, 
Strasbourg, and the garrison towns of Alsace were 
used as reservoirs on the German side, just as were Toul, 
Epinal, and Belfort on the French, until both antago- 
nists had drawn their last possible reinforcement, and 
the invasion failed by exhaustion. 

For the actions now to be followed, the opposed 
forces, from north to south, were as foUows : 

2nd ARMY (General de CASTEL- VI ARMY (CROWN 
NAU). PRINCE OF BAVARIA). 

78rd Division Reserve (General «„ , „. . . 

Chatelain). oSrcr Diuiaion Reserve. 

From foul. In the Moselle From Metz, for the move- 
valley, south of Pont-k-Mousson. mentmtheWoevre. South 

2nd Group of Divisions of Reserve °^ Pont-a-Mousson. 

(General Leon Durand). 2 or 8 Landwehr Diuisiona, 

59th, 68th (General Aubignose), south of Nomeny. 

70th (General FayoUe). From Ste. n d ■ n ,r- 1 

Genevieve to near R6mer6ville, the " ^«7"«f. .^"^Ps (General 

centre of the Nancy front. von Martmi) 

64th Division Reserve (General Com- .,, ,/ " "°" 

pagnon). Supporting the 70th '"® Vezouse. 

bek>re Nancy. Guard Ersatz Division. 



200 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 



20th Corps (General Balfourier, suc- 
ceeding General Foch). 

39th and nth Divisions, with a 
Colonial brigade attached. Across 
the Sanon, from Haraucourt to 
near Vitrimont. 
74th Division Reserve (General Bigot). 
Astride the Mortagne, from 
Mont to Xermamenil. 

16th Corps (General Taverna). 

32nd and 31st Divisions. On 
the Mortagne, between Einvaux 
and Gerb^viller. 

1st ARMY (General DUBAIL). 

8th Corps (General de Castelli), with 
8 groups of Alpinist reserves 
added. From Gerbeviller south- 
ward. 

6th Cavalry Division. 
Till September 8. 

18th Corps (General Alix). 

At the centre, till September 10. 

68th Division Reserve. 

67th Division Reserve (General Ber- 
nard). 

7Ut Division Reserve. 

In support, south of BruySres. 

14th Corps. 

West of the St. Die valley. 

44th Division (General Soyer). 
From the Army of Alsace. 

41st Division. 

South of St. Di6 and east of the 
Meurthe. 



/// Bavarian Corps (General 
von Gebsattel). 

Between the Seille and 
the Sanon. 

XXI Corps. 

Between the Meurthe and 
the Mortagne. 

/ Bavarian Corps (General 
von Xylander). 

/ Bavarian Corps Reserve 
(General von Fasbender). 

VII ARMY (General von 
HEERINGEN, till the 
night of September 6). 

XIV Corps (General von 
Hoeningen). 
West of Baccarat. 

XI V Corps Reserve. 

Both the above were 
transferred to the VI Army 
on September 6. 

XV Corps (General von 
Deimling). 

Detached, September 7, 
with Heeringen, to the 
Aisne. 

X V Corps Reserve. 

At first only the 30th 
Division Reserve ; later 
the 39th Division Reserve 
arrived. In the St. Die 
valley. 

Ersatz and Landwehr Brig- 
ades. 



Uncertainty as to some German units, and the con- 
tinual transfer on both sides, make an accurate compari- 
son of strength impossible. M. Hanotaux "^^ estimates 
the French forces at their maximum at 532,000, and 
the German at 530,000 men. This was during the 
battle of the Gap of Charmes, and at the end of August. 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 201 

On September 4, Castlenau had lost 70,000 men or 
more, and the ist Army was similarly reduced in the 
following days. On the other hand, Heeringen took 
the 15th Corps with him to the Aisne on September 7. 
It is probable that, during the crucial struggle before 
the Grand Couronne, Castlenau was considerably 
outnumbered ; and the French were markedly inferior 
in artillery, even when the heavy fortress guns had 
been brought into the field. 

So long as they stood on the defensive, however, the 
French had the great advantage of a range of positions 
naturally formidable, and improved by some passable 
field-works. General de Curieres de Castlenau, a 
particular star of the old aristocratic-miHtary school, 
was unorthodox in one vital matter. In a study 
written in the spring of I9i4,'*he had concluded that 
the French concentration would be completed as soon 
as, or a little sooner than, the German. Nevertheless, 
he had declared for the strategical defensive ; and, 
foreseeing a decisive battle on the Grand Couronne, 
the heights bordering the Gap of Charmes, and the 
west bank of the Mortagne, he had planned, for when 
the German attack should be worn down, the reaction 
north and south of the Forest of Vitremont which he 
was actually to conduct some months later. In this, 
Castlenau was one of the far-sighted few. The 
defensive idea favoured in the period when the military 
inferiority of France was most acutely felt had sunk 
into disrepute. " The system of offensive strategy, of 
' striking out,' gained adepts, especially among the 
young officers," says M. Hanotaux. " Certainly the 
system of awaiting strategy had not lost all its partisans : 
General de Castlenau represented a strong and reasoned 



202 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

doctrine when he advocated, for the east in particular, 
the offensive-defensive, and the preparation of a stand 
on the Meurthe at the outset, then on the Mortagne." 
He was overborne in favour of the daring and gifted 
Heutenant and teacher who, in igoo, had insisted that 
" movement is the law of strategy," that the shock 
must be sought, not waited for, and that, " in a war 
with Germany, we must go to Berlin by way of 
Mayence." '^ Instead of leading to Mayence and 
Berlin, the French march upon Morhange and Sarre- 
bourg had led back to the Gap of Charmes and the 
Grand Couronne. Tragically justified, Castlenau now 
had his chance. For the first time, the invaders 
found themselves faced by entrenchments, wire- 
fields, gun-pits, and observatories prepared as well as 
the time available had allowed. 

Such a line, extending 60 miles from near Pont-a- 
Mousson to the north-western spurs of the Vosges, 
might well have followed straightly the high western 
banks of the Moselle, Meurthe, and Mortagne, having 
the fortresses of Toul and Epinal close behind. The 
abandonment of the beautiful city of Nancy — a 
garrison town, but in no sense a fortress — ^had usually 
been contemplated in the event of war : that is, 
perhaps, why the Kaiser so ostentatiously prepared 
for his ceremonial entry. Castelnau was resolved 
against this sacrifice. No positions, he thought, could 
be better defended than the crescent of hills called 
the Grand Couronn6, of which the two horns point 
north-east from Nancy and the Meurthe, as though in 
anticipation, the northern horn ending in the twin 
mounts of Amance (410 and 370 metres), and the 
southern in a ridge extending from the Rambetant 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 203 

(330 m.) to the Bois de Crevic (251 m.) ; while the 
space between the tips is covered by the forest-plateau 
of Champenoux. On the north, the Nancy crescent 
is supported by the Moselle Heights, from La Rochette 
(406 m.), above Bouxieres, to Sainte Genevieve (382 m.) ; 
and the river is closed in by sharp and thickly-wooded 
slopes on both banks. On the south, beyond the 
River Sanon, the crescent is extended by the hUls of 
Flainval and Anthelupt, and, within a wide loop of 
the Meurthe, by the great bulk of Vitrimont Forest, 
reaching near to the large town of Lun^ville. Farther 
south, DubaU's divisions stretched along the high 
western bank of the Mortagne, and then, at an obtuse 
angle from Rambervillers, into the passes of the 
Vosges giving upon Raon-l'Etape and St. Die. 

We will follow the attack as it came up from this 
southern region, beginning with what must be regarded 
as a heavy demonstration preparatory and secondary 
to the chief affair, that of the Grand Couronne. After 
the failure to penetrate the Gap of Charmes, Heeringen 
had been charged to break through, or to make a 
feint of breaking through, the French ist Army 
toward Epinal. Reinforced by the 41st and 44th 
Divisions and four divisions of reserves, Dubail was 
well resisting this pressure when, on September 4, he 
was required to give up his 21st Corps. At the same 
time, Heeringen's XIV Corps and other troops, from 
the valley of the Upper Meurthe, made a desperate 
effort to force the two mountain ways by which alone 
large bodies of men could reach the Moselle valley 
from the northern Vosges, namely, the road from 
Raon-l'Etape across the Col de la Chipote to Ramber- 
villers, and thence to Charmes or Epinal by easy 



204 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

routes ; and the road from St. Die, through the 
mountain Forest of the Mortagne, to Bruyeres, and 
thence to Epinal. Sharp fighting, in which the French 
lost heavUy, especially in officers, took place on 
September 4 and 5 at the Chipote — a bare red hump 
barring the pass, surrounded by fir-clad cUffs — on 
the twin hills by Nompatelize, and on the lesser passes 
south of St. Die. The real intention of the German 
Command was probably no more than to pin down 
Dubail's forces ; it could hardly hope to pierce such 
a depth of mountain fastnesses in time to affect the 
general issue. 

On the left of the ist Army, on September 5, the 
German XXI Corps drove Castelnau's i6th and 
Dubail's 8th Corps out of Gerbeviller and Moyen, and 
passed on to the west bank of the Mortagne ; but the 
French recovered most of this ground the same 
evening. On the right, the 14th Corps had to abandon 
the Passe du Renard and several neighbouring hills 
south of Nompatehze ; and the 41st Division was 
driven up the St. Die valley to the crest above Mandray, 
and beyond. On the following day, these positions 
also were won back in a reaction that began to threaten 
the German line of communications in the St. Die 
valley. From this moment, the combats of the Upper 
Meurthe slackened and gradually expired. The battle 
had been definitely deplaced to the north. Heeringen, 
with one of his active corps, was ordered to the Chemin 
des Dames, where he was to stop the threatening pro- 
gress of the British Army — a most significant move ; 
two remaining corps were about to be transferred to 
the Bavarian Command for the struggle before Nancy, 
the last and greatest effort on the east. On the night 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 205 

of September 7, the 8th Corps repassed the poisoned 
waters of the Mortagne at Magnieres and St. Pierre- 
mont ; and everything pointed to a sweeping advance, 
when Dubail was summoned by the General Staff to 
surrender another of his best units, the 13th Corps, 
to re-form his whole line, and to stand still with what 
remained. The danger-point now lay elsewhere. 

Castelnau had hardly filled the spaces left by the 
removal of his 15th and 9th Corps when, in the early 
afternoon of September 4, a cannonade of a violence 
hitherto unknown broke over the positions of the 
2nd Army before Mont Amance, across the eastern 
side of Charnpenoux Forest, by Remereville, Cour- 
bessaux, Drouville, and Maixe, to the east edge of the 
Forest of Vitrimont, The first attack came upon the 
right of this front, waves of Bavarian infantry flooding 
upon the barricaded farms and hamlets and the 
trenched hillsides. Behind Serres and in advance of 
Maixe, the 39th Division was pressed back ; but, as a 
whole, the front of the 20th Corps was little changed ; 
and, on its right, the i6th Corps was not yet disturbed. 
While this hell-fire was being lit, Kluck was racing 
southward across the Marne and a regiment of Cuiras- 
siers, in full array, was marching through the streets 
of Metz, under the eyes of the Emperor, who, after 
visiting the Verdun front, was waiting for the hour 
of his triumphal entry into Nancy. 

At nightfall the conflict waxed more furious. The 
German plan, as it was presently revealed, was to 
burst through the opening of the Grand Couronne, 
and, while maintaining a strong pressure upon the 
southern horn of the crescent, to envelop the northern 
horn by a rapid push from Pont-a-Mousson up the 



2o6 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Moselle valley, this move by fresh troops from Metz 
furnishmg the precious element of surprise.'^ 

Throughout the night of the 4th, the storm raged 
about the rampart of Nancy. Doubtless the German 
Command had chosen the way between the Champenoux 
Forest and the Rambetant as the least difficult for the 
first phase of its last effort ; and, although night 
attacks are manifestly dangerous, the calculation in 
this case that the defenders would suffer most from 
confusion appears to have been justified. Boldly 
adventuring by dark forest paths and misty vales, the 
Bavarian Corps of Martini ejected the fore-posts of 
the 20th Corps from the hills near Luneville, from 
Einville Wood, and the ridges between Serres and 
Drouville. Maixe and Remereville were lost, retaken, 
and lost again. Erb^viller, Courbessaux, lesser ham- 
lets, and farmsteads flamed across the countryside, a 
fantastic spectacle that deepened the terror of the 
remaining inhabitants, who had taken refuge in their 
cellars or the fields. General FayoUe's reservists of 
the 70th Division stood bravely on the east edge of 
Saint Paul Forest and at Courbessaux. On their left 
the 68th lost Champenoux village at dawn, but re- 
captured it a few hours later ; while, behind it, the 
64th busied itself in completing another fine of resist- 
ance from the important point of the Amezule gorge 
(on the highroad from Nancy to Chateau-Salins, 
midway between Laneuvelotte and Champenoux), by 
Velaine and Cerceuil, to the Rambetant. 

At midnight on the 4th, Prince Ruprecht en- 
deavoured to broaden his attack southward by striking 
from Luneville across the loop of the Meurthe. Here, 
the 74th Reserve Division was prepared, having dug 




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NATMCY 

Posiiions on Sept. 6 ,nlgli±. 



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THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 207 

three successive lines of trenches between Blainville 
and Mont. At Rehainviller and Xermamenil, the 
right bank of the Mortagne became untenable by 
reason of enfilade fire. The i6th Corps, therefore, 
withdrew to the west bank. Just before dawn on 
September 5, the XXI Corps succeeded in getting a 
small body of men across the river below Gerbeviller, 
During the afternoon, these were thrown back by a 
combined push of the i6th Corps from the north and 
the Dubail's 8th Corps from the south. This success 
was confirmed and extended on September 6, when 
the i6th Corps passed the Mortagne, and drove the 
enemy out of Gerbeviller, and through the woods 
above the ruined town. Thus the line of the Mortagne, 
so essential to the French defence, was restored, and 
in such solid fashion that it might become the base 
of a thrust against the German flank about Lun^ville. 

None' so happy was the outlook at Castelnau's 
centre. During the morning of September 5, the 
Bavarians worked round the north end of Champenoux 
Forest as far as the foot of Mount Amance, where, after 
making five desperate assaults, they were stopped. 
In the evening, the 20th Corps was driven back to the 
line Vitrimont-Flainval-Crevic-Haraucourt-Buisson- 
court : that is to say, half of the south horn of the 
crescent was overrun. The morrow witnessed a rally, 
the 70th Reserve Division touching Remereville, the 
39th Active carrying the village of Crevic and pro- 
gressing toward Drou villa, and the nth reoccupying 
Vitrimont Forest. But the grey tide still beat upon 
the foot of Amance. 

At this juncture, when it seemed that the plateau of 
Champenoux must be turned on both sides, and Castel- 



208 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

nau's centre pierced, a no less alarming threat appeared 
in the attempt to turn the whole Nancy system by 
the north. Two French reserve divisions had been set 
facing Metz on either side of the Moselle — the 73rd 
on the west, between Pont-a-Mousson and Dieulouard, 
the 59th before the Seille, from Loisy, by the sharp 
rise of Ste. Genevieve, to Meivrons, where it joined 
the 68th. A single battalion (of the 314th Regiment, 
59 D.R.), and a single battery (of the 33rd, 9th Corps) 
were posted on the extremity, at Loisy and Ste. Gene- 
vieve, of this outer buttress of the Grand Couronne, 
when, at noon on September 5, amid a thunder of guns, 
columns of the German XXXIH Reserve Division were 
observed traversing Pont-a-Mousson, and marching 
south. The cannonade and the deployment occupied 
the rest of the day ; and next morning the invasion 
seemed to have passed westward. In fact, it had 
made rapid way, although at material cost, on the left 
bank of the Moselle, passing Dieulouard and reaching 
Marbache, which is only 6 miles north of Nancy, and 
Saizerais, 8 miles from Toul. Few as they numbered, 
the guns and weU-entrenched riflemen on the Ste. 
Genevieve spur, now an acute salient, were a thorn 
in the side of this success — a very troublesome thorn. 
At 7 p.m. a German force of about seven battalions 
debouched from the wooded lowland and began to 
mount the hillside. Hundreds of them had been 
mown down ere Captain Langlade and his eight remain- 
ing gunners would shift their hot pieces to a safer place 
behind. Commandant de Montlebert's battalion con- 
ducted throughout the night a more than Spartan 
defence. Time after time, urged on by fife and drum, 
the grey ranks rose, only to break like spume in the 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 209 

moonlight before the trenches could be reached. It 
was one of the occasions when the deadly power 
of the " 75's " was shown to the full. At one o'clock 
in the morning the combat ceased : the assailants had 
withdrawn in a state of panic. They are said to have 
left 1200 dead behind them. The French battalion 
had lost 80 men. 

A rare episode this : in general, the battle becomes 
more confused as the culmination is reached. In- 
deed, it is difficult to find an exact time or place of the 
climax. Each side saw its own trouble, but could hardly 
guess at the condition of the other. The last reserves of 
the 2nd Army were in play. Castelnau had warned 
the G.Q.G. that he might have to abandon Nancy, in 
order to cover Toul. The reply was an injunction to 
keep touch with Sarrail's right in the direction of St. 
Mihiel, whither — failing Epinal, failing Charmes, 
failing Nancy — the enemy now seemed to be turning. 
On September 7, the German host gathered itself 
together for its last and greatest effort. The Emperor, 
escorted by his guard of Cuirassiers, left Metz by 
the Nancy highroad, crossed the frontier, and took 
his stand on a sunny hill near Moncel (probably by 
St. Jean Farm, at the comer of Morel Wood), to 
watch the bombardment of Mount Amance, which 
was to prepare the way for the breach of the French 
centre by way of the Amezule defile." The gap was 
duly rushed at the first attempt, made by about ten 
battaHons of infantry, in the morning. The left of 
the 68th Division fell back to the foot of Mount 
Amance, the right to Velaine, and the 70th. Division 
to Cerceuil. The 20th Corps, ordered to move north 
and menace the German flank, was pushed aside ; 
14 



210 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

and by noon, the Bavarians had full possession of 
Champenoux Forest. This bulwark gone, everything 
depended upon Amance. Most of the artillery on the 
Grand Couronne (which included twenty 5-inch 
cannon, and eight 6-inch mortars) flashed upon its 
approaches ; and here the momentary triumph ex- 
pired. The authority of the Crown Prince, the pres- 
ence of the Emperor, could effect no more. Old 
Castelnau began to hope ; hearing that the Metz 
troops had further advanced toward Toul as far as 
Rozieres, he unhesitatingly took the 2nd Cavalry 
Division out of the line, and sent it off to the neigh- 
bourhood of St. Mihiel, whither it was to be followed 
next day by the 73rd Reserve Division. 

The struggle dragged on with an increasing appear- 
ance of exhaustion and deadlock. On September 8, 
the Bavarians tried twice to break through the front 
of the 20th Corps, without success. Again they bent 
to the slopes of Mount Amaixe ; the poilus let them 
approach, then staggered out of their holes, and, in a 
spasm of battle-madness, swept them back. La 
Bouzule Farm, dominating the narrowest part of the 
Amezule defile, and other strong points, changed hands 
repeatedly. On the right, in face of Luneville, the 
74th Reserve Division carried Rehainviller by assault, 
and the 32nd and 31st Divisions pressed from Gerbe- 
viller nearly to the Meurthe — a severe pin-prick in 
the German left flank. On September 9 there were 
obscure fragmentary combats in the glades of Cham- 
penoux and St. Paul which we cannot attempt to 
follow. It will be safe to suppose that the German 
Command was now governed by the news from the 
west. Whether the Nancy front could have held 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 211 

without that aid, it is impossible to say. Though 
Castehiau ordered a counter-offensive all along the line, 
his men could respond only feebly. 

In the evening an armistice of four hours was arranged 
for the collection of wounded and the burial of dead. 
The French claimed to have found 40,000 German 
dead on the ground ; the total losses will probably 
never be known. The Kaiser had left his observatory ; 
the rebel heart of Metz leaped to see his disillusioned 
return. The defenders of Nancy could not know 
this ; but there was a visible sign of failure, now easy 
to interpret : at midnight on September 8, amid a 
heavy thunderstorm, a German battery, told off for 
the purpose, threw eighty shells into Nancy — 67 
explosive shells and 14 shrapnel, to be precise, accord- 
ing to the diary of the of&cer responsible '^ — a silly 
outrage like the first bombardments of Rheims. 

The " smashing blow " was failing at the same 
moment on the Ourcq, on the Marne, at Fere Champe- 
noise, and here before the hill-bastion of the eastern 
marches. News ran slowly through the armies in 
those days ; but some invigorating breeze of victory 
must soon have reached the trenches in Lorraine. 
For Prince Ruprecht it remained only to guard his 
main Hues of retreat, in particular the roads from 
Nancy, Dombasle, and Luneville to the frontier ; and, 
as his troops had dug themselves well in, this was 
not difficult. Three French columns of assault, com- 
posed of relatively fresh troops, and supported by the 
64th and 68th Reserve Divisions, after a powerful 
artillery preparation, advanced on the morning of 
September 10 against the Amezule and neighbouring 
positions ; but they could not make much headway. 



212 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

On the morrow the order was repeated, to better effect, 
especially on the wings. That night the German 
retreat in Lorraine began. Castelnau's men gazed 
incredulous into spaces suddenly calm and empty. 
" Our soldiers," says one of them, "hungry, harassed, 
haggard, could hardly stand upright. They marched 
like spectres. .Visibly, we were at our last breath. 
We could hold out only a few hours more. And then, 
prodigy, calm fell, on the 12th, upon the whole of 
the stricken field. The enemy gave up, retreated for 
good, abandoned everything, Champenoux, so franti- 
cally contested, and the entire front he had occupied. 
He fell back in dense columns, without even a pretence 
of further resistance." The grand adventure was 
finished. 

Pont-a-Mousson, Nomeny, RemereviUe, Luneville, 
Baccarat, Raon-l'Etape, and St. Di6 were evacuated 
in rapid succession. Before the war fell into the 
entrenched lines which were to hold with little change 
for four years, most of Lorraine up to the old frontier 
and a long slice of Alsace had been recovered. But 
with what wounds may be read, for instance, in the 
report of the French Commission of Inquiry into the 
devastation wrought by the enemy in the department 
of Meurthe and Moselle. As though the destruction of 
farmsteads and villages in course of the fighting were 
not sufficient, the Bavarian infantry had been guilty 
at many places of almost incredible acts of ferocity. 
At Nomeny, the 2nd and 3rd Bavarian regiments, 
after sacking the village, set it on fire, and then, as 
the villagers fled from their cellars, shot them down — 
old men, women, and children — ^50 being killed and 
many more wounded. At Luneville, during the three 



THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 213 

weeks' occupation, the Hotel de Ville, the Synagogue, 
and about seventy houses were burned down with 
torches, petrol, and other incendiary apparatus ; and 
17 men and women were shot in cold blood in 
the streets. Under dire threats, signed shamelessly by 
General Von Fosbender, a " contribution " of 650,000 
francs was paid by the inhabitants. On August 24, 
practically the whole of the small town of Gerb6viller 
was destroyed by fire (more than 400 houses), 
and at least 36 civilians, men and women, were 
slaughtered. At Baccarat, 112 houses were burned 
down, after the whole place had been pillaged under 
the supervision of General Fabricius, commanding the 
artillery of the XIV Baden Corps, and other officers. 
This feature of the campaign cannot be ignored in our 
chronicle. Good men had supposed war itself to be 
the uttermost barbarism ; it was left to the disciplined 
armies of the HohenzoUern Empire to prove that 
educated hands may lower it to depths of wickedness 
unimagined by the Apache and the Bashi-Bazouk. 

On September 18, General Curieres de Castlenau was 
made Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour on the 
ground that, " since the beginning of the war, his army 
has fought without cessation, and he has obtained 
from his troops sustained efforts and important results. 
General Castlenau has had, since the beginning of 
the campaign, two sons killed and a third wounded ; 
nevertheless, he continued to exercise his command 
with energy." 



CHAPTER XI 
SUMMING-UP 

THE battle of the Marne closed a definite phase 
of the Great War, and perhaps — in so far as it 
was marked by open and rapid movement, and 
as it finally exposed certain gross military errors — a 
phase of warfare in general. A fresh examination of 
the plans of the preceding years and the events of the 
preceding month immensely enhances the interest of 
the whole development ; for it shows the real " miracle 
of the Marne " to have been an uprush of intelligence 
and patriotic will in which grave faults of strategy and 
tactics were corrected, and the victory to be the 
logical reward of a true conception, executed with un- 
failing skill through a new instrument created while the 
conditions of the struggle were being equalised. In 
whatever sense we may speak of a " greatest " battle 
of history, this was assuredly, of all clashes of force, 
that in which reason was most conspicuously vindicated. 
Insanely presumptuous as was her ambition of re- 
ducing France, Russia, and Britain, Germany had 
at the outset some remarkable advantages. Chief 
among these must be counted the power of surprise, due 
to her long secret preparation, and a complete unity of 
command in face of dispersed Allies. The German 
forces concentrated on the west were not numerically 
superior to those of France, Britain, and Belgium ; 



SUMMING-UP 215 

their effective superiority was considerable. Half of the 
active corps, which alone the French expected as troops 
of shock, were doubled with thoroughly trained reserve 
formations, giving a mass of attack of 34 corps, instead 
of 22, a difference larger than the two armies of the 
enveloping movement. Their strength was also in- 
creased by a clear superiority in several branches of 
armament and field service (the French field-gun and 
the use by the Allies of the French railways being 
notable exceptions), and in some particulars of tactical 
practice, especially the prudent use of field defences. 
The basic idea being to strike France down before 
Russia and Britain could effectually interfere, speed 
was a principal condition of success ; and the plan of 
the Western campaign was probably the only one on 
which it could be realised. One-third of the whole 
force was to hold the old Franco-German frontier in 
a provisional defence, while one-third attacked through 
Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes, and the re- 
mainder was thrown across the Meuse and the open 
plain of Flanders, toward the French capital. This 
unprecedented enlargement of the offensive front, the 
outstanding feature of the plan, secured the most rapid 
deployment of the maximum forces ; it alone could 
yield the great element of surprise ; it alone provided 
the opportunity of envelopment dear to the German 
military mind. Its boldness, aided by terrorism in the 
invaded regions, astounded the world, and so seemed to 
favour the scheme of conquest. It might ultimately 
provoke a full development of British power ; even in 
case of failure, it would cripple France and Belgium 
for many years. Its immediate weakness arose from 
the wide extension of forces not larger, except at 



2i6 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

certain points, allowing no general reserve and no 
large reinforcement, and from the necessity of great 
speed. The plan ignored many possibilities, from the 
Alps to Lille ; once in motion, however, it could not be 
considerably or rapidly changed. Berlin, confident 
in the superiority of the war-machine to which it had 
devoted its best resources and thought, believed there 
would be no delay and no need of change. 

France had been inevitably handicapped by the need 
of renouncing any initiative that could throw doubt 
upon her moral position, by the independence of her 
British and Belgian AlUes, and by uncertainty as to 
Italy. This last doubt was, however, quickly removed ; 
the Belgian Army delayed the invasion by a full week ; 
and our " Old Contemptibles " gave most precious aid. 
A united Command at that time might have done little 
more than strengthen the instrument and confirm the 
doctrine whose imperfections we have traced. The 
instrument was inferior not only in effective strength, 
not only in some vital elements of arms and organisation, 
but in the system and spirit of its direction. The 
doctrine of the offensive, general, continuous, and 
unrestrained, had become an established orthodoxy 
during the previous decade, when the Russian alliance 
and the British Entente were fixed, when service was 
extended to three years, the 75 mm. gun was perfected, 
and a new method of railway mobilisation promised 
that the armies would be brought into action at least as 
rapidly as those of the enemy. Before a shot was fired, 
it had prejudiced the military information services — 
whence the scepticism of the Staff as to a large German 
movement west of the Meuse, and as to the German use 
of army corps of reserve in the first line ; whence the 



SUMMING-UP 217 

ignorance of the German use of aeroplanes and 
wired entrenchment. No answer was prepared to 
the German heavy artillery. While unable to create 
the means to a successful general offensive, the French 
Command had discounted, if not positively discredited, 
modern methods of defence and delaying manoeuvre, 
methods peculiarly indicated in this case, since France 
had the same reasons for postponing a decision as 
Germany had for hastening it. The only hope of the 
Allies at the outset lay in a combination of defence and 
manoeuvre : there was no adequate defence, and no 
considerable manoeuvre, but only a general headlong 
attack on a continuous line. Of the consequences of 
this lamentable beginning, an accomplished and sober 
French officer says : " It is just to speak of the Battle 
of the Frontiers as calamitous, for this battle not only 
doomed to total or partial ruin nine of our richest 
departments : insufficiently repaired by the fine 
recovery on the Marne, it weighed heavily upon the 
whole course of the war. It paralysed our strategy. 
From September 1914, our High Command was neces- 
sarily absorbed in the task, first, of Umiting, then of 
reducing, the enormous pocket cut in our territory. 
Ever obsessed by the fear of abandoning to devastation 
a new band of country, we were condemned for nearly 
four years to a hideous trench warfare for which we 
were infinitely less prepared and less apt than the in- 
vader, and that we were able to sustain only by force 
of heroism." '^ Any one of the errors that have been 
indicated would have been grave ; in combination, 
they are accountable for the heavy losses of the three 
abortive inroads into Alsace, Lorraine, and the Ardennes, 
and for the dispositions which necessitated the long 



21 8 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

retreat from the north. That the German armies 
suffered in these operations is, of course, to be remem- 
bered ; but for France it was more urgent to economise 
her strength. In strategy infatuated, in tactics reckless, 
in preparation unequal to the accomplishment of its 
own designs, the then French Command must be held 
responsible in large measure for the collapse of the 
national forces in the first actions of the campaign. 

Joffre, who had been named Generalissimo de- 
signate three years before, almost by accident, who 
was an organiser rather than a strategist, had inherited, 
with the imperfect instrument, the imprudent doctrine 
and plan. There was not the time, and he was hardly 
the man, to attempt radically to change them ; nor 
has he yet recognised in words that there was any 
large strategical error to correct. But the facts 
speak clearly enough : from the evening of August 23, 
when the general retreat from the north was ordered, 
we enter upon a profoundly changed situation, in 
which the native shrewdness and solid character of 
the French Commander-in-Chief are the dominant 
factor. The defence that should have been prepared 
could not be extemporised. The armies must be 
disengaged and re-formed. A large sacrifice of terri- 
tory was therefore unavoidable. To delay the 
critical encounter till the balance of forces should 
be rectified was the first requirement. On August 24, 
Headquarters issued a series of tactical admonitions, 
prelude to a clean sweep of no less than thirty-three 
generals and many subordinate officers. Next day 
followed the " General Instruction " in which will be 
found the germ of the ultimate victory. The rule 
of blind, universal, unceasing offensive disappeared, 



SUMMING-UP 219 

without honour or ceremony ; arose that of 
manoeuvre, informed, elastic, resourceful, prudent but 
energetic. 

At once there was precipitated a conception which 
governed not only the battle of the Marne, but the 
whole after-development of the war. There must be 
no more rash adventures on the east ; from Belfort 
to Verdun, the front would be held defensively, with 
a minimum of strength, to fulfil the purpose for 
which its fortifications were built, and to protect the 
main forces, which would operate henceforth in the 
centre and west. The importance of the north-west 
coast, and the fact that Kluck was not approaching 
it, plainly suggested the creation of a new mass of 
manoeuvre on this side to menace the German flank : 
this new body was Maunoury's 6th Army. These two 
features of the Allied riposte — defence on the east, 
offence from the west — ^were to be permanent. The 
French centre must be strengthened to bear the im- 
pact of Billow, the Saxons, and the Duke of Wiirtem- 
berg. Foch's Army, created to this end, to come in 
between those of d'Esperey (Lanrezac's successor) and 
de Langle, had the further effect of preserving the full 
offensive strength of the 5th Army. For these purposes, 
large numbers of men had to be transferred from the 
east to the west and centre. Joffre at first hoped to 
stand on the Somme, and then on the Oise. But the 
new forces were not ready ; the defence of the east 
was not secured ; the British Army was momentarily 
out of action ; Kluck threatened the Allied com- 
munications ; the line was a hazardous zigzag. The 
Generalissimo would not again err on the side of 
premature attack. 



220 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

The pursuit was not an unbroken course of victory 
for the invaders. Before the Gap of Charmes, on 
August 24-26, Castlenau and Dubail administered the 
first great German set-back of the war. At the same 
time, the Prince Imperial received a severe check at 
Etain ; and, ahhough Smith-Dorrien's stand at Le 
Cateau on August 26 disabled the British Force for 
some days, it did much to save the Allied left wing. 
On August 28, the German IV Army was sharply 
arrested at Novion Porcien ; and next day took 
place the combats of Proyart and Dun-sur-Meuse, 
and the battle of Guise. In these and many lesser 
actions, the spirit of the armies was prepared for the 
hour when the issue should be fairly joined. 

The Fabian strategy was soon and progressively 
justified. Weaknesses inherent in the German plan 
began to appear. Every day of their unsuccessful 
chase aggravated the problem of suppl3dng the armies, 
removed them from their heavy artillery, stretched 
and thinned their infantry lines, weakened their 
liaison, bred weariness and doubt (which were too 
often drowned in drink), while the French, on the 
contrary, were shortening their communications, 
and generally pulling themselves together. "It is 
the old phenomenon of the wearing down of forces in 
case of an offensive which we here encounter anew," 
says Freytag-Loringhoven. Two or three corps had 
to be left behind to mask Antwerp and to besiege 
Maubeuge ; the Grand Staff could not altogether 
resist the Russian scare. There was increasing dis- 
location : in particular, Kluck had got dangerously 
out of touch with Biilow. And there was some- 
thing worse than " wearing down " and dislocation. 



SUMMING-UP 221 

" Perhaps our programme would not have collapsed," 
the historian Meinecke imagines,^" " if we had carried 
through our original strategical idea with perfect 
strictness, keeping our main forces firmly together, 
and, for the time, abandoning East Prussia." This 
cannot be admitted. So far from being pursued more 
strictly, the original German idea soon could not be 
pursued at all. Its boldest feature had become 
inapplicable to circumstances more and more subject 
to another will. On September i, when the Somme 
had been passed, and while Joffre was ordering the 
extension of the retreat to the Seine and the Aube, 
Moltke was engaged in changing radically the direction 
of the marching wing of the invasion, Kluck's I 
Army, Failing successively on the Sambre, the 
Somme, the Oise, and finally stultified by the superior 
courage that staked the capital itself upon the chance 
of a victorious recoil farther south, the greatest of all 
essays in envelopment ended in a recognised fiasco. 

With the appearance on the southern horizon of 
the fortress of Verdun and the city of Paris, and the 
entry of the Allied armies between them as into a 
corridor, the whole problem, in fact, was transformed. 
The German Command suddenly found itself in face 
of a fatal dilemma. As Paris obstructed the way of 
Kluck, so Verdun challenged the Prussian Crown 
Prince. To enter the corridor without first reducing 
these two unknown quantities would be to risk serious 
trouble on both flanks ; to stay to reduce them would 
involve delay, or dispersal of force, either of which 
would be disastrous. The course of argument by 
which the Grand Staff decided this deadly question 
has not been revealed They chose the first alternative. 



22 2 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Kluck was ordered to pass south-eastward of the one 
" entrenched camp," the Imperial Crown Prince 
south-westward of the other, both, and the three 
armies between them, to overtake the AUies and 
force them to a frontal encounter, while a fresh effort 
was made to break through the eastern defences. A 
heavy price must be paid for such large re-establish- 
ments and changes of plan in face of an alert enemy. 
Kluck has been too much blamed for what followed. 
He may have been guilty of recklessness, over-reach- 
ing ambition, and specific disobedience. But here, 
as in the Battle of the Frontiers, it is the authors, not 
the executants, of the offensive operation who must 
be held chiefly responsible for consequences that are 
in the logic of the case. 

Joffre's hour had come. He had laboured to win 
three elements of an equal struggle lacking in the 
north : {a) a more favourable balance of numbers 
and armament — ^this was gained by the " wearing 
down " of the enemy, and the reinforcement of the 
Allied line, in course of the retreat, so that the battle 
of the Marne commenced with something more than an 
equality, and ended with a distinct AlHed superiority 
in the area of decision ; (&) a favourable terrain — 
this was reached on the classic ground between the 
capital and the middle Meuse, under cover of the 
eastern armies, and subject to the dilemma of Paris- 
Verdun ; (c) a sound strategic initiative. For this, 
the 6th Army had been prepared, and the 5th kept at 
full strength. The failure of the enveloping move- 
ment and the change of the German plan provided 
the opportunity. To reduce the distended front of 
the invasion, at one time no less than 140 miles 



SUMMING-UP 223 

(Amiens to Dun-sur-Meuse), to one of 100 miles 
(Crecy-en-Brie to Revigny), Kluck had boldly crossed 
the face of the 6th Army, and on the evening of 
September 5 presented a moving flank of more than 
40 miles long to Maunoury, French, and d'Esperey's 
left. Joffre seems to have hesitated for a moment as 
to whether it were best to continue the retreat, as 
arranged, to the Seine, and then to have given way 
to Galheni's importunity. " We cannot count on 
better conditions for our offensive," he told the 
Government. 

The order of battle was issued on the evening of 
September 4. " Advantage must be taken of the 
adventurous situation of the I German Army (right 
wing)," it started : this was to be the factor of surprise. 
Positions would be taken on the 5th in order that the 
general movement might begin at dawn on the follow- 
ing day. The 6th Army and the British were to strike 
east on either side of the Marne, toward Chateau- 
Thierry and Montmirail respectively, while the 5th 
Army attacked due northward : thus, it was hoped, 
Kluck would be taken in flank and front, and crushed 
by superior force. The central armies (gth and 4th) 
would move north against Biilow, the Saxons, and the 
Duke of Wiirtemberg ; and Sarrail would break west- 
ward from Verdun against the exposed flank of the 
Crown Prince. The function of Foch's, the smallest 
of the French armies concerned, and of de Tangle's, 
the next smallest, must be regarded as primarily 
defensive, the chief offensive role being entrusted to 
d'Esperey's, by far the strongest, and Maunoury's, 
with the small British force Unking them. Sarrail 
had not the means to exploit his advantage of position. 



2 24 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

The essence of the plan lay in the rectangular attack 
of the left. 

The design was perfect : Kluck's columns, stretched 
out from the Ourcq to near Estemay, should have been 
smashed in, the western part of the German communi- 
cations overwhelmed, the other armies put to flight. 
These results were not obtained ; the whole battle 
was, indeed, compromised, before it was well begun, 
by the unreadiness of the Allied left and the precipi- 
tancy of General Gallieni. When Lamaze's reservists 
stumbled upon Schwerin's outposts north of Meaux, 
at midday on September 5 — eighteen hours before the 
offensive was timed to open — Maunoury had only three 
divisions in line, and on the following day he had only 
two more. Kluck had instantly taken alarm ; his 
II Corps was actually on its way back to the Ourcq 
while the main body of the Allied armies was com- 
mencing their grand operation. The benefit of surprise 
was thus sacrificed ; and Kluck v/as able to move one 
after another of his corps to meet Maunoury 's re- 
inforcements as they arrived upon the field. Certain 
French partizans of the then Governor of Paris have 
attempted to shift the responsibility for this mis- 
carriage to the shoulders of the British Commander- 
in-Chief, The Expeditionary Force deserves more 
scrupulous justice. It had retired and was re-forming 
behind the Forest of Crecy, at the request of General 
Joffre, when the order of September 4 arrived. The 
positions therein named to be reached on the following 
day (Changis-Coulommiers) were unattainable, being 
too far away, and solidly held by the enemy. The 
instructions for Marshal French were to attack east- 
ward toward Montmirail on the 6th ; neither to him 



SUMMING-UP 225 

nor to the French Staff was it known till the afternoon 
of that day that Kluck was withdrawing across the 
Marne. No need appeared of helping Maunoury until 
September 7. By that time the Field-Marshal had 
again changed his direction at Joffre's request, 
facing north beside d'Esperey, instead of east beside 
Maunoury ; and, from the moment when Kluck's 
withdrawal was discovered, rapid progress was made. 

The German Staff now seems to have completely 
lost control of its two chief Commanders. The fatal 
fault is plainly exhibited in Billow's " Bericht zur 
Marneschlacht " — significantly, withheld from pub- 
lication for five years. Though weakened by a 
premature start, unreadiness, and imperfect co- 
ordination, the French attack on the Ourcq necessarily 
produced not merely a local shock, but a dis- 
turbance reverberating eastward by what has been 
called its " effect of suction." To double this with 
the strain of Billow's continued offensive — disastrously 
successful in the surprise of Fere Champenoise — was 
the most reckless gambling. With the I Army 
pulUng north-west, the II Army puUing south-east, 
and 60 miles between the points where they were 
seeking a decision, how could anything more than a 
pretence of liaison be kept up ? But it was precisely 
before this interval that Joffre had aligned a full third 
of the strength of the French crescent — the 20 divisions 
of the French 5th and British armies. In the separa- 
tion of the two masses of the German right, and the 
entry between them of this powerful body, lies the 
governing cause of the victory. 

All the rest is a prodigy of endurance. The battle 
of the Ourcq was no sooner joined than it resolved 
IS 



2 26 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

itself into a race of reinforcements, and a stubborn, 
swaying combat over a few miles of open farmland, 
with little of manoeuvre, save reciprocal attempts at 
envelopment by the north. The story of the battle 
of the Marshes of St. Gond is the epic of Foch's ob- 
stinacy, of Humbert's defence of the pivot on the 
Sezanne plateau, the loss of the swampy barrier and 
Mont Aout, the agonising breakdown about Fere Cham- 
penoise on September 8, and the devices of the 
following day to close the breach. Between these 
points of strangulation, the real offensive arm of the 
Allies progressed with comparative ease. On the 
night of September 8, when d'Esperey's 3rd Corps 
entered Montmirail, it was exactly midway between 
them. On the morning of the 9th, when the British 
1st and 2nd Corps passed the Mame, Kluck and Biilow 
were more definitely divided. At noon, Smith-Dorrien 
and Haig were on the Lizy-Chateau-Thierry road ; 
and in the evening d'Esperey's i8th Corps held 
Chateau-Thierry. No last - moment success of the 
enemy on the Ourcq or in Champagne could have 
greatly affected the course of this development. The 
necessity of a retreat of the three Western armies 
was probably accepted by the German Grand Staff 
in the morning of September 9 ; but it may be that 
a considerable success by either or both of the Crown 
Princes on that day would have modified the decision 
as regards the rest of the front. At 11 a.m. Betz 
was evacuated ; and during the afternoon great 
convoys were seen hurrying from the Ourcq to the 
Aisne. Billow's orders, inspired by fear of flank 
attack by d'Esperey's loth and ist Corps, rather than 
by the 42nd Division, seem to have been given about 



SUMMING-UP 227 

3 p.m. F^re Champ^noise was abandoned in the 
evening, and Foch's anxiously prepared manoeuvre 
could not be carried out. The 6th and 9th Armies 
were too much exhausted to attempt a serious pursuit 
till next morning ; and the German right reached the 
Aisne without inordinate losses. 

Every part of the French line had contributed to 
this result, for every other army had been cut or kept 
down to serve the major opportunity. And, if it 
stood relatively immobile, no less heroism and resource 
were shown on the eastern than on the western wing of 
the Allied crescent. Sarrail and de Langle were 
able to keep a rectangular disposition like that of 
Maunoury and the B.E.F., forcing the Crown Prince 
to fight on a double front ; but they had not even a 
numerical equahty of force with which to exploit it. 
The 4th Army, in holding foot by foot the Ornain- 
Saulx valley from Vitry to Sermaize, and the 3rd 
in its defence of the long salient of the Meuse, were 
also weighed upon by this peculiar anxiety : a com- 
paratively small force might pierce their frail river 
guard, or the wall of the Lorraine armies might 
collapse beside them. They were helped to success 
by three errors of omission on the part of the German 
armies concerned : (i) Verdun was not directly 
attacked, the Crown Prince being confident that it 
would fall automatically while his cavalry were 
reaching Dijon ; (2) the attempt to force the Meuse 
at Troyon was feeble and tardy ; (3) the thinly- 
covered gap on Tangle's left was not discovered until 
the 2ist Corps had been brought up. All along the 
line, the fighting was of a sustained violence. The 
15th Corps arrived from^Torraine on September 8 just 



22 8 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

in time to save the junction of the 3rd and 4th Armies. 
It was, however, not till noon on the nth that the 
Duke of Wiirtemberg abandoned Vitry ; and only on 
the night of the 12th did the Prince Imperial order a 
retreat which definitely relieved Verdun, and reopened 
the Chalons road and railway. 

In resting his plan upon a defence of the eastern 
pivot of the retreat and the recoil, Joffre was accepting 
an accomplished fact. The great attack upon the 
Couronne of Nancy began on the evening of September 
4, thirty-six hours before the Allied offensive. It 
may be supposed, therefore, that the German Staff had 
decided to get the Bavarian Army into a position in 
which it could co-operate effectively with the Imperial 
Crown Prince when he came up level on the west. 
Heeringen's push from the St. Die region toward Epinal, 
and the attack on the Mortagne, were probably intended 
to hide this design, and to pin down Dubail's forces. 
The promptitude with which Pleeringen was sent off 
to the Aisne, on the night of September 6, that is, as 
soon as the danger of Kluck's position was realised, is 
significant. In itself, the presence of the Kaiser 
during the Bavarian attack on the Grand Couronne 
proves nothing. His ceremonial entry into Nancy 
would have grievously hurt French pride ; but the 
sacrifice of the city had always been contemplated, 
Toul being the real redoubt of the Moselle defences. 
The prize was to be larger ; the prestige of three 
royal personages was to be satisfied. The Crown 
Princes of Prussia and Bavaria, ingeniously linked, 
had been so directed that in the crisis they had the 
whole Verdun-Toul system between them, and appa- 
rently at their mercy. The assault of the Amezule 



SUMMING-UP 229 

defile and Mount Amance was reciprocal to the 
adventure which Sarrail arrested 50 miles farther west. 
For five days and nights the battle raged about the 
entrenched crescent of the Nancy hills, with fiery wings 
outspread to Gerbeviller on the south-east, and 
Rozieres on the north-west . No more dreadful struggle 
can be recorded. The German effort ceased on the 
night of September 9 ; and on the nth the general 
^vithdrawal to the old frontier began. Like Foch, 
Langle, and Sarrail, Castlenau had won through by the 
narrowest of margins ; but his, pre-eminently, was a 
victory of foresight and preparation. With all their 
power of heavy artillery (and here the resources of 
Metz and Strasbourg were at hand), it is remarkable 
that the German Staff never attempted to repeat in 
Lorraine the coup of Liege. As the French respected 
Metz, they respected Verdun ; and the manoeuvre of 
the double approach to Toul, from east and west, 
proves their fears. These were, as we now know, well 
justified. " It is certain," says Freytag-Loringhoven, 
" that the old-fashioned fortresses are worthless, and, 
moreover, that the earlier notion, handed down from 
the Middle Ages, that positions have to be secured by 
means of fortresses, must be discarded. . . . But it will 
not be possible to dispense with certain previously 
prepared fortified points at places where only defen- 
sive tactics can be employed. The fortifications of the 
French eastern frontier, above all Verdun and the 
Moselle defences, have demonstrated how valuable 
these may be. . . . It is a question of constructing not 
a continuous system of fortifications, but a succession 
of central points of defence, and this not in the shape 
of fortified towns, but of entrenchment of important 



2 30 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

areas " (pp. 64-6). And again : " The intention was 
to effect an envelopment from two sides. The en- 
velopment by the left wing was, however, brought to a 
standstill before the fortifications of the French eastern 
frontier, which, in view of the prompt successes in 
Belgium, it had been hoped to overcome. . . . The 
defensive tactics of the chiefs of the French Army 
were rendered very much easier by the support these 
fortifications gave to their wing, as well as by the possi- 
bility of effecting rapid transfers of troops afforded by a 
very convenient network of railways, and a very large 
number of motor-wagons upon good roads (pp. 79- 
80) . . . The war has proved that the assertion often 
made in time of peace, that the spade digs the grave of 
the offensive, is not correct " (p. 97). 

One day, toward the end of the battle, I came upon 
a ring of peasants digging a pit for the carcasses of two 
horses that lay near by. They had already buried 
fourteen others, but seemed happy at their gruesome 
task — just such sententious fellows as the master took 
for his models in a famous scene. One of them guided 
me uphill to a small chalk-pit, at the bottom of which a 
mound of fresh earth, surmounted by a couple of sticks 
tied crosswise with string, marked the grave of two 
English lads unnamed. A thicket shaded the hollow ; 
but all around the sunshine played over rolling stubble- 
fields. Ere the grave-diggers had finished, a threshing- 
machine was working at the farm across the highway. 
Some men were ploughing the upper ridge of the battle- 
field ; and, as I left, a procession of high-prowed carts, 
full of women and children sitting atop their household 
goods, brought back home a first party of refugees. 



SUMMING-UP 231 

The harvest of death seemed already to give way to the 
harvest of life. 

First of many still-born hopes. The Christmas that 
was to be the festival of peace passed, and another, and 
another. Interminably, the war prolonged itself 
through new scenes, more ingenious forms of slaughter, 
new abysms of pain, till the armies had fallen into 
a temper of iron endurance. But, even in such 
extremities, the heart will seek its food. Month after 
month, by day and night, coming from beleaguered 
Verdun or the gateways of Alsace to reach the Oise 
and Flanders, I passed down the long sparkling valleys 
of the Marne ; every turn grew familiar, and their green 
folds whispered of the gain in loss and the quiet within 
the storm. Like all religion, patriotism, for the many, 
speaks in symbols ; what symbol more eloquent than 
the strong stream, endlessly renewed to cleanse, to 
nourish, and to heal ? Through those stony years, 
most of the convoys crossed the Marne at some point — 
lumbering carts, succeeded by wagons white with a 
slime of dust and petrol ; fussy Staff cars and hurried 
ambulances ; gun-trains, their helmet ed riders swaying 
spectrally in the misty air of dawn ; columns of heavy- 
packed infantry, dreaming of their loves left in 
trembling cities far behind. In turn, all the armies of 
France, and some of those of Britain, America, and 
Italy, came this way ; and into their minds, un- 
consciously, must have fallen something of the spirit of 
the Marne, and of those frightened apprentices of the 
war who first saved France, and dammed an infamous 
aggression. 

So much the poilus knew ; that comfort supported 
them. Most of the high company of Joffre's captains 



232 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

were still with them, winning fresh laurels — Foch, 
Petain, and Haig, Castlenau, Humbert, Langle, Sarrail, 
Franchet d'Esperey, Mangin, Guillaumat, Pulteney, 
Nivelle, Maud'huy, Micheler, and many another. 
Soon the world at large understood that this strange 
overturn of fortune was the base of all subsequent 
victories in the same good cause. More than this — 
that a man had conceived, designed, organised, and 
controlled it, and so earned enduring fame — might be 
vaguely felt, but could not be certainly known until 
the passage of time allowed it to be said that, as surely 
as there were warts on Cromwell's nose, there were 
shadows to the lights of the record of victory. At 
length, a true picture is possible ; and instead of a play 
of blind forces, or a senseless " miracle," we see a 
supremely dramatic revolt of outraged reason, nobly 
led, and justly triumphing. 

The German conspiracy failed on the Marne not by 
any partial fault or executive error, but by the logic of 
its most essential characteristics. It was a master- 
piece of diabolical preparation : it failed, when the 
quickly-awakened French mind grappled with it, from 
dependence upon a rigid mechanism, and the inability 
of its authors to adjust it to unexpected circumstances. 
It was a wager on speed — for the enveloping movement 
bore in it the germs of the ultimate disturbance ; that 
is to say, it presumed the stupidity or pusillanimity 
of the Republican Command, and this presumption 
proved fatal. These faults were aggravated by disunion 
among the army leaders and disillusion among the men, 
while the Allies were inspired to an almost perfect co- 
operation. Already delayed and weakened in Belgium, 
the invading armies saw their surplus strength evapor- 



SUMMING-UP 233 

ating in the long pursuit, their dislocated line caught 
in a sudden recoil, and to be saved from being rent 
asunder only by closing the adventure. In the 
disastrous moment when Kluck and Biilow turned in 
opposite directions, the proudest war school in the 
world was beaten, and humiliated, by a stout burgess of 
Rivesaltes, Long before the war itself became hate- 
ful, this thought worked bitterly. Criminals do not 
make the best soldiers. Moltke was cashiered, with 
him Kluck and Hansen, and we know not how many 
more. It was the twilight of the heathen gods. 

In the long run, mankind cherishes the reasonable, 
in faith or action ; and, of the barbarous trial of war, 
this is all that remains in the memory of future ages. 
The Marne was a signal triumph for Right, won, not 
by weight of force or by accident, but by superior 
intelligence and will. That is its essential title to our 
attention, and its most pregnant meaning for posterity. 
So immense a trial was it, and a triumph so vitally 
necessary to civilisation, that all the heroic episodes 
of our Western history pale before it, to serve hence- 
forth for little, faint, but comprehensible analogies ; 
in the French mind even the epopee of the great 
Emperor is at last eclipsed. The combatants them- 
selves could not see it thus. Afterwards, the war and 
those doomed to continue it became sophisticated — 
governments and the press told them what to expect, 
and followed them with praise and some care. In this 
first phase, there is a strange naivete ; it is nearly all 
headlong extemporisation ; masses of men constantly 
plunged from one into another term of the unknown. 
The " front " was never fixed ; there were few of the 
features of combat later most characteristic — ^no 



2 34 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

trenches or dugouts, no bombs or helmets, no poison- 
gas, no mines, no Stokes guns, no swarm of buzzing 
'planes across the sky, no field railways, few hot meals, 
and fewer ambulance cars. The armies did not come 
up to their tasks through zones devastated by the 
enemy, and then reorganised by engineers into so 
many monstrous war-factories. The forests they 
crossed were undisturbed, the orchards blossoming, 
the towns intact. They knew nothing of " camou- 
flage " : on the contrary, they saw and sought the 
individual foe, and by him were seen individually. 
Very often, and quickly, they came to bodily grips ; 
commonly, the conflict ceased, or slackened, at sunset. 
What would afterward have seemed a moderate 
bombardment terrorised them, for it was worse than 
anything they had heard of. 

In sum, with less of horror and less of protection, 
they felt as much as, and more freshly than, those 
who followed. War had not yet become habitual — 
there was neither the half-sceptical stoicism nor the 
profound comradeship of later days. Only a month 
had passed since this first million lads had left home. 
Every hour had brought some new shock. Resent- 
ment was fresh and fierce in them. No romantic 
illusion fed it ; but deep offence called to the depths 
of dignity of an aged nation for answer, and the answer 
came. There stood the Boche, arrogant and formid- 
able, polluting the soil of Brie and Champagne, the 
heart of France — what argument could there be ? 
They did not think of one spot as more sacred than 
another, as, afterwards, thousands fell to hold Ypres 
and Arras, Soissons, Rheims, and Verdun. Like the 
process, the inspiration was simpler. The fields of 



SUMMING-UP 235 

the Marne were France, the land that had nurtured 
them, its freedom and grace of hfe and thought, the 
long Latin heritage, the virtues that a new Barbarism 
had dared to dispute and outrage. For this great all, 
they gave straightway their little all. 

Rivers of blood, the old, rich Gallic blood that 
mingled Roman experience and Mediterranean fire 
with the peasant vigour of the North, tempered 
through centuries of labour and exaltation. The best 
must needs suffer most ; and France, historic guardian 
of ancient treasuries, standard-bearer of European 
civilisation, must suffer in chief for the weaknesses 
of the Western world. To those who knew her, 
there was ever something of worship in their love, 
as in our regard for the fullest type of womanhood. 
The earth thrilled with anger to see her so foully 
stricken, and breathed freely only when her sons 
had shown the pure nobility of their response. No 
frenzies of meliorism, no Carmagnoles of murderous 
ambition, no Danton or Robespierre, no La Vendue 
and no Buonaparte have marred the story of the 
defence of the Third Republic. Democracy, Reason, 
slow-growing Law, are justified of their children. 

Men raised by such achievement into an im- 
mortaUty of human gratitude, the young limbs 
and hearts so swiftly girded up, so soon loosed 
upon eternity, should evoke no common mourning. 

" Knows he who tills this lonely field, 
To reap its scanty corn, 
What mystic fruit his acres yield .'' " 

Not their own soil only, they enriched with their 
blood, but the universal mind. In saving the best in 



2 36 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

dream and reality that France means to the world, 
they saved the whole future, as short reflection upon 
the alternative will show. The victory of the Marne 
sealed the brotherhood of France and England, and 
did much toward bringing America and the Dominions 
into the comity of nations. It was the basis of the 
completer victory to follow, and of the only possi- 
bilities of future peace and liberal progress. For ever, 
this example will call to youth everywhere — " that 
from these honoured dead we take increased devotion, 
that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not 
have lived in vain." May there not again be need 
to pass through such a Gehenna ; but it is surer that 
the world will only be made " safe for democracy," 
or even for elementary order, by the vigilance and 
chivalry of each oncoming generation. For these, 
for ever, ghostly bugles will blow through the woods 
and hamlets of the Marne. 

"Afnes des chevaliers, revenez-vous encor? 
Est-ce vous qui paries avec la voix du corf 
Roncevaux ! Roncevaux ! dans ta sombre vallee 
L ombre du grand Roland, riest-elle pas consolde .? " 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 

1 Many volumes of soldiers' notes and recollections have been 
published, and some of them have high literary merit. One of 
these is Ma Piece, Souvenirs d'un Canonnier (Paris : Plon-Nourrit), 
by Sergeant Paul Lintier, of the 44th Artillery, who shared in the 
defeat of Ruffey's Army near Virton, in the south-eastern corner 
of Belgium, 35 miles north of Verdun. It was almost his first 
sight of bloodshed, and with an artist's truthfulness he records all 
the confusion of his mind. 

'■■ The battle is lost," he writes on August 23, " I know not how 
or why. I have seen nothing. It is a sheer nightmare. We shall 
be massacred. . . . Anguish chokes me. . . . This boiling mass of 
animaUty and thought that is my life is about to cease. My bleed- 
ing body will be stretched upon the field. I see it. Across the 
sunny perspective of the future a great curtain falls. I am only 
twenty- one years old. . . . What are we waiting for ? Why do 
not our guns fire ? I perspire, I am afraid . . . afraid." 

This mood gradually passes away. A few days later he is try- 
ing to explain the change : " One accustoms oneseK to danger as 
to the cruellest privations, or the uncertainty of the morrow. I 
used to wonder, before the war, how the aged could live in quietude 
before the immanence of death. Now I understand. For our- 
selves, the risk of death has become an element of daily existence. 
One counts with it ; it no longer astonishes, and frightens us less. 
And, besides, every day trains us to courage. The conscious and 
continuous effort to master oneself succeeds at length. This is 
the whole of military bravery. One is not born brave ; one be- 
comes so." And this stoicism is softened and spiritualised by a 
new sense of what the loss of France would mean. 

Another notable narrative of this period of the war is Ce qu'a vu 
un Officier de Ckasseurs-a-Pied (Paris : Plon-Nourrit), by Henri 
Libermann. The writer was engaged on the Belgian frontier 
farther west, near where the Semoy falls out of the Ardennes into 
the Meuse, the region where the Saxons and the IV Army joined 
hands on the one side, and, on the other, the 5th French Army, 
Lanrezac's, touched all too lightly the 4th, that of de Langle de 



238 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Cary. Some French officers have quartered themselves in an 
old convent, picturesquely set upon a wooded hill. They do not 
know it, but, in fact, the cause is already lost from Dinant to 
Neufchateau. All they know is that a part of the 9th Corps is in 
action a few miles to the north. The guns can be heard ; the 
villagers are flying in panic ; the flames of burning buildings redden 
the northern sky. 

" In the convent parlour, the table is laid with a fine white 
cloth, decorated with flowers, bottles covered with venerable dust, 
cakes whose golden crust gladdens the eyes. A brilliant Staff, 
the Commandant, a few chasseur officers. The Sisters hurry 
about, carrying dishes. ' A little more fowl, my dear Commandant,' 
says the Brigadier ; ' really, it is delicious. And this wine — 
Pontet-Canet of '74, if you please ! ' All of us are grateful to the 
good Sisters, who are such deUcate cooks. At dessert, as though 
embarrassed by an unhappy impression shared by all the guests, 
the General speaks : ' Rest tranquil, gentlemen. Our attack to- 
morrow morning will be overwhelming. Debouching between 
hills 832 and 725, it will take in flank the German Corps which is 
stopping our brave 9th, and will determine the victory." 

Hardlj'' has the toast of the morrow's triumph been drunk than 
a heavy step is heard outside, the click of spurs, and then a knock 
on the door. A captain enters, in helmet and breastplate, a bloody 
bandage across his forehead, dust thick upon his uniform, perspira- 
tion rolling down his face. He has ridden from Dinant with news 
of the defeat, and secret instructions. The Uhlans are near. 
Nevertheless, the officers go to bed. During the night they are 
aroused by an increasing clamour of flying peasants outside the 
convent. There are soldiers among them, wildly crying : "The 
Prussians are coming, sauve qui pent ! " An infantry regiment 
had camped, the previous evening, in the village of Willerzie. 
" They arrived late, tired out. No thought but of rest, no scouts 
or outposts. On the verge of the neighbouring forest, grey-coated 
horsemen appeared. The sentinels fired a few shots, and they 
retired into the wood. The regiment then went to sleep in its 
false security. About 1 1 p.m., however, three searchhghts flashed 
along the village streets. ' Schnell, schnell ! Vorwarts, vorwdrts ! ' 
A terrible fusillade broke out around the houses ; and, as our 
infantrymen, hurriedly wakened, ran to arms, a thick rain of bullets 
fell upon them. In a few instants, terror was transformed into 
panic, panic into rout. At this moment the regiment was flying, 
dispersed in all directions, pursued by the ' hurrahs ' of the victorious 
Germans." 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 239 



THE GERMAN OBJECTIVE 

2 The question whether the Eastern thrust was integral in the 
original plan cannot be absolutely determined on the present in- 
formation ; but it is significant that at the outset the German 
forces on the East were inferior to the French. 

M. Gabriel Hanotaux {Revue des Deux Mondes, November 15, 
19 16) thinks that the German right, centre, and left were aiming at 
the region of Troyes, Kluck from the north-west, Prince Ruprecht 
of Bavaria from the east, and the Imperial Crown Prince from the 
north. " The direction of the Prince of Bavaria appears from an 
order seized on the enemy giving as objective Rozelieures, that is 
to say, the Gap of Charmes ; the direction of the Crown Prince is 
revealed by an order of September 6 giving Dijon as objective for 
his cavalry." 

Lt.-General von Freytag-Loringhoven (Deductions from the World 
War. London: Constable. 191 8) says: "The intention was to 
effect an envelopment from two sides. Envelopment by the left 
wing of the [German] Army was, however, brought to a standstill 
before the fortifications of the French eastern frontier." 

A German brochure on the battle of the Marne — Die Schlachten 
an der Marne (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn. 19 16), by a " German Staff 
Of&cer ' ' who was evidently an eye-witness, and probably a member 
of the staff either of General von Kluck, or of General von Moltke, 
chief of the Grand Staff from the beginning of the war till after the 
battle, says the plan was to rest on the defensive from the Swiss 
frontier to the Donon, while the mass of the armies rolled the French 
up south of the Seine, and Reserve and Landwehr Corps advanced 
to the coast to stop the landing of British troops. " By all human 
provisions, this plan might have been carried out by the end of 
September 1914." 

A French translation of this interesting booklet [Une Version 
Allemande de la Marne. Brussels et Paris : G. Van Oest et Cie. 1917) 
includes also a critical study by M. Joseph Reinach, a part of which 
is given to the results of an examination of the maps taken on 
German dead, wounded, and prisoners in the beginning of the war. 
These Staff maps fall into four categories, of which three date from 
the mobilisation or earlier, and so throw light on the original plan of 
campaign, while one set was distributed at a later date. The former 
are : (i) sets of maps of Belgium — the whole country — in seventy 
sheets, reproducing the Belgian " 6o,oooth " Staff map, and dated 
1906, another evidence of premeditation. (2) The north-east of 
France, from the French " 80,000 " map, with names in French, 



240 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

but explanations in Italian, dated 1910. These had evidently been 
printed for the use of Italian troops, but, when Italy declared 
itself neutral, had been distributed to German officers from motives 
of economy. (3) The north and north-east of France in 87 sheets, 
not including Paris, dated from 1905 to 1908, and distributed to 
German officers on the eve of the mobilisation. These are based 
upon the French " 80,000 " map, with some variations and special 
markings. They include the whole of the eastern and northern 
frontiers from Belfort to Dunkirk ; the significant thing is their 
limits on the west and south. On the west they include the regions 
of Dunkirk, St. Omer, Arras, Amiens, Montdidier and Beauvais, 
but not those of Calais, Boulogne, Abbeville, and Rouen. At 30 
or 40 miles north of Paris, they turn eastward, including the sectors 
of Soissons and Rheims, but excluding those of Paris and Meaux. 
They then turn south again, including the Chalons, Arcis, and 
Troyes sheets ; and the southern limit is the regions of Troyes, 
Chaumont, and Mirecourt. (4) Finally, there is a set of 41 sheets 
supplementary to the last named, printed in 19 14, and either distri- 
buted at a later date, or intended for armies other than those of 
the first invasion. These included Calais and the Channel coast, 
Rouen, Paris, Meaux, to the south thereof the regions of the Or- 
leanais. Berry, the Nivernais, including the great manufacturing 
centre of Le Creusot, the north of Burgundy, Franche Comt6, 
the Jura, and the Swiss frontier from Bale to near the Lake of 
Geneva. 

In his L'Enigme de Charleroi (Paris : L'Edition Fran9aise lUustree, 
20 Rue de Provence. 191 7), M. Hanotaux expresses the belief 
that, at the outset, the German Command, regarding England as 
the chief enemy, intended its armies to cross northern Belgium, 
" straight to the west and the sea, with Dunkirk and Calais as imme- 
diate objective," and that the French resistance diverted them from 
the coastal region. The evidence of the maps appears to the present 
writer more convincing than the reasoning of M, Hanotaux. 

THE OPPOSED FORCES 

3 It is not necessary here to state the evidence in detail; but 
these figures may be accepted as substantially correct. I am 
indebted to a British authority for criticism and information. 
Besides the 4 Landwehr Divisions in course of formation during 
the last days of August, tliere were a number of Landwehr Brigades, 
which, however, had no artillery and were not organised for the 
field. By the first week of September, the XI Corps and Guard 



NOTES AxND REFERENCES 241 

Reserve Corps had gone to the Russian front; but the 4 Landwehr 
Divisions named above had come in as effective. The " Metz Army 
Detachment " may be counted as adding a division. 

4 The transport of " covering troops " began at 9 p.m. on July 
3 1 , and ended at noon on August 3 . On the Eastern Railway alone, 
538 trains were required. The " transports of concentration," from 
August S to 18, engaged 4300 trains, only a score of which were 
behind time. After Charleroi, between August 26 and September 3, 
the removal of three army corps, five infantry divisions, and three 
cavalry divisions from Lorraine to the Central and Western fronts was 
effected by 740 trains, while the railways were largely swamped by 
other miUtary movements and the civilian exodus. 

5 For fuller explanations on this point, see Le Revers de igi^ et ses 
Causes, by Lt.-Col. de Thomasson (Paris: Berger-Levrault. 1919). 
Of the volumes published in France up to this date on the first 
period of the war, this moderate and closely-reasoned essay by an 
accomplished officer is one of the most valuable. 

General Verraux (L'Oeuvre, June i, 1919) refers to this weakness 
and confirms my general conclusion : " Despite the inferior organisa- 
tion of reserves, with our 25 x\ctive Corps, the 80 corps battalions 
of reserves, the Belgians and the British, we had, if not a numerical 
superiority, almost an equaUty with the German forces, deducting 
those on the Russian front." 

M. Victor Giraud, a competent historical writer, in his Histoire de 
la Grande Guerre (Part I. ch. iii. Paris : Hachette. 1919) gives other 
details, leading to the same conclusion. 

6 Etudes et Impressions de Guerre, vol. i. (Paris : Tallandier. 1917). 
General Malleterre, commanding the 46th Regiment, 3rd Army, was 
seriously wounded in the battle of the Mame. Taking up the pen 
on his recovery, he became one of the ablest French commentators 
on the war. 

7 "No enterprise, perhaps, "says a French miUtary publication, 
" is as purely French as the conquest of the air. The first free 
balloon, the first dirigible, the first aeroplane all rose from our 
soil." However, " the war surprised our aviation in an almost 
complete state of destitution. Our 200 pilots, almost all sportsmen, 
possessed between them a total of two machine-guns. A few 
squadrillas, without clearly-defined functions, sought their places 
on the front." Aerial artillery ranging, photography, and observa- 
tion had been envisaged, and, more generally, chasing and bom- 
bardment ; but there was hardly a beginning of preparation. 

France had at the beginning of the war 24 squadrillas, each of five 
or six machines, all scouts of a speed from 50 to 70 miles an hour. 
16 



242 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

M. Engerand says that " Germany entered the campaign with 1500 
aeroplanes ; we had on the front only 129." Captive balloons 
had been abandoned as incapable of following the armies in the 
war of movement then almost exclusively contemplated. " Events 
proved our mistake," says the official publication already quoted. 
" Enemy balloons followed the rapid advance of the armies of in- 
vasion. Ascending immediately behind the lines, they rendered 
the adversary indubitable services at the battle of the Marne. Then 
we hurriedly constituted balloon companies ; and in 191 5 we 
followed the German model of ' sausage ' balloons." 

Moiis and the Retreat, by Captain G. S. Gordon, a British Staff 
officer (London : Constable. 19 18), contains some information of the 
Royal Flying Corps in August and September 1914. The Corps was 
founded in April 19 12. At the beginning of the war, it included 
six squadrons, only four of which could be immediately mobilised, 
with a complement of 109 officers and 66 aeroplanes. These, how- 
ever, did excellent work from the beginning. The writer says: 
" If we were better scouts and fighters, the Germans were better 
observers for the guns. The perfect understanding between the 
Taubes and the German gunners was one of the first surprises of the 
war." 

DE block's prophecy AND FRENCH'S CONFESSION 

8 De Bloch, who had been a large railway contractor in the Russo- 
Turkish War, and a leading Pohsh banker, published the results 
of his experiences and researches, in six volumes, under the general 
title La Guerre, during the last years of the nineteenth century, 
and afterwards estabhshed a " Museum of War and Peace " at 
Lucerne to illustrate the subject. His chief thesis was that, owing 
to the technical development of military instruments and other 
factors, an aggressive war between States of nearly equal resources 
could not now give the results aimed at ; and there is no longer 
any doubt that he foresaw the main track of military development 
as few soldiers did. The following sentences from a sketch of the 
writings and conversations of de Bloch, pubhshed by the present 
writer in 1902, will serve to show that he anticipated some of the 
governing characteristics of the Great War : 

" The resisting power of an army standing on the defensive, 
equipped with long-range, quick-firing rifles and guns, from ten 
to twenty times more powerful than those of 1870 and 1877, expert 
in entrenching and the use of barbed wire and other obstacles, 
and highly mobile, is something quite different from that which 
Napoleon, or even later aggressors, had to face. Not only is it a 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 243 

much larger force , the manhood of a nation ; it is also a body 
highly educated, an army of engineers. Its infantry Unes and 
battery positions will be invisible. Reconnaissances will be easily 
prevented by protecting bands of sharpshooters ; and no object 
of attack will offer itself to the invader till he has come within a 
zone of deadly fire. The most heavy and powerful shells, which 
are alone of use against entrenched positions, cannot be used in 
great number, or brought easily into action. Artillery shares the 
advantage of a defensive position. If the attackers have a local 
superiority, the defenders can delay them long enough to allow of 
an orderly retirement to other entrenched positions. The attacker 
will be forced to entrench himself, and so the science of the spade 
reduces battle to sieges. Battle in the open would mean anni- 
hilation ; yet it is only by assault that entrenched positions can be 
carried. 

" Warfare will drag on more slowly than ever. While an in- 
vading army is being decimated by sickness and wounds, and 
demoralised by the heavy loss of officers and the delay of any 
glorious victory, the home population will be sunk in misery by 
the growth of economic burdens, the stoppage of trade and industry. 
The small, elastic, and manageable army of the past could make 
quick marches, turning movements, strategical demonstrations 
in the widest sense. Massed armies of millions, like those of to-day, 
leaning on long-prepared defences, must renounce all the more 
delicate manifestations of the military art. Armies as they now 
stand cannot manoeuvre, and must fight in directions indicated in 
advance. The losses of to-day would be proportionately greater 
than in past wars, if it were not for the tactical means adopted to 
avoid them. But the consequence of distance and dispersion is 
that victorious war — the obtaining of results by destrojdng the 
enemy's principal forces, and thus making him submit to the con- 
queror's will — can exist no more." 

With all its errors of detail, de Bloch's picture, drawn when the 
aeroplane and the petrol motor-wagon, " wireless " and the field- 
telephone, poison-gas and barrage fire were unknown, was a true 
prophecy, and aU the belligerents paid dearly for neglecting it. 

For somewhat similar prognostications by a French officer, see 
Comment on pouvait privoir I' immobilisation des fronts dans la 
guerre moderne (Paris : Berger-Levrault), being a summary of the 
writings of Captain Emile Mayer, whose first studies date from 1888. 

9 He adds : ' ' and that if, in September, the Germans had learned 
their lesson, the Alhes would never have driven them back to the 
Aisne." This is a more disputable proposition. On the Sambre, the 



244 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

French were immediately driven back ; on the Ourcq, the Germans 
held out for four days, and retired partly because their supply 
services had given out. To a very large extent they had certainly 
learned their lesson; and for nearly four years thereafter they 
bettered it on the Aisne hills. 

The quotations are from the volume 1914, by Field-Marshal 
Viscount French of Ypres (London : Constable. 1919), an important 
body of evidence, passages of which, however, must be read critically. 
Lord French in his narrative repeatedly insists upon the slowness 
with which the need of a " transformation of military ideas," owing 
to the factors named, was recognised. " It required the successive 
attempts of Maunoury, de Castehiau, Foch, and myself to turn the 
German flanks in the North in the old approved style, and the 
practical failure of these attempts, to bring home to our minds 
the true nature of war as it is to-day." 

Of the end of the battle of the Marne, he writes (ch. vii.): "We 
had not even then grasped the true effect and bearing of the many 
new elements whch had entered into the practice of modern war. We 
fully beUeved we were driving the Germans back to the Meuse, if 
not to the Rhine ; and all my communications with Jofire and the 
French generals most closely associated with me breathed the same 
spirit. . . . We were destined to undergo another terrible disappoint- 
ment. The lessons of war, as it is to-day, had to be rubbed in by 
another dearly-bought experience, and in a hard and bitter school.'' 

There is both courage and naiveU in the following tardy pro- 
fession of the belief de Bloch had expounded fifteen years before : 
" Afterwards, we witnessed the stupendous efforts of de CasteLnau 
and Foch ; but all ended in the same trench ! trench 1 trench ! I 
finished my part in the battle of the Aisne, however, unconverted, 
and it required the further and more bitter lesson of my own failure 
in the North to pass the Lys River, during the last days of October, 
to bring home to my mind a principle in warfare of to-day which I 
have held ever since, namely, that, given forces fairly equally 
matched, you can ' bend,' but you cannot ' break,' your enemy's 
trench line. . . . Everything which has happened in the war has 
borne out the truth of this view ; and, from the moment I grasped 
this great truth, I never failed to proclaim it, although eventually 
I suffered heavily for holding such opinions." 

CRITICISMS AND DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH STAFF 

10 M. Victor Giraud, in his Histoire, writes : " The French troops 
were neither armed nor equipped as they should have been. . . 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 245 

Neither in the liaison of arms, nor in the role of the artillery, nor in 
the possibilities of aviation or trenches, had the army very clear 
ideas ; it believed only in the offensive, the war of movement, 
which precisely, to-day more than ever, calls for a superiority of 
armament, if not also of effectives. . . . France could and should 
have remembered that it was the country of Vauban and de S^re 
de Riviere. . . . There was no longer any faith in permanent forti- 
fication, but only in the offensive, which was confused with the 
offensive spirit." 

Pierre Dauzet, Guerre de igi4. De Liige d, la Marne, p. 29 
(Paris: Charles Lavauzelle. 1916). "I shall not exaggerate 
much in saying that in many regiments the recruits incorporated 
in October 191 3 commenced the war next August without ever 
having shifted a spadeful of earth or dug the most modest trench " 
(Thomasson, p. 19). 

11 Two commanders of armies, 7 of corps, 20 infantry division- 
aires, 4 commanders of cavalry divisions. In some army corps, 
the commander and his two divisional generals were removed 
(Thomasson, p. 12). 

12 Etudes, p. 66, note. And again (p. 88) : "The offensive idea 
had become very clear and very formal in our minds. It had the 
place, so to say, of an official war doctrine. The lesson of the Russo- 
Japanese war and the Balkan wars seemed to have disturbed the 
teaching of the War School and the governing ideas of our Staff. 
At the moment when the war opened, there was a sharp discussion 
between the partisans of the offensive d outrance and those who, 
foreseeing the formidable manoeuvre of Germany, leaned to a more 
prudent, more reasoned method, which they described as defensive 
strategy and offensive tactic." 

13 In " L'Erreur " de 1914. Reponse aux Critiques (Paris and 
Brussels : G. van Oest. 1919), General Berthaut is reduced to the 
suggestion that some of these phrases were intended " to stimulate 
the ardour of the young officers," but that " the Command was not 
at all bound to take them literally." 

General Berthaut was sub- chief of the French General Staff, and 
director of the geographical service, from 1903 to 19 12 ; and his 
defence of the ideas prevailing up to the eve of the war deserves 
careful reading, unsatisfying as it may be found on many points. 
It is mainly intended to j ustif y the Eastward concentration, and to 
controvert those who think the business of an army is to defend the 
national territory foot by foot. The general appeals to the weight 
of military authority (which, as we shall see, is less one-sided than 
he suggests) : " From 1875 to 19 14, we had 40 Ministers of^War ; 



246 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

we changed the Chief of Staff sixteen times ; changes were still 
more numerous among sub-chiefs of Staff, heads of bureaux and 
services. Several hundred officers of all arms, returning periodi- 
cally to their regiments, contributed to the Staff work of the army. 
Yet the directive idea of our defence never varied. Such as it was 
in 1876, so it was revealed in 1914." Throughout this time, con- 
centration was foreseen and prepared behind the upper courses 
of the Meuse and Moselle with a view to positions being held in the 
upper valleys of the Marne, Aube, and Seine. The idea that the 
French eastern frontier was infrangible, General Berthaut considers 
" extremely exaggerated." If it had not been adequately held, 
the Germans would have turned thither from the north. The 
violation of the neutrality either of Switzerland or Belgium was, 
however, beyond doubt. To cover the whole frontier was im- 
possible ; and, "incontestably," the armies had to be turned in 
one mass toward the east. Trenches are " an effect, not a cause, 
of the stabilisation of fronts." The general has a very poor 
opinion of fortresses, the only one to which he attributes great 
importance being Metz ! Liege was " a practically useless 
sacrifice"; Maubeuge "stopped nothing." These opinions seem 
to the present writer untenable ; and General Berthaut admits 
that the reaction against fortification "went too far" (p. 182). 
He may be said to damn the three French offensives with faint 
praise. The move into Alsace " could not be of any military 
interest," and was " a political affair." The Lorraine offensive 
was "necessarily hmited," as a distant objective could not be 
pursued between Metz and Strasbourg. As to Charleroi, France 
was bound to make a demonstration on behalf of Belgium and " to 
satisfy public opinion." Much of General Berthaut's apologia is 
vitiated by his assumption that France had necessarily to face a 
superiority of force. 

One of the critics General Berthaut started out to controvert is 
M. Fernand Engerand, deputy for Calvados, whose articles (particu- 
larly in L.e Correspondant, December 10, 191 7, and subsequent 
numbers) have been reprinted in a volume of 600 pages : Le Secret 
de la Frontiere, i8i^-i8ji-igi4.. Charleroi (Paris ; Editions 
Bossard, 43 Rue Madame. 1918). The French plan of campaign, 
says M. Engerand, was "humanly impossible. Nothing happened 
as our High Command had foreseen ; there was surprise all along 
the line, and, what is gravest, surprise not only strategic but in- 
tellectual, the reversal of a doctrine of war. After the magnificent 
recovery of the Marne, we may without inconvenience avow that 
never has there been so complete a self-deception. The error was 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 247 

absolute and, worse, deliberate, for never was an attack more 
foreseen, more announced, more prophesied than that of August 
1914. Strategists of the old school had not only predicted it for 
forty ;years, but had given us the means of parrying it; their ideas 
were scouted and their work was destroyed." 

M. Engerand quotes, in particular, Lt.-Colonel Grouard on the 
impossibility of an immediate French offensive beyond the frontiers 
(see Grouard, La Guerre Eventuelle, 191 3 ; and L'Art de la Guerre 
et le Colonel Grouard, by C. de Bourcet, 1915). Grouard foresaw, 
among other things, that ' ' the army of the German right, marching 
by the left bank of the Meuse, would pass the Sambre in the neigh- 
bourhood of Charleroi, and direct itself toward the sources of the 
Oise." M. Engerand's chapters contain a summary of the three 
French offensives. His general comment is : " No unity of 
command, separate and dislocated battles, no notion of information 
and safeguards before and during the combat, systematic mis- 
conception of the ground and defensive means, defective liaison 
between the corps and between artillery and infantry, no manoeuvre, 
but only the offensive, bhnd, sj'-stematic, frantic. If we were 
defeated, is it an exaggeration to say that it was less by the enemy 
than by a false doctrine ? " 

Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, on these points, quotes warning notes 
from General Collin's Transformation de la Guerre, written in 191 1, 
and refers to the case of Lt.-Col. Berrot, who, in 1902, had exposed 
" the dangerous theories that had been deduced from the Napol- 
eonic wars," and who "was disgraced pitilessly, and died while yet 
young." 

THE SURPRISE IN THE NORTH 

14 Early French writers on the war found it difficult to make up 
their minds whether there had, or had not, been a surprise in the 
North. See Histoire de la Guerre de igi4 (ch. " Septembre "), by 
Gabriel Hanotaux. This work, the most ambitious of the kind yet 
attempted, is being published in fortnightly sections and periodical 
volumes, of which the first deals with the origins of the war, the 
next three with the frontier battles, and the following ones with 
the battles of the retreat and preliminaries of the battle of the 
Marne (Paris : Gounouilhou, 30 Rue de Provence). 

M. Hanotaux says : " The project prepared by the German Staff 
of an offensive by Belgium was not a secret. All was public and 
confessed. There was no surprise in the absolute sense of the 
word. But there remained an unknown quantity : would the 
probable hypothesis be realised? " Later, however, he says : 



248 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

" The long-prepared manoeuvre consisted in crushing us by the 
carefully veiled onslaught not of 12, but of 25, army corps, so that 
the surprise was double for us : the most eccentric movement and 
the most unexpected numbers. ... It was this combination of 
circumstances, foreseen and unforeseen, that the French Command 
had to parry : political necessity, surprise, numbers, preparation, 
munitions." And, again : " The invasion of Belgium by the left bank 
of the Meuse certainly surprised the French High Command" ("La 
Manoeuvre de la Mame," Rev. des Deux Mondes, March 15, 1919). 

M. Reinach, usually so clear and positive, was also ambiguous on 
this point (La Guerre sur le Front Occidental, vol. i.). It suffices 
he says, to glance at the map : " Nature herself traced this path 
(Flanders and the Oise). Innumerable armies have followed 
it, in both directions, for centuries " (p. 30). Nevertheless, the 
French Staff, though it had "followed for many years the German 
preparations for an offensive by Belgium" (p. 57), remained in an 
"anguish of doubt." 

Much evidence with regard to the events of the first phase of the 
war is contained in the reports of the French ' ' Commission of Inquiry 
on Metallurgy," 1918-19, the special task of which was to consider 
why the Briey coalfield was not defended. On May 14, 1919, 
General Maunoury testified to disaccord existing between command- 
ing officers at the beginning of the campaign, failure to co-ordinate 
efforts, and ignorance of some generals of the plan of concentration. 
On the same day. General Michel said that, in 191 1, when he was 
Vice-President of the Superior War Council, that is. Generalissimo 
designate, he submitted a plan of concentration based upon a 
certitude of the whole German invasion passing by Belgium and of 
the need of the principal French action being directed to the North. 
The plan was rejected, after being examined by General Brun, 
M. Berteaux, and M. Messimy. 

General Percin, at the same inquiry (May 24, 1919), spoke of 
"intrigues" and a "real palace revolution" in 191 1 to replace 
General Michel, as future Commander-in-Chief, by General Pau, 
the offence of the former being to have foretold that the Germans 
would advance by the left bank of the Meuse, and that they would 
at once engage their reserves. According to General Percin, in 
the spring of 19 14 General de Castelnau said: " If the Germans 
extend their fighting front as far as Lille, they will thin it so much 
that we can cut it in two. We can wish for nothing better." There 
is other evidence of this idea prevailing in the General Staff : 
apparently it arose from underestimates of the effective strength of 
the invasion. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 249 

Marshal Joffre gave evidence before the Commission on July 5, 
19 19, but his reported statements do not greatly help us. He 
defended the concentration under " plan 17," which, he said, was 
operated much more to the north than in previous plans, nearly 
all of these foreseeing concentration south of Verdun. The French 
StafiE was chiefly concerned to give battle only when it had its full 
forces in hand. The 3rd Army had a quite particular function, 
that of investing Metz. The plan made before the war was not 
absolute, but was a directive modifiable according to events . 
Officially, it stopped short at Hirson ; but the Staff had foreseen 
variants to second the Belgian effort. In March 1914, the Staff 
had prepared a note in which it had foreseen the invasion by Belgium 
— a plan providing for eventualities. It was, therefore, absurd to 
pretend that it had never foreseen the invasion by Belgium. The 
Briey district was under the cannon of Metz, and could not be 
included in the region of concentration. The loss of the "battle 
of the Frontiers " was due to the fact that the best units of the 
German Army presented themselves on the feeble point of our front. 
On the French side there were failings. Generals who had great 
quahties in peace time failed under stress of war. He had had to 
take action against some who were his best friends, but believed 
he had done his duty. Asked by the chairman with how many 
rifles he commenced the war. Marshal Joffre replied, "with 2,300,000." 
Lille, he said, could not be defended. 

Field-Marshal French {1914, ch. i.) says : " Personally, I had 
always thought that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality, 
and in no such half-hearted measure as by a march through the 
Ardennes." 

15 In an article on the second anniversary of the first battle of the 
Yser, the Temps (Oct. 30, 1916) said that, before the war, Belgium 
was more suspicious of England and France than of Germany. 
" If our Staffs had wished to prepare, for the defence of Belgium, 
a plan of operations on her territory, these suspicions would have 
taken body and open conflict occurred. Nothing was foreseen 
of what happened, and nothing was prepared." 

Field-Marshal French says : ' ' Belgium remained a ' dark horse ' 
to the last, and could never be persuaded to decide upon her atti- 
tude in the event of a general war. . . . We were anxious she 
should assist and co-operate in her own defence." On August 
21, he received a note from the Belgian Government remarking 
that the Belgian field army had from the commencement of 
hostilities " been standing by hoping for the active co-operation 
of the^AUied Army," but was now retreating upon Antwerp. 



2 50 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

M. Engerand {Le Drame de Chavleroi) says that on July 29, 
General Lanrezac had sent to General Joffre a report on the 
likelihood of an enveloping movement by the left bank of the Meuse ; 
that after the German Chancellor's defence, on August 4, of the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, the Belgian Government asked 
France for aid ; that the French Minister of War had of his own 
initiative offered to send five army corps, " but, on August 5, our 
Councillor of Embassy at London, M. de Fleurian, informed the 
Belgian Minister that ' the French Generalissimo did not intend to 
change his strategic pan, and only the non-co-operation of the 
British Army would obhge him to extend the French left.' The 
Sordet Cavalry Corps, on and after August 6, reported to the General 
Staff that 13 German Corps, in two armies, were intended to oper- 
ate west of the Meuse, and that ten others were ready to advance 
on the east of the river. On August 7, Lanrezac addressed to the 
Grand Quartier General another report on the danger to our left ; 
and on the 14th he expressed his conviction that there would be 
a strong offensive west of the Meuse directly to General Joffre, 
who did not credit it." 

Major CoUon, French mihtary attache at Brussels, and afterwards 
attached to French Headquarters, has published the following 
facts in a letter to the Swiss Colonel Egli {Temps, September 19, 
191 8) : Although the Army of Hanover (Emmich's Army of the 
Meuse) was mobilised from July 21 and concentrated ih West- 
phalia from July 26, it was not till August 3, after the publication 
of the German ultimatum, that France offered Belgium her eventual 
military aid. This was declined ; but on August 4, when the viola- 
tion of the frontier occurred the offer was accepted in principle. 
On August 5, General Joffre authorised the Sordet Cavalry Corps to 
move to the Semoy. It began its march on the 6th, and on that 
night Major CoUon arrived at Belgian Headquarters with a view to 
assuring the co-ordination of the French and Belgian operations. 

16 " This plan was at once weak and supple. It was feeble be- 
cause General Joffre, who established it, ' saw too many things,' 
in the words of the Napoleonic warning. . . . He knew as well as 
any one the feebleness of his plan. It was imposed upon him. He 
sought at least to make it supple " (Reinach, op. cit. pp. 58-9). 

In an article reviewing this volume {Petit Parisien, June 16, 
1916), M. Millerand, who became Minister of War a few days after 
the events in question, endorsed this opinion : The French Staff 
" had to foresee, did foresee, the two hypotheses — that of Belgium, 
certainly, but also that of Lorraine. Hence general dispositions 
whose suppleness did not escape weakness, a concentration for 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 251 

two ends." The word " Belgium " here is ambiguous ; it is clear 
that an attack by Western Belgium was not foreseen. The vice 
of the concentration was not that it faced two ends, " Belgium" 
and " Lorraine," but that it essentially faced the end of a Lorraine 
offensive, whereas what was essentially needed was a northern 
defensive. 

General Bonnal remarks : " The project of offensive operations 
conceived by Benihardi in 191 1 in case of a war with France de- 
served close study by us, which would probably have led to modi- 
fications in our plan of concentration while there was yet time " 
{Les Conditions de la Guerre Moderne, p. 115. Paris : De Boccard. 
1916). 

General Palat writes: " The French concentration was vicious. 
Better conceived, it would have saved hundreds of thousands of 
our compatriots from the tortures of the invasion and occupation " 
{La Revue, Dec. i, 1917). 

" The unknown quantity on the side of Belgium," says Lt.-Col. 
de Thomasson, " condemned us at the outset to a waiting strategy. 
The idea of at once taking the offensive madly overpassed the 
boldest conceptions of Napoleon " (p. 54). " A well-advised 
command would have understood that it was folly to launch at 
once all its army to attack troops of the value of the Germans; 
that the offensive should have been made only on certain points of 
the front, with a sufhcient numerical superiority, and for this purpose 
the forces must be economised ; that, in brief, the beginning of 
hostihties could only be favourable to us on condition of a superior 
strategy such as was shown in the preparation for the battle of the 
Mame, but not in the initial plan or in the first three weeks of the 
war " (177-8). 

17 See Hanotaux, Histoire Generate de la Guerre ; Engerand, 
" Lorraine- Ardennes " {Le Correspondant, April 25, 1918) ; Paul H. 
Courriere, " La Bataille de Sarre-et-Seille " {La Revue, Jan. i, 191 7) ; 
Gerald Campbell, Verdun to the Vosges (London : Arnold) — the 
author was correspondent of The Times on the Eastern frontier; 
Thomasson, loc. cit. 

18 See Hanotaux, "La Bataille des Ardennes, Etude Tactique et 
Strategique " {Revue des Deux Mondes, Feb. 15, 1917) ; Engerand, 
as above ; Ernest Renauld, " Charleroi-Dinant-NeufchSteau- 
Virton" {La Revue, Oct. 1916 — inaccurate as regards the British 
Army) ; Malleterre, Un Pen de Lumiere sur les Batailles d'A oxit- 
Septembre igi4 (Paris : Tallandier). 

19 See L' Illustration, March 16, 191 8 : La Defense de Longwy, 
by P. Nicou. 



252 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 



THE ABANDONMENT OF LILLE 

20 The military history of Lille, is curious. See Lille, by Genera 
Percin (Paris: Grasset). M. Engerand, in his chapter on "The 
Abandonment of Lille," says that a third of the cannon had been 
removed earlier in the year, but that on August 2 1 , when General Her 
ment took command, there remained 446 pieces with enough ammuni- 
tion and 25,000 men, not counting the neighbouring Territorial 
divisions of General d'Amade. Though Lille had been virtually de- 
classed on the eve of the war, General Percin, the Governor (afterwards 
cruelly traduced on the subject) and General Herment were anxious, 
and had begun preparations, to defend it. The municipal and other 
local authorities protested to the Government against any such 
effort being made ; and at the last moment, on the afternoon of 
August 24, when the retreat from the Sambre had begun, the 
Minister of War ordered the abandonment of the town and the 
evacuation of the region. German patrols entered the city two days 
later, but it was only occupied at the beginning of October. It has 
been argued that, with Lille and Maubeuge held on their flanks, 
and the Scarpe, Scheldt, and Rhonelle valleys flooded, the Allied 
forces might have delayed the enemy long enough to permit of a 
definite stand on the line Amiens-La Fere-Laon-Rheims. General 
Berthaut rejects any such idea, and says that inundations would 
have required forty days. 

21 French's igi4. 

22 See La Grande Giierre sur le Front Occidental, especially vol. 
iv., by General Palat (Paris: Chapelot, 191 8-19). 



M. HANOTAUX AND THE B.E.F. 

23 For details, see Hanotaux, Histoire General and L'Enigme de 
Charleroi (Paris, 1917) ; Maurice, Thomasson, Engerand, loc. cit. ; 
Sir John French's Dispatches and igi4 ; Lord Ernest Hamilton, 
The First Seven Divisions ; La Campagne de V Armke Beige, from 
official documents (Paris : Bloud et Gay, 1915) ; L' Action de I'Armee 
Beige, also official; "Van der Essen, L' Invasion Allemande. For 
some information in this chapter and the subsequent note with 
regard to the British Army, I am indebted to the miUtary authorities. 

24 Speaking of the attack of the 20th Division (loth Corps) at 
Tamines, M. Hanotaux {Histoire, vol. v. p. 278) says it advanced 
with feverish ardour only to fall upon sohdly held defences. " Our 
officers had always been told that, on condition of attacking reso- 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 253 

lutely and without hesitation, they would surprise the enemy 
and easily dispose of them. But the Germans everywhere awaited 
them firmly on solid positions flanked with innumerable machine- 
guns, before which most of our men fell." Of the " insensate 
immolation " of the 3rd Corps at Chatelet, M. Engerand says : 
" Without artillery preparation, and knowing that they were 
going to a certain death, these picked troops threw themselves 
on the enemy infantry, solidly entrenched on the edge of the town ; 
in a quarter of an hour a half of their effectives had fallen." He 
adds that the upper command of the Corps was relieved the same 
evening. 

25 "It was expected that the British Army would take its place 
on the 20th, But it arrived only on the 22nd. On the 20th, it 
was still far behind in the region of Le Nouvion-Wassigny-Le 
Cateau. If it had been in place on the 20th, the Allied Army would 
have found itself constituted at the very moment when the Germans 
entered Brussels." This last phrase is at least singularly ambigu- 
ous : Von Billow was not in Brussels, but only a day's march from 
the Sambre, on the 20th. But, if the British had then been at 
Mons, the Alhed Army would not have been " constituted," for 
Lanrezac's forces were far from being all in place on that day. " It 
is true," said M. Hanotaux a little later, " that the French Army 
was not all in place on the 22nd, and that the Territorial divisions 
were in rather mediocre conditions as to armament and encadre- 
ment" (L'Enigme de Charleroi, p. 52). It is Billow's appearance on 
the Sambre a day before Lanrezac was ready that makes the French 
historian credit the enemy with " the principal advantage, the 
initiative." 

After the reference to Brussels, M. Hanotaux continues : " The 
role reserved to the British Army was to execute a turning move- 
ment of the left wing, advancing north of the Sambre toward Mons, 
in the direction of Soignies-Nivelles ; it was thought it would be 
there before Kluck." It was there a day before Kluck. " Un- 
fortunately, as the Expose de Six Mois de Guerre recognises, it did not 
arrive on the 20th, as the French Command expected. ... In fact, 
it was only in line on the 23rd " (pp. 49-50). M. Hanotaux repeats 
himself with variations. The AUied Armies suffered, he says, not 
only from lateness and fatigue, but from lack of co-ordination 
in the High Command. " It is permissible to-day to say that the 
Belgian Command, in deciding to withdraw its army into the en- 
trenched camp of Antwerp, obeyed a political and military concep- 
tion which no longer conformed to the necessities of the moment. 
Again, the British Army appeared in the region only on the 23rd , 



254 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

although the battle had been engaged for two days and was already 
compromised between Namur and Charleroi. The role of turning 
wing which the British Army was to fulfil thus failed at the decisive 
hour" (pp. 53-4). M. Hanotaux mentions (p. yy) the receipt by 
Sir John French, at 5 p.m. on August 23, of "a telegraphic message 
qualified as ' unexpected,' " announcing the weight of Kluck's force 
and the French retirement, but omits to say that this message came 
from the French Generalissimo. He adds that the British comman- 
der gave the order to retreat at 5 p.m., Lanrezac only at 9 p.m., 
omitting to explain that the French retreat was, in fact, in operation 
at the former hour, while the British retreat only began at dawn 
on the 24th, after a night of fighting. " By 5 p.m., on Sunday the 
23rd, when Joffre's message was received at British Headquarters" 
— says Captain Gordon, on the authority of the British War Office 
{Mons and the Retreat) — " the French had been retiring for ten or 
twelve hours. The British Army was isolated. Standing forward 
a day's march from the French on its right, faced by three German 
Corps with a fourth on its left, it seemed marked out for destruction." 

In strong contrast with M. Hanotaux's comments — repeated, 
despite public correction, in his article of March 191 9 cited above — 
are M. Engerand's references to the part played by the British 
Expeditionary Force. First, to its " calm and tenacious defensive 
about Mons, a truly admirable defence that has not been made 
known among us, and that has perhaps not been understood 
as it should be. It was the first manifestation of the form the war 
was to take ; the English, having nothing to unlearn, and instructed 
by their experiences in the South African war, had from the outset 
seized its ■ character. ... It shows us Frenchmen, to our grief, 
how we mightjhave stopped the enemy if we had practised, instead of 
the infatuated offensive, this British defensive ' borrowed from 
Brother Boer.' " Then as to the retreat : " The retreat of the 
British followed ours, and did not precede it. It is a duty of loyalty 
to say so, as also to recognise that, in these battles beyond the 
frontiers, the British Army, put by its chief on the defensive, was 
the only one, with the ist French Army, which could contain the 
enemy." M. Engerand, who is evidently well informed, and who 
strongly defends General Lanrezac, says that Sir John French told 
this officer on August 17, at Rethel, that he could hardly be ready to 
take part in the battle till August 24. 

Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, while regretting that the British did not 
try to help Lanrezac on the 2 3rd, admits that an offensive from Mons 
would have been fruitless and mighthave been disastrous (pp. 216-8). 

M. Hanotaux' faulty account of the matter appears to be in- 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 255 

spired by a desire to redistribute responsibilities, and to prove that, 
if the British had attacked Billow's right flank, the whole battle 
would have been won. This idea will not bear serious examination. 
The French Command cannot have entertained this design on 
August 20, for it must have known that the British force was two 
days behind the necessary positions. When it came into line before 
Mons, on the evening of the 22nd, it was certainly too late for so 
small a body of troops to make an offensive movement north-east- 
ward with any prospect of success. Had it been possible at either 
date, the manoeuvre which M. Hanotaux favours might conceivably 
have helped Lanrezac against Biilow ; but it would have left Kluck 
free to encircle the Allies on the west, and so prejudiced, at least, the 
withdrawal and the subsequent successful reaction. It might well 
have created a second and greater Sedan. 

In deaUng with these events, M. Hanotaux, by adding the strength 
of Lanrezac's Army, d'Amade's Territorial divisions, the British 
Army, and the garrisons of Namur (General Michel, 25,000 men), 
Maubeuge (General Fournier, 35,000 men), and Lille (General 
Herment, 18,000 men), arrives at the remarkable conclusion that 
" the Allied armies, between August 22 and 25, opposed to the 
545,000 men of the German armies a total figure of 536,000 men." 
This figure is deceptive, and useless except to emphasise the elements 
of Allied weakness other than numbers. So far as the later date is 
intended, it has no relation to the battle of Charleroi-Mons. At 
both these dates, and later, when the Allies were in full retreat, and 
both sides had suffered heavy losses, the Allied units named were so 
widely scattered and so disparate in quality that it is impossible to 
regard them as a single force " opposed " to the three compact 
masses of Kluck, Biilow, and Hausen. The deduction that General 
Joffre had on the Sambre " AlUed forces sufficient to keep the 
mastery of the operations " is, therefore, most questionable. 

The actual opposition of forces on the morning of August 23 
was as follows : Lanrezac's Army and the Namur garrison, amount- 
ing to an equivalent of five army corps, or abovit 200,000 men, had 
upon their front and flank six corps of Biilow and two corps of 
Hausen, about 320,000 men. The little British Army, of 2^ corps, 
had immediately before it three of Kluck's corps, with two more 
behind these. 

General Lanrezac pubhshed in the New York Herald (Paris 
edition) of May 17 and 18, and in L'Oeuvre of May 18 and 22, 19 19, 
dignified replies to certain statements of Field-Marshal French. 
To the latter's remark that the B.E.F. at Mons found itself in " an 
advanced position," he answers that the battle shifted from east 



256 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

to west, and " on the evening of the 23rd, the 5th Army had been 
fighting for forty-eight hours, while the British were scarcely 
engaged." Doubtless owing to Lord Kitchener's original instruc- 
tion that it would not be reinforced, the B.E.F. kept, during the 
later part of the retreat, " two days' march ahead of the 5 th Army, 
and obstinately maintained this distance, stopping only on the 
Seine." " It was rather French who uncovered my left than I 
who uncovered his right." General Lanrezac disowns any critical 
intent in saying this : "In my opinion, in the tragic period from 
August 22 to September 4, 1914, the British did all they could, and 
showed a magnificent heroism. It was not their fault if the strategic 
situation forbade our doing more." 

In regard to the original French plan of campaign, General 
Lanrezac refused to put himself in the position of being both judge 
and party, but added : " The Commander-in-Chief had a plan ; 
he had elaborated it with the collaboration of officers of his Staff, 
men incontestibly intelligent and instructed, General Berthelot 
among others. Nevertheless, this plan, as I came to know it in 
course of events, appeared to me to present a fundamental error. 
It counted too much on the French centre, 3rd and 4th Armies, 
launched into Belgian Luxembourg and Ardennes, scoring a prompt 
and decisive victory which would make us masters of the situation 
on the rest of the front." " So it was that General Berthelot, on 
August 19, told M. Messimy that, if the Germans went in large 
numbers west of the Meuse, it was so much the better, as it would be 
easier to beat them on the east." 



THE FALL OF MAUBEUGE 

26 Four years passed ere a detailed account of the defence and fall 
of Maubeuge was published {La Verite sur le Sidge de Maubeuge, by 
Commandant Paul Cassou, of the 4th Zouaves. Paris : Berger- 
Levrault). There are, in the case of this fortress, points of likeness 
to and of difference from that of Lille. In June 19 10 the Ministry 
of War had decided that Maubeuge should be regarded as only 
a position of arrest, not capable of sustaining a long siege ; and in 
19 1 3 the Superior War Council decreed that it should be considered 
only as a support to a neighbouring field army. It then consisted 
of an enceinte dating from Vauban, dominated by an outer belt 
of six main forts and six intermediate works about twenty years old, 
furnished with 335 cannon, none of which carried more than 6 miles. 
The garrison consisted of an infantry regiment, three reserve and six 
Territorial regiments. In the three weeks before the siege began, 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 257 

30,000 men were engaged in digging trenches, laying down barbed 
wire, and making other defences. 

The siege was begun by the VII Reserve Corps, a cavalry brigade, 
and a division from another corps, about 60,000 men, on August 25. 
On that and two following days effective sorties were made. On 
the 29th the bombardment began. One by one the forts were 
smashed by heavy guns and mortars, including 420 mm. pieces 
throwing shells of nearly a ton weight, firing from the safe distance 
of 9 or 10 miles. On September i, all the troops available made a 
sortie, and a regular battle was fought. Some detachments reached 
within 250 yards of the German batteries, only to be mown down 
by machine-gun fire. After this two German attacks were re- 
pulsed. On September 5, however, the enemy got within the 
French lines, and on the 7th the place had become indefensible. 
At 6 p.m. the capitulation was signified, and on September 8, at 
noon, the garrison surrendered, General von Zwehl saying to General 
Fournier : " You have defended the place with a rare vigour and 
much resolution, but the war has turned against you." The 
German Command afterward claimed to have taken at Maubeuge 
40,000 prisoners, 400 guns, and a large quantity of war material. 

27 Statement of M. Messimy before the Commission of Inquiry on 
Metallurgy, May 30, 191 9, reported in the Paris Press the following 
day. In his evidence, M. Messimy blamed Joffre for not having 
been willing, in August 1914, to recognise the danger on the side 
of Belgium. Undoubtedly, he added, it was a fault of the French 
Command in 19 12 and 191 3 not to contemplate the prompt use of 
reserves, and to fall back on the Three Years' Service law, "which 
no one would defend to-day." M. Messimy argued that the doc- 
trine of the offensive a outrance was common to the French and 
German Armies, and was at that time universal in military circles. 

Joffre, Premiere Crise du Commandement, by Mermeix (Paris : 
Ollendorff. 1919), is a careful and unprejudiced study of the changes, 
ideas, and personal antagonisms in the French Army Commands 
during the first period of the war. It concludes with a section in 
which " Attacks upon Joffre" and "Explanations collected at the 
G.Q.G.," are set forth on opposite pages. 

28 See note at top of p. 249. 

29 G, Blanchon, Le General Joffre, Pages Actuelles, 1914-5, No. 1 1 
(Paris : Bloud et Gay). 

30 M. Arthur Hue, editor of the Dipeche de Toulottse, in which 
journal the interview was printed, March 1915. 

31 Statement by General Messimy at the Commission of Inquiry 
on Metallurgy, April 28, 1919. 

17 



258 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

32 For details, see Hanotaux, "La Bataille de la Trou6e de 
Charmes," Rev. des Deux Mondes, November 15, 1916; Engerand, 

loc. cit. ; a vindication of General Dubail, by " Cdt. G. V." : " La 
Ire Armee et la Bataille de la Trouee de Charmes," La Revue, 
January i, 191 7 ; Barres : " Comment la Lorraine fut Sauv6e," 
Echo de Paris, September 191 7. 

33 See p. 34. The mismanagement of this battle was the 
subject of evidence at the Metallurgical Commission of Inquiry on 
May 15, 1919. 

34 Miles, Le General Maunoury, Pages Actuelles, No. 49. 

35 French, jgi4, ch. iv. The Hon. J. W. Fortescue {Quarterly 
Review, Oct. 191 9), defending Smith-Dorrien, charges Lord French 
with "clumsy and ludicrous misstatements," and questions the 
figures in the text. 

36 Meine Bericht zur Marneschlacht (Berlin : Scherl), notes, written 
in December 1914, on the operations of the II Army to the end of 
the battle of the Aisne. Biilow charges Kluck with not having 
informed German G.H.Q. of the gathering of Maunoury's forces and 
the action of Proyart. 

For the battle of Guise, see Hanotaux, " La Bataille de Guise- 
St. Quentin," Rev. des Deux Mondes, September i, 1918. 

37 For his report of a stormy interview with Lord Kitchener at 
the Embassy in Paris on September i, see 19 14, ch. v. This 
account has, however, been strongly questioned by Mr. Asquith 
(speech at Newcastle, May 16, 1919), who says that Lord Kitchener 
did but convey the conclusions of the Cabinet, which had been 
" seriously disquieted" by Sir John French's communications. 

38 See Foch, by Rene Puaux, and, above all, Foch's own 
works, De la Conduite de la Guerre (3rd ed., 19 15), Les Principes de 
la Guerre, 4th ed., 1917 (Paris: Berger-Levrault). 

39 " I see no inconvenience," Joffre replied, " in your turning back 
to-morrow, 28th, in order to af&rm your success, and to show that 
the retreat is purely strategic ; but on the 29th every one must be 
in retreat." 

40 For details of the last stages of the retreat and pursuit, see 
La Marche sur Paris de I'Aile Droite Allemande, by Count de Caix 
de Saint Aymour (Paris : Charles Lavauzelle) ; Gordon and Hamilton, 
op. cit. : and La Retraite de V Armle Anglaise du 23 AoUt igi4, by 
Ernest Renauld, Renaissance, November 25, 1916. 

On September 3, General Lanrezac was removed from the com- 
mand of the French 5th Army — " because his views were contrary 
to a complete liaison with the British Army," says M. Hanotaux 
{Rev. des Deux Mondes, March 1919) ; but this is a partial and 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 259 

inadequate statement. As we have seen, Lanrezac had been at 
issue with G.Q.G. from the beginning of the campaign. 

M. Hanotaux quotes a note sent to the Minister of War, M. 
Millerand, on September 3, by General Joffre, who, " finding that 
the rapid recoil of the British Army, effected too soon and too 
quickly, had prevented Maunoury's Army from coming into action 
in good conditions, and had compromised Lanrezac's left flank," 
described his intention thus : "To prepare a new offensive in liaison 
with the British and with the garrison of Paris, and to choose the 
battlefield in such a way that, by utilising on certain parts of the 
front prepared defensive organisations, a numerical superiority 
could be assured in the zone chosen for the principal effort." 

41 An anonymous writer, " ZZZ," in the Revue, de Paris, Sep- 
tember 15, 1917, says that Field-Marshal French's communication 
was made on September i to the French Government — prob- 
ably it was a result of the Kitchener interview — and was trans- 
mitted to Joffre by the Minister of War, who, subject to the full 
liberty and responsibility of the GeneraUssimo, favoured the idea 
of resistance on the north and north-east of Paris. 

42 Petit Parisien, June 16, 1916. 

43 Le Livre du Souvenir, by Paul Ginisty and Arsdne Alexandre, 
pp. 75-6. 

PARIS AND THE GERMAN PLAN 

44 Major-General Sir F. Maurice, in his brilliant studj , Forty Days 
in 1914 (London : Constable. 1919), speaks, however, of the German 
Staff assuming " that Paris had only a moral and not a miUtary 
value." General Maurice refers to the city as being " at the mercy 
of the enemy," and emphatically condemns Kluck for failing to 
occupy it, and so " sacrificing substantial gains in favour of a 
grandiose and ambitious scheme which, as events proved, could 
not be realised" (p. 139). Despite General Maurice's great author- 
ity, I see no reason to change the conclusions in the text with re- 
gard to the points here discussed. There are several important 
factors which he does not mention, particularly the influence of the 
appearance of the new 9th Army, under Foch, at the French centre, 
and the equaUsation at this time of the German and Allied forces. 
Kluck was the victim of necessity rather than of any grandiose 
ambition ; and as for the Staffs, it was more Joffre's strategy than 
" Prussian conceit and self-sufficiency " that " marred the execution 
of a well-laid plan." 

Says Mr. Joseph Reinach (La Guerre sur le Front Occidental, 
1914-15, ch. V. sec. 7) : " Bernhardi has classed the capitals of 



2 6o THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Europe in two categories : those whose capture has a decisive 
importance from the military point of view, like Paris and Vienna, 
and those whose importance is much smaller. To take Paris, what 
glory ! to enter Paris, what a gage ! But the same Bernhardi, 
the master of all the German generals, and before him all the greatest 
captains, all the oracles of the military art, Moltke, Jomini, insist 
that the aim of war must be fixed as high as possible, and this aim 
is the complete ruin of the enemy State by the destruction, the 
putting out of action, of its armies. Only an enemy completely 
disarmed will bow to the will of the conqueror. . . . The opinion 
that prevailed with the German Staff is that to attack Paris before 
having finished with the Allied Armies would be a fault entailing very 
serious consequences. . . . The event does not prove that this 
opinion was mistaken." 

45 This message, first published by Le Matin, February 27, 1918, 
was dispatched by Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador in Berlin, 
on the morning of September 8, to his colleague in Paris, Mr. Myron 
Herrick, who received it late on the same evening. It read as 
follows : " Extremely urgent. September 8. The German 
General Staff recommends that all Americans leave Paris via Rouen 
and Le Havre. They will have to leave soon if they wish to go. — 
Gerard." It is added that the message was sent on the pressing 
wish of the German Staff, and that it was doubled, one copy going 
via Switzerland, and the other via Rome. 

When this document was penned, the struggle had been proceed- 
ing on the Ourcq for two days and a half ; Kluck had withdra^vn 
nearly all his forces from the Marne ; and the British and d'Esperey's 
Armies were advancing rapidly northward. How, in these cir- 
cumstances, could the German General Staff imagine that they 
could arrange " soon " a triumphant entry into Paris ? There is 
one, and only one, fact in the military situation that they could 
build upon. At 5 a.m. on September 8, the right wing of Foch's 
Army had broken down, and was in full retreat toward Fere Cham- 
penoise. If they really accepted this as such a promise of victory 
as to justify the warning to the Americans of Paris, the German 
Staff must have been in an infatuated state of mind. 

It is possible, however, that the message was only a reckless piece 
of propaganda on their part, intended, at a critical moment, to 
awe the neutrals of America, Switzerland, and Italy, and to frighten 
some good Americans out of Paris. In no case can a warning 
conveyed on September 8 countenance the idea that the entry into 
Paris was originally intended to occur before a decisive victory 
had been won. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 261 

46 In the Gaulois, "Une Cause de la Defaite AUemande sur la 
Marne." 

47 M. Reinach states this, adding : ' ' There was, it seems, an ex- 
change of messages between the Staff and Kluck. Finally, theory 
prevailed " [La Guerre, p. 145 ; Commentaires de Polybe, vol. iv. p. 
198). 

According to an article in the Renaissance, September 2, 1916, 
Kluck had previously favoured the advance on Paris, quoting a 
reply of Bliicher to Schwartzenberg in 18 14 : " It is better to go 
to Paris ; when one has Paris, one has France." At a council held 
at German Headquarters after the battle of Guise and St. Quentin, 
says the writer, Kluck went over to the advice of Moltke. 

48 M. Hanotaux {Histoire Illustrce, especially ch. xxxvii., and 
in the Rev. des Deux Mondes, March 191 9) has his own picturesque 
theory of these events, supported by rather frail evidence. It is, 
briefly, that there was an antagonism between Kluck, who wished to 
complete his enveloping movement, and Biilow, who after Guise had 
persuaded the Grand Staff to renounce it in favour of a frontal 
action against the French centre in which he would be the chief 
actor. After Charleroi and after Guise, Biilow had had to call 
Kluck to his aid. They were natural antagonists, the junker and 
the popular soldier. Moltke and the Staff hesitated between them, 
and then decided for Biilow. Biilow was to lead the attack ; 
Kluck was ordered to remain between the Oise and the Marne to 
watch the region of Paris. But he refused to be thus thwarted 
of his victory, and rode impetuously on toward Provins, overrun- 
ning Billow's slower approach. Maunoury's attack caught him in 
flagrante delicto. All this is plausible enough except the statement 
that Kluck was ordered to remain north of the Marne. Had 
he done so, the same result would have been produced two or three 
days sooner. 

M. Hanotaux also states that Marwitz's three cavalry divisions 
had been ordered on September i to carry out a raid to the gates 
of Paris, destroying railways as they went, but that " Kluck had 
other views " {La Manoeuvre de la Marne). 

49 The author of Die Schlachten an der Marne says : " Kluck knew 
there were troops to the left of the British, but did not know their 
exact strength." 

In his book Comment fut sauvt^ Paris, M. P. H. Courriere cites 
the following order issued by General von Schwerin at dawn on 
September 5, and afterwards found on the battlefield : " The IV 
Reserve Corps continues to-day the forward march, and charges 
itself, north of the Marne, with the covering of the north front o 



262 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

Paris ; the IV Cavalry Division will be added to it. The II 
Corps advances by the Grand Morin valley below Coulommiers, and 
directs itself against the east front of Paris." 

50 General von Freytag-Loringhoven says : "It was proved on 
the Marne that the age of armies numbering millions, with their 
improved armament and widely extended fronts, engenders very 
special conditions. . . . The envelopment of the whole host of the 
enemy is a very difficult matter " (Deductions, pp. 79-80). 

51 M. Maurice Barres, Echo de Paris, June i, 1916. But General 
Maunoury had telegraphed at midnight on August 31 to General 
Joffre reporting that Kluck seemed to be leaving the direction of 
Paris. 

52 General Cherfils describes the extent of Gallieni's authority 
as being in a state of " nebulous imprecision." The position 
appears to have been this : The entrenched camp of Paris, under » 
the old regulations, was under the control of the Minister of War, not 
the Generalissimo, who could claim the services of a part of the 
garrison if he left enough men to assure the safety of the city, 
subject to a protest by the Governor, but could not touch its muni- 
tions or supplies. On his appointment as Military Governor of 
Paris (August 26), Gallieni had asked that the garrison, then con- 
sisting of four divisions of Territorials, should be reinforced. The 
6th Army was accordingly placed under his orders. On the same 
day, the entrenched camp was placed, by the Minister, M. Millerand, 
under the superior orders of General Joffre. There was thus a three- 
fold command, Maunoury being under Gallieni, and Gallieni under 
Joffre. 

General Bonnal [Les Conditions de la Guerre Moderne, p. 56) 
says that it was " in virtue of his own initiative, based on the powers 
of the Governor of a place left to its own forces," that Gallieni 
ordered Maunoury, on the morning of September 4, to prepare to 
take the offensive. 

For particulars of Gallieni's communications with General Jofire 
and Sir John French, see the work named, the same author's long 
article in the Renaissance, September 4, 1915, and an article in that 
review on September 2, 191 6. According to the last named, it was 
at 2.50 p.m. on September 4 that the Commander-in-Chief authorised 
the advance of Maunoury's Army ; and Gallieni's orders were that 
it was to bring its front up to Meaux on the next day, and to 
" attack " on the morning of the 6th. 

Gallieni's control over Maunoury's Army ceased when, by the 
development of the battle of the Ourcq, it passed out of the region of 
the entrenched camp of Paris. In August 1915, the old rules on the 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 263 

" Service de Place " were altered to give the French Commander- 
in-Chief absolute authority over fortresses and their governors, 
and full power to dispose of their resources. 

53 "La Bataille de I'Ourcq " ; Paul H. Courriere, in the Renais- 
sance, September i, 19 17. 

54 In his dispatch of September ly, 1914, Sir John French does 
not mention any visit or message from General Galheni, and only 
speaks of receiving General J off re's request to turn about, made 
during their interview on Saturday, September 5. In his volume 
igJ4, he does mention the visit, but attributes to Gallieni the state- 
ment that Maunoury would move east toward the Ourcq " on Sunday 
the 6th." This suggests that the move actually made on the 5th 
was not at the time known at British Headquarters. 

55 Die Schlachten an der Marne (p. 107 of French edition). 

SOME BOOKS ON THE BATTLE 

Chaps. VI .-X. For further details of the actions traced in these 
chapters, see the works of Marshal French, Von Biilow, M. Hanotaux, 
Generals Mallaterre, Canonge, and Palat, M. Victor Giraud, Lord 
Ernest Hamilton, Mr. G. Campbell, and others named above, and 
the following : 

" Guides Michelin pour la visite des Champs de Bataille" (Paris: 
Berger-Levrault. 191 7-1 8). 

Vol. I. L'Ourcq (Meaux-Senlis-Chantilly). 
„ II. Les Marais de Saint Gond (Coulommiers-Provins- 

Sezanne). 
„ III. La Trouie de Revigny {Chal6ns~Vitry-Bar-le-Duc). 
Excellent guides, containing good chronological summaries 
of the fighting on the left, centre, and right, with maps and 
other illustrations. 
La Bataille de la Marne. By Gustave Babin (Paris : Plon. 191 S). 
With 9 plans. One of the first day by day narratives of the 
battle, based on Staff information. 

La Victoire de la Marne. By Louis Madelin, with 2 plans. 
A weU-written sketch by a historian who was on the Staff at 
Verdun (Paris: Plon. 1916). 

Avant-propos Strati giques. By Col. F. Feyler, the well-known 
Swiss mihtary writer (Paris : Payot. 1916). 

Les Campagnes de igi4. By Champaubert (General Malleterre). 
Collections of the French official bulletins published by Payot, 
and reports of the French Devastation Commission by Hachette. 
Les Champs de I'Ourcq. By Jose Roussel-Lepine (Paris: Plon. 



2 64 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

1 919). Especially good in its descriptions of the Ourcq country- 
side. 

La R6le de la Cavalevie Fran^aise a Tails gauche de la premiere 
bataille de la Mame. By J. Hethay (Paris. 191 9). Includes an 
account of the strange raid of the 5th Division, ist Cavalry Corps, 
into Villers-Cotterets Forest and region of La Ferte-Milon, ordered 
by General Bridoux on the morning of September 8. It was driven 
hither and thither for several days, at last escaping in fragments to 
the west ; but it created some little alarm and disturbance on Von 
Kluck's lines of communication. 

Les Marais de Saint Gond. By Charles le Gof&c (Paris: 
Plon. 1916), A standard work on this part of the battle. 

" Mondemont." Article by " Asker," in L' Illustration, July 3, 
191 5. Many valuable articles will be found in the files of this 
weekly journal. 

La Victoire de Lorraine. By A. Bertrand (Paris: Berger- 
Levrault. 1917). 

Morhange et les Marsouins de Lorraine. By R. Christian- 
Froge (Berger-Levrault. 191 7). 

Sous Verdun. By M. Genevois (R. Hachette. 1916). 

Die Schlacht an der Mame. By Major E. Bircher, of the 
Swiss General Stafi. Contains a bibliography of 1 50 works and a 
number of useful maps and plans (Berne : Paul Haupt). 

56 Avec Charles P&guy de la Lorraine a la Mame, by Victor 
Boudon (Paris : Hachette). Peguy, a sort of mystical Tory- 
Socialist, or, as M. Lavisse says, "Catholic-Anarchist," was author- 
editor of Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine. 

57 M. Hanotaux (p. 126) says that GalUeni's order of September 4 
was " an order for deployment, not for the offensive," and he adds 
that the Governor intended that the cavalry should feel the way. 
There is no evidence of cavalry activity on the 5th ; and it is mani- 
fest that the encounter before St. Soupplets was a complete surprise 
for the 6th Army. 

58 Sir John French, in his dispatch, says: "I should conceive it 
to have been about noon on the 6th September, after the British 
Forces had changed their front to the right, and occupied the line 
Jouy le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve le Comte, . . . that the 
enemy realised the powerful threat that was being made against 
the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the great 
retreat which opened the battle." This is a significant mistake. 
We now know that Biilow sent a first warning of an Allied concen- 
tration towards the west on the afternoon of September 5 to Kluck, 
who by then had his own information from the IV Reserve Corps. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 265 

A few hours later Kluck was fully aware of his danger ; and, as he 
has since stated to an interviewer, decided " in five minutes " how 
to meet it. 

Field- Marshal French {igi4, eh. 5), wrongly, I think, considers that 
Kluck "manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy." 

GENERAL BONNAL AND THE BRITISH ARMY 

59 Several French volumes hint the first criticism, and it is ex- 
pressed ver)r definitely by General Bonnal in the article already re- 
ferred to on the battle of the Ourcq in La Renaissance of September 
4, 191 5. The substance of General Bonnal's charge is as follows : 

" Unfortunately, the British Army, rather hesitant after its 
checks at Le Cateau, Landrecies, and Compiegne, lost time in dis- 
placements dictated by prudence, and did not give the 6th Army 
in time all the help desirable." Maunoury had asked for it at noon 
on Sept. 4 ; and the Generalissimo's directions of that night antici- 
pated the British being at Coulommiers and Changis on the evening 
of the sth. But, on the afternoon of the 4th, the head of Sir John 
French's Staff had announced to Gallieni for that night " an order 
of movement the result of which was to distance the British Army 
at once from the 6th and the sth Armies." (If this movement 
was not the further retirement asked for by General J off re, we do 
not know what is meant.) " Marshal French occupied during the 
5th positions north and south of Rozoy, facing east. But this dis- 
position placed the British Army much to the rear, to the west, of 
the line first fixed, and permitted the German II Corps, reported 
in the morning at Coulommiers, to repass the Marne and escape 
to the north-west. Fearing its appearance on the Ourcq, General 
GalUeni wrote on the 6th to Marshal French praying him at once 
to advance in accordance with the orders of General Joffre. On 
his side, the latter telegraphed to General Maunoury, on 
the 6th, asking him constantly to support the British left. In 
consequence, the chief of the 6th Army sent to Meaux the same 
evening the Sth Division (4th Corps), which had just detrained at 
Paris." (This division actually came in on the morning of the 6th.) 
" If the presence of the Sth Division on his left did not determine 
Marshal French immediately to take the offensive " (what this 
means we do not know, for the British offensive had commenced 
on the morning of the 6th), " it was because at this moment he 
was much concerned as to the pretty considerable interval between 
his right and the left of the 5 th Army. Yet this interval was 
watched by the Cavalry Corps of General Conneau." 



266 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

" On the evening of the 6th, the British Army reached the line 
of the Grand Morin, in contact on its right with the 5 th Army. 
Unfortunately this contact was so close that the British Army 
thought it necessary to march level with and on the same lines as 
the 5 th, which had great difficulty in assuring its route, having to 
drive before it four corps of Von Billow's Army." 

General Bonnal concludes his criticism with a not very amiable 
homily on the insufficient training of the old British Army, and 
the inadequacy of its Staff work. Generals not trained as in France 
and Germany had, he says, a tendency " to practise the linear 
order," to move their troops in deployed formation, supporting 
their flanks on neighbouring bodies, and taking a thousand pre- 
cautions that lead to delay. That is why " the British Army, com- 
posed of of&cers and men full of strength, vigour, and energy, took 
more than two days to cover the 20 kilometres between the Grand 
Morin and the Marne, when, on the 6th, they ought to have marched 
on the nearest enemy." 

For similar comments, see " La Bataille de la Marne, Recit 
Succinct," by General Canonge {Le Correspondant, September 25 and 
October 10, 191 7), with details of the battle. 

One sentence of M. Hanotaux is more to the point than all these 
criticisms and suppositions : " No doubt, if the encounter had not 
been produced, a little prematurely perhaps, in the region of St. 
Soupplets-Penchard, at noon on the 5 th, the whole army of Von 
Kluck would have been south of the Marne in the evening ; while 
Maunoury would have taken it in reverse on the north bank, Kluck 
would then have been closed in " {Histoire, ch. 38, p. 184). 

An interesting attempt to justify Gallieni against Joffre, and to 
challenge the latter's strategy at this time, will be found in La Genise 
de la Bataille de la Marne, by General H. Le Gros (Paris : Payot). 
He quotes Joffre as complaining to the Government (on Sept. 4) 
that Gallieni was seeking to "push him into a premature 
offensive." 



SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH 

60 Four days later, in the village inn at Pezarches, Madame, an 
upstanding woman of about thirty, told me of the following 
incident : 

" On Sunday morning my mother had gone to church, and I 
remained at home with my father and my little boy. My father 
left us to get some tobacco. Going out for a moment with the 
child, I saw a group of horsemen in the street, and said to myself : 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 267 

' We are saved. It is the Belgians ! ' When I returned, to my 
surprise, they were in the house, sitting in my room and in the cafe. 
An officer asked me to cook him a couple of eggs. I noticed that 
one of the men was wounded, and asked whether it was painful. 
He nodded, and I went to the kitchen. There I saw, on the window- 
sill, a spiked helmet. I nearly fainted ! So they were Germans ! 
I managed to take in the eggs. Then the officer asked me, very 
politely, to show him my left hand, and, pointing to the wedding- 
ring, said : ' You are married ? ' ' Yes,' I rephed, trembhng. 
' Your husband is a soldier ? ' ' Yes.' ' You have a child ? ' 
' No, I have no children,' I said. ' But I saw him. You are hiding 
him because you have heard that the Germans cut off the hands of 
French children. That is false. We never hurt women or children. 
Bring your little boy.' But, as I persisted that it was not my child, 
he said no more. He and the others paid in German money for 
what they had, and left. A quarter of an hour later the firing 
began." 

61 igi4, ch. 4. 

62 Le Petit Journal, September 9, 191 7. 

63 In Courtacon, I found eighteen of the two dozen small brick 
houses completely destroyed by fire, after having been sacked. 
The pretext given was that villagers had betrayed the German 
troops — part of the Guard Cavalry Division — to the Allies. The 
single room of the village school presented an unforgettable ex- 
hibition of malice. Dirty straw, remnants of meals, torn books, 
and broken cartridge cases littered the floor. Piles of half-burnt 
straw showed that a hurried attempt had been made to destroy the 
building ; there were two such piles under the bookcase and the 
tiny school museum, which consisted of a few bottles of metal and 
chemical specimens. Amid this filthy chaos, the low forms, the 
master's desk, and wall-charts inculcating " temperance, kindness, 
justice, and truth," stood as they had done on the day before the 
summer holidays. As I turned to leave, I saw, written across 
the blackboard in bold, fine writing, evidently as the lesson of that 
day, the words : " A chaque jour suffit sa peine " — " Sufficient unto 
the day is the evil thereof," as our English version has it. Under 
this motto, all unconscious of it, these brutes had slept and 
wakened to their incendiary work — men of a nation that boasted 
itself the pioneer in Europe of elementary schoohng. Could any 
recording angel have conceived a more biting irony ? 

64 M. Madelin says that 7000 German corpses were found. The 
figure may be doubted. 

65 Le Goffic, Les Marais de St. Gond. 



268 THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 

66 A u Centre de la Bataille de la Marne, by the Abbe Neret, Cure 
of Vertus, who gives the hours named. 

67 I rely upon the article by M. le Goffic, " La Defense du Mont 
Aout," in La Liberie, September 7, 1918, embodying the narrative 
of an eye-witness, who mentions the following curious details : 
" A black cow, maddened by the bombardment, charged the 
trenches, leaped aside when a shell burst, sniffed the smoke, and 
stamped in the shell-holes. Slowly, a shepherd, a big, careless 
ruffian, climbed the slope with his five white sheep. For a moment 
he stopped level with us, 500 yards to the right. As though by 
accident, his five sheep were on his left, on our side ; and immediately 
shells began to arrive in fours, the range lengthening each time by 
a hundred j'-ards. But we were not in range." This perhaps 
rather imaginative correspondent thinks that the Germans mis- 
took dead for living Frenchmen on the slopes of Mont Aout, and 
that that is why they did not seek to occupy it. 

THE MYTH OF THE 43ND DIVISION 

68 General Canonge, in liis historical sketch, confirms my own 
inquiries. The embryo of the myth is to be found in the " Official 
Resume," published on June 8, 191 5, in the Bulletin des Amices, 
according to which, on the evening of September 9, Foch's Army, 
" moving from west to east toward Fere Champenoise, took in 
flank the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Corps which were attack- 
ing south-east of this locality. This audacious manceuvre decided 
the success." This was presently elaborated, with various romantic 
decorations. 

69 Canonge, after two inquiries on the spot, and with written 
evidence in addition, says that the 42nd Division left Broyes 
between 2 and 3 p.m., reached Linthelles about 5 p.m., stopped 
there, and then bivouacked in the zone Linthes-Linthelles-Ognes- 
Pleurs, passing the night there " in general reserve," and moving 
away only about 5 a.m. on September 10. Fere Champenoise, he 
adds, was evacuated by the Germans, after an orgie of 24 hours, 
at about 5.30 p.m. on the 9th, but was traversed during the greater 
part of the night by German troops coming from Connantre and 
Gourgancon. Connage thinks that, " on sight of the troops of the 
42nd Division, those of General Dubois, certain now of support, 
advanced, and the Division then stopped and turned back to night- 
quarters." Biilow, he believes, had ordered his retreat at 3.30 p.m. 
The first French detachment entered Fere Champdnoise at 7 a.m. 
next day. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 269 

70 Giraud {Histoire, p. 166) gives a rather different report of this 
dialogue. I rely upon an article in L' Illustration of Jan. 9, 191 5, 
containing a long passage from the diary of "an officer who was 
the soul of the defence " — doubtless, Captain Heym himself. 

71 Colonel Feyler's Avant-Propos Strategiques (Paris: Payot. 
191 5) are particularly valuable for a pitiless analysis of the " moral 
manoeuvre " represented in early German accounts of the first part 
of the campaign. 

72 Major-General Maurice says: " I am convinced that history 
will decide that it was the crossing of the Marne in the early hours 
of the 9th by the British Army which turned the scale against 
Kluck and saved Maunoury at a time of crisis. . . . That an army 
which on August 23 had been all but surrounded by an enemy who 
outnumbered it by two to one should have fought its way out, re- 
treated 170 miles, and then immediately turned about and taken a 
decisive part in the battle which changed the course of the campaign 
of 1914, is as wonderful an achievement as is to be found in the 
history of war" {Forty Days, pp. 183-4). 

73 Hanotaux, Histoire Illustree, vol. vii. pp. 132-8. 

74 Idem, pp. 172-5. 

75 Foch, Des Principes de la Guerre. 

76 M. Hanotaux (p. 76) regards this last part of the plan as " pure 
folly," as " a few thousand resolute men holding the defiles, crests, 
and cliffs would break whole armies before Nancy was attained." 
This appears to be an exaggeration ; but it is highly probable that 
before Nancy, as before Mons and on other occasions at the be- 
ginning of the war, the German Armies lost, through the traditional 
beUef in envelopment, what they might have gained by concentra- 
tion on the central attack. 

77 " ChosesVues a Metz,"i?eyMei/e5(iowa(ifliVe, December 18, 1915. 
Colonel Feyler quotes from the Lokal Anzeiger of Berlin the fol- 
lowing commentary on one of the Kaiser's earlier appearances at 
the Front : " The presence of the Emperor demonstrates clearly 
what a development events have taken. . . . The Emperor would 
never have gone into France if those responsible had envisaged 
the possibility of the German Army being thrown back beyond 
the frontier. His presence among his troops in enemy country will 
not fail to produce a deep impression in Germany as well as abroad." 

78 Quoted in Un Village Lorrain en AoM-Septembre 1914. 
Rim'reville, by C. Berlet. 

79 Lt.-Col. Thomasson, Le Revers, introduction. 

80 Professor Friedrich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, December 31, 1916. 



INDEX 



Air Forces, German and 
Allied, 1 8, 27, 126, 140, 141, 
167, 241-2 

Aisne, German stand on the, 
187-8, 192-3 

Alsace, French advance and 
withdrawal in, 2, 29, 56, 212 

Amade, General d', 28, 35, 65, 
66, 72 

Americans urged to leave Paris, 
82, 260 

Amiens occupied by Von Kluck, 
72, 80 

Antwerp, 40, 44, 88, 105 

Ardennes, Belgian, French of- 
fensive into, 24, 31-3, 36 

Armaments, German and Allied 
compared, 14, 215 

Artillery, German and French, 
17, 18, 215; at Namur and 
Maubeuge, 40, 257 ; in the 
battle of the Marne, 104, 126, 
128, 146, 180, 201, 210 



Battlefield described, 106-9, 

1 1 3-4, 143-4, 170-1. 203-7 
Bavarian Corps, Prince Ruprecht 

and, 30, 56, 61-3, 87, 197- 

213 
Belgium, the surprise in, 12-13, 

21,26-7, 34, 36, 38,41,45,49, 

54. 215, 247-51 
Belgium's contribution, 15, 27, 

32, 37-41,43-4 
Berthaut, General, defends the 

French Staff, 245-6 
Bloch, Jean de, forecasts of, 19, 

242-4 
Briey coalfield, 33, 248, 249 



British Expeditionary Force, 
34-44, 65-9, 80-1, 99, 118- 
26 ; advance to the Mame 
begun, 123 ; the Marne 
crossed, 131, 140-1 ; a deter- 
mining factor, 185, 188-9, 
224-5 ; M. Hanotaux' criti- 
cisms, 253-5, 259; General 
Bonnal's criticism, 265-6 

Billow, General von, 32, 36-43, 
66, 68-9, 81, 85, 100; com- 
promised by Von Kluck' s 
retreat, 129, 134, 135-7 '• 
attack upon the French 
centre, 135, 142, 146-64; dis- 
order and retreat, 165-8, 
190-3 

Castelnau, General de, 27, 29-31, 

62-3, 71, 104, 197-213, 248 
Gateau, Le, battle of, i, 65-6, 

68 
Cavalry, role of the, 16, 27, 66, 

6y, 104, 125, 134, 192-3, 264 
Chilons reoccupied, 193 
Charleroi, battle of, 37-43 
Charmes, Gap of, defence of, 31, 

56, 61-3 
Chateau-Thierry reoccupied, 141 
Command, unity of, 25, 40, 216 
Concentration, first French, and 

re-grouping, 27-8, 251 
Coulommiers occupied by the 

British, 124 
Couronne, Grand, of Nancy, 

defence of, 63, 199, 205-12, 

228-9, 269 
Crown Prince, the Imperial, 

32-3, 63-4, 70-1, 89, 103, 

169-72, 178-82, 195 



272 



THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 



Dubail, General, 27, 29, 30-1, 
62-3, 104, 197-8, 200, 203 

Eastern defences, French, 12, 
31, 44, 56, 61-4, 89-90, 170, 
197, 229 

Emperor, the German, 84, 205, 
209, 269 

Esperey, General Franchet d', 
2,y, 40-1, 100, 122 ; advance 
to the Marne begun, 137 ; 
Marne crossed, 141-2 ; helps 
Foch, 139, 142, 156; a 
determining factor in the 
victory, 189-91 ; on the 
Aisne, 193 

Fere-Charapdnoise lost, 157; re- 
occupied, 167 

Foch, General, his teaching, 22, 
24, 50, 160, 202; at head of 
20th Corps, 30, 62 ; of 9th 
Army, 61, 69-70, lOi, 138 ; 
battle of St. Gond, 142-54 ; 
the centre broken, 155-64; 
projected manoeuvre and 
German retreat, 161-2, 165-8, 
190, 193, 268 

Forces, German and Allied, 
compared, 15-16, 30, 32-3, 
41, 65 ; on eve of the battle 
of the Marne, 97-105, 137, 
144-5, 169, 171-2, 176, 177-8, 
198-201, 215-6, 240-1, 255 

Fortifications, modem, function 
of, 21, 229, 245 

French, Sir John, 18, 32, 35, 36, 
39-43, 66-7, 69, 72, 73 ; 
communications with Gallieni 
and Joffre, 93-4, 12 1-3 ; 
battle order, iii ; farthest 
south, 119, 121 ; the pursuit, 
188 ; criticisms of, 253-6, 
258, 265-6 

Gallieni, General, 47, 49, 77-9, 
81, 83, 90, 133 ; order to 6th 
Army on September 4, 92-3 ; 
communications with Joffre 
and French, 93-4 ; battle 
of the Ourcq; his precipi- 



tancy, 1 16-7, 12 1-3, 134, 
224 ; Generals Cherfils and 
Bonnal on, 262 

Gaps in German and Allied 
lines, 69, 85, III, 136-7 , 145, 
166, 189, 192-3, 225-6 

Generals removed, French, 20, 
49, 52, 245 ; German, 83, 

233 
Gond, St., marshes of, 143 et 

seq., 191, 226 
Guise, battle of, 68-9 

Haig, General Sir D., 37, 64, 66, 

99. i4i> 193 
Hanotaux, M., controverted, 

41-3, 252-5 
Hansen, General von, and the 

Saxon Corps, 32-3, 35, 38-41, 

69, 71, loi, 135, 145, 155-9, 

165-6, 171, 172, 17s, 191, 193 
Heeringen, General von, 30, 

61-3, 192, 197, 199, 200, 

203-4 
Humbert, General, at Monde- 

mont, 149, 152-4, 

Italian Frontier, 15, 25, 28 

Joffre, General, moves 5th 
Army and B.E.F. to Sambre 
(August 16), 35-6, 42 ; 
" most unexpected " news, 
41 ; career and character, 
46-53 ; second new plan of 
campaign, 54-61 ; tactical 
lessons, 58 ; watches eastern 
frontier, 62, 64, 197 ; forms 
6th Army, 65 ; helps the 
B.E.F., 65-8 ; forms 9th 
Army, 70 ; extends the re- 
treat, 73-5 ; orders for 
general offensive, 74-5, 93-7, 
III, 121 ; M. Millerand on, 
77 ; gains and superiority of 
forces, 104-5 ', 3-iiti GalUeni's 
precipitancy, 116, 119, 12 1-3 ; 
and the decisive movement 
between Kluck and Biilow, 
135, 189 ; on the victory, 
195-6 ; the author of the 



INDEX 



273 



victory, 218-29, 233 ; before 
Commission of Inquiry, 249 ; 
General Lanrezac on, 256; 
M. Messimy on, 257 

Kitchener, Lord, and Field- 
Marshal French, 69, 258, 259 

Kluck, General von, 32, 38-44, 
66-9, 72-3, 79 et seq., 97 ; 
withdraws Corps across 
Marne against MaunourjT-, 118, 
122-4; his farthest south 
positions, 11 9- 120; results 
of retreat, 135-7, 141, 185 ; 
reaches the Aisne, 187 ; his 
two fatal movements, 220-2 ; 
Kluck and Biilow, 261 

Landwehr and Ersatz employed 

on front, 15-16, 128, 199 
Langle de Cary, General de, 28, 

32-3, 48, 70, 102, 169-75, 193 
Lanrezac, General, 27, 32, 35-43, 

49, 67-8, 250, 255-6, 258 
Launois, battle of, 70 
Lille, fortress of, 34, 249, 252 
Longwy, siege of, 33-4, 44 
Lorraine, first French offensive 

in, 29-31 

Machine guns, 18, 58, 115, 117, 

253 
Maud'huy, General, 30, 100, 138, 

140. 193 
Mangin, General, 37, 100, 138 
Maps, German, evidence of the, 

240 
Maubeuge, 34, 44, 87, 105, 252, 

256-7 
Maunoury, General, 32, 63-5, 

72-3, 77, 80-1, 8s, 93, 97, 

116, 122, 124, 126-30, 132-4, 

184-8, 248 
Michel, General, and the French 

Staff, 47, 49, 248 
Mondemont, 143-4, 148-54 
Mons, battle of, 37-43, 253-6 
Montmirail reoccupied, 140 
Morhange-Sarrebourg, battle of, 

30-1 



Namur, siege and fall of, 27, 38, 

40 
Nancy bombarded, 2 1 1 
Nivelle, Colonel, 127 

Offences, German, against rules 
of war, 80, 117, 124, 192, 
194-5, 211, 212-3, 267 

Offensive, French doctrine of 
the, 21-24, 58, 201-2, 216, 
218, 245-7, 251 

— from the Somme-Laon- 
Craonne, proposed, 58-60, 65, 

71 
Ourcq, battle of the, 114-8, 126- 
35, 184-7 

Paris, the defence of, 55, 73, 
76-9, 259-60 ; the German 
dilemma, 82-8, 109, 221 
Pau, General, 29, 47, 48, iq8, 

248 
Percin, General, 248, 252 
Pefcain, General, 100, 138 
Plans of campaign: the Ger- 
man, 10-14; disturbed after 
Guise, 68-9 ; the dilemma of 
Paris-Verdun, 84-91, 109-10, 
214 et seq. ; 239-40 ; the 
French, 28-9, 31, 36, 49-50, 
54-61, 73-5, 88-9, 105, no, 
216 et seq. 
Proyart, action at, 68 

Railways, efficiency of French, 

15, 57. 241 

Reserves, German and Allied, 

16, 21, 198-9, 245 

Retreat, the long, scenes on, 1-9, 
72-3, 78, 237-8 ; necessity of, 
54-5 ; advantages of, 57 ; 
prolonged, 72-4 ; end of, 81, 
109, 119; general German, 
ordered September 9, 185 

Revigny lost, 179 ; recovered, 
194 

Rheims reoccupied and bom- 
barded, 192 

Russian victories, influence of, 
44. 75. 87 



274 



THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 



Sambre, German victory on the, 

36-43 
Sarrail, General, 48, 89, 103, 

169-72, 175-82, 19s 
Sermaize, destruction of, 194 
Smith-Dorrien, General, 38, 64, 

66, 99, 141 



Taxi-cabs and the battle of the 

Ourcq, 1 30-1 
Toul, German advance toward, 

208 
Trenches: German superiority, 

18, 31. 33> 35, 58, 114, 217, 



253 ; Field-Marshal French 
on, 18, 244 ; Castelnau's 
defences, 201-2 
Troyon, Fort, defence of, 180-3 

Verdun, 32, 56, 71, 74, 89, 108, 

169-71, 176-82, 19s, 221 
Vosges, fighting in the, 203-4 

War Council, French Higher, 

47-51 
" Wireless," German, picked up, 

134 
Wurtemberg, Duke Albrecht of, 
32, 70, 102, 169-75, 193 



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